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THE LOVE OF PERSONS
CHAPTER I
IHTRODDCTIOH
Any attempt to characterize, describe, or define love runs into 
difficulties. There are a bewildering variety of phenomena that can 
be— and have been— classified as love. The mother's doting attention 
to her child, the young couple's amorous interludes, the saint's 
fervent dedication to God are all considered examples of love. Given 
this diversity of experiences, it is not surprising that opinions 
about what love is vary. Love has been called a feeling, an emotion, 
an attraction, a desire, and even a judgment. And there is an equally 
diverse range of things that can lay claim to being the object of one 
love or another. God and the gods, man and animals, nature and the 
land, justice and freedom are among the things that have been claimed 
to be loved. Trying to find order among the phenomena, theories, and 
objects might well be a hopeless task, for there is no guarantee that 
all these have a common thread. There might not be a unifying theme 
to all loves, and even if some order were found, demonstrating the 
correctness of this order would be no small task. Hence, rather than 
take on the formidable job of describing any love whatsoever, I have 
chosen to examine one important area of love— adult
interpersonal love.
There are reasons for choosing to examine adult interpersonal 
love other than the practical requirement for a clearly circumscribed 
and limited focus to an inquiry. After all, being practical demands 
only that some well defined area or other be chosen. One very good 
reason for choosing adult interpersonal love is that, to my knowledge, 
adult interpersonal love is one of only two kinds of love consistently 
studied in philosophy. The other kind is the love of God. However 
troublesome studies of love in general or even just interpersonal love 
may be, an examination of man's love for God presents special 
difficulties. The first difficulty is that the object of the love may 
not e x i s t .  It is then rather difficult to inquire into the nature of 
the beloved and the justifications for loving Him. And even if He 
does exist, since there is no consensus on his attributes, an 
examination of the nature of the beloved would require taking some 
p o s i t i o n  or o t h e r  w i t h  regard to his attributes. Since a 
justification of a love depends in part on the nature of the beloved, 
it follows that any justification of the love of God based on a 
specific set of attributes could be rejected out of hand by anyone who 
rejects that set of attributes. An examination of the love of God, 
then, would seem to require both a proof of God's existence and a 
demonstration of his attributes, two tasks that would range far afield 
of the examination of love.
Just as important as these two very practical reasons for not 
exploring the love of God, is the primacy of man's love for man. If I 
were to attempt a description of man's love for God, it would be in
very human terms. St. Theresa's descriptions of her loving 
experiences with God are excruciatingly human and sexual. In all 
likelihood she experienced her love for God within the bounds of human 
concepts and feelings, and even if she did not, she felt compelled to 
express that love in terms of human love. I am not here claiming that 
man's love of God is some sort of psycho-social derivation from a 
man's love for father or mother, the idolization of father (mother) 
writ large. It is just that any description of a man's experience of 
loving God 1 have heard has been in language that any romantic lover 
would understand. Man's love for God may not be_ a fantasy founded on 
man's love for man, but the language used to describe the love of God 
is the language of romantic love. Perhaps with a feeble effort, but 
the best one we can manage, we point to our love of God by pointing to 
our love of man and saying, "See, something like this." I believe 
that this is the case. Whether God exists, whatever attributes he may 
have, whether we can actually love him, and regardless of the genesis 
of the love for him, we speak of that love in the language of the 
romantic lover. If we are to understand the love of God, we must 
understand the love of man. We explain our love of God analogically. 
To understand the love of God at all requires first understanding the 
foundation of the analogy— the love of man. and hence, the love of 
man will be the focus of this study.
There are several questions anyone who was curious about 
interpersonal love in general would ask. The first and most obvious 
set of questions begins with "What is love?" Is it a feeling? Or a 
desire? What is the nature of love? The second set can be asked of a
love in general, but I will phrase them for an interpersonal love. 
What is it that we love about whom we love? Do I love you because 
you're witty? Or for your long blonde hair? What is it exactly about, 
you that I love? Since I am concerned with interpersonal love, the 
object is loved is another person. But to say this is uninformative. 
What is it about the beloved that justifies my loving her? The 
question about who is loved becomes a question about what it is about 
the beloved that justifies loving her. Finally, we can ask about the 
relationship between the love and the desires and actions attending 
it. What kinds of desires are to be associated witb love? What is 
their relationship to love? How are the lover's actions related to 
his desires and his love? If these various questions are adequately 
answered, then a reasonably clear picture ci love should emerge. In 
fact, posing these questions and pursuing an answer to them will 
constitute the method of this inquiry. The questions must be answered 
if an adequate account of love is to be given. In addition, by 
pursuing various possible answers to the questions, the focus of the 
inquiry will remain on the phenomenon of love.
To answer these questions I will consider the positions of four 
philosophers, Plato, Scheler, Sartre, and Gabriel Taylor. Each as 
made a significant contribution to the philosophy of love. Plato's 
position on love will be used as the point of departure. His 
description of love is vivid and (I believe) accurate, for the most 
part, and his analysis is provocative. It is also well over two 
thousand years old. The fact that this ancient account accords well 
with modern descriptions means that an examination of it can provide
an initial look at most of the issues raised by the questions about 
love. His position, however, only hints at the nature of love. It 
also gives an unacceptable explanation of what it is about whom we 
love that prompts us to love him/her. For a more detailed exploration 
of the nature of love I will turn to Max Scheler. His account of love 
is sufficient for me to develop an answer to the question, "What is 
love?" Who is loved and why, is not so carefully examined by Scheler, 
and so I will use Jean-Paul Sartre's analysis of persons and love to 
develop an answer to the question what is it about the beloved that 
prompts us to love him. After adapting Sartre's account of persons to 
this purpose, I will use this modified account to provide answers to 
questions about the relationship of desire and action to love. 
Finally, I will examine Gabriel Taylor's account of love and test, 
against this late twentieth centry account of love, the veracity and 
explanatory power of the theory I have developed
The earliest comprehensive view of love is Plato's. He gives 
slightly different descriptions in the Symposium and Phaedrus. I have
chosen to review his position in the Phaedrus. since his description
in the Svmposium is more in the service of his metaphysics than of 
love. Even in the Phaerdus this very human phenomenon of love is used 
to support his metaphysics. Plato claims that true love is a love of 
the Beautiful as exemplified in individuals and describes the path a 
lover takes, through his love of a person, to philosophy— a love of
truth and beauty. I do not wish to dispute the broad claim that
interpersonal love can lead to a philosophical life, but, if we are to 
count as love romantic loves, love does not necessarily lead to a
philosophical life. To the extent that Plato believes that true love 
will lead to the philosophical life, he can be accused of wishful 
thinking. And opportunism. He deftly describes the lover in the 
first throes of love— a more accurate and poetic description probably 
cannot be had— but then goes on to claim that this love is the 
starting point in the style of life he endorses and recommends. We 
cannot condemn Plato for trying to convince us that earthly love is 
consistent with, indeed the beginnings of, a nobler end. And yet to 
the extent he makes his description of love fit his metaphysical view, 
he has abused the phenomenon. He is not satisfied with an analysis of 
love; he must make it the means to some greater end.
My point is to analyze the phenomena and give as accurate a 
description as possible without regard to what else might be 
(metaphysically) the case. Plato's basic description of love serves 
this purpose; his attempt to tie love to his metaphysical theory does 
not. Part of the project, then, will be to separate the description 
of the phenomenon from his metaphysics. Plato's primary goal is the 
defense of his metaphysics, and love is marshalled to this defense. 
Scheler, too, uses love to support his metaphysics. He claims that 
there is an objective hierarchy of values existing in the world 
independent of man and that we can perceive these values as we can see 
trees and hear symphonies. My position with regard to Scheler is much 
the same as with Plato. His metaphysical position about values may or 
may not be defensible, but the defensibility of his metaphysics is not 
important to my purpose. What is important are his ideas about love. 
Insofar as they can stand independent of his metaphysical ideas, I
will be able to use them to develop an answer to the question about 
the nature of love.
With regard to Sartre my position is slightly different. To 
answer the question about what it is about the beloved that we lOve, a 
theory of persons is necessary. Sartre's position does provide a 
theory of persons and the relationships among them, but he claims that 
all relationships are doomed to failure. Obviously, Sartre's theory, 
as he presents it, is antithetical to a theory of constructive, 
positive interpersonal interactions. Nonetheless, there seems to be 
more than a measure of truth in it. I will criticize his view and 
reformulate it so that it 1) conforms more to what I believe persons 
and the relationships between them are and 2) can provide some answers 
to questions about love. My reformulated Sartrian position will be 
able to answer the questions "What is it about the beloved that is 
loved," "What desires and actions are associated with love," and "What 
is the relation of these desires and actions to love and to one 
another."
I will treat Taylor as an adversary; she claims to give an 
account of love, an account that differs significantly from mine. The 
point will be to demonstrate that her theory does not adequately or 
coherently account for the phenomenon of love and that mine does. She 
attempts to analyze love as an emotion and in terms of the beliefs 
that justify emotions. When I address her article I will have already 
shown that love is not an emotion and that it is not justified on the 
kinds of beliefs that she claims it is. Sut rather than simply 
restating my arguments, I will address her on her own terms and show
some considerable flaws in her project.
E a c h  of the p h i l o s o p h e r s  I consider has philosophical 
commmitments that interfere with his analysis of love. Plato claims 
that there is a metaphysical something called Beauty and that the 
praiseworthy life is in contemplation of that Beauty. Scheler claims 
that there is a objective heirarchy of values apart from man's 
recognition of them. Sartre is committed to a view of consciousness 
that makes interpersonal relationships invariably tragic. And Taylor 
is committed, not so much to a metaphysical position, as a method of 
analysis in terms of beliefs. I claim that an accurate account of 
love eludes each of them because of their other commitments. So, 
along with giving an accurate account of love, I should have, in the 
end, demonstrated that these various commitments are excess baggage 
and a hindrance to a clear understanding of love.
For the most part I will not consider the relationship of sex and 
love. The notable exception is the discussion of Plato. Plato's 
account explicitly considers the role of sex in love and so I will 
take up the subject briefly. Elsewhere I will consider sex as one of 
the possible desires a lover may have. Taylor, from what I can tell, 
puts sex under the rubric "wanting to be with the beloved." And 
indeed, sexual desires are wanting to be with the beloved in a very 
particular way. Since sexual desires can be placed under the more 
general category of "wanting to be with", I see no particular reason 
for giving them special treatment. There is no denying that sexual 
desires play an important role in our lives and in our loves. Yet 
sexual desires are clearly different from love. I may love— as a
brother perhaps— with no significant sexual desires. And I may 
sexually desire someone without the vaguest inclination to love her. 
Since sexual desires are distinct from love and since a category of 
desires under which sexual desires fall will be considered, there is 
no pressing reason to give special consideration to an additional 
topic in an already massive area of discussion.
There are two conventions I will observe that bear mentioning. 
First, I will routinely use "the beloved" as the object of the lover's 
love. At times this may seem stiff or archaic, but the phrase has the 
advantage of being brief, quite an advantage in a phrase that will be 
so often needed. Other phrases, of course, will be used for the 
beloved. They are the result of using a particular philosopher's 
vernacular. There should be no problem identifying synonyms for "the 
beloved." Also, except for the discussion of Plato, I will us "him" 
and "her" indifferently to refer to the lover and the beloved. 
Plato's love is always by a man of a man and so I will use masculine 
pronouns when discussing his theory. Otherwise, it is unimportant who 
is loving whom. A man may love a man or woman and a woman may love a 
woman or a man. Hence, I will use masculine and feminine pronouns as 
the mood strikes. Nothing more is intended than some person or 
another, but the pronouns for persons have gender and so will indicate 
the sex of this hypothetical person. Sex, and sexuality, and gender 
are not specifically at issue here. What is important is the 
development of an accurate theory of love with as few metaphysical 
commitments as possible.
CHAPTER II
PLATO'S ACCOUNT OF LOVE
2.1 Exposition
Not all of Plato's Phaedrus  ^ is dedicated to a discussion of 
love, but the portion that is is fertile territory. Plato divides the 
discussion into three speeches. The first is given by Phaedrus but
supposedly written by Lysias. The second is by Socrates and is an 
attempt to better Lysias at his own game. Both of these speeches 
counsel the prospective young lover that it is better not to bestow 
his favors on a suitor. In different respects both Lysias and 
Socrates, in his first speech, claim that the lover is a madman not to 
be trusted with anything as important as one's well-being. The third 
speech is again by Socrates but this time he recants his position that 
a young man ought not take a lover. A seemingly contrite Socrates now 
offers a paean to love to pacify the gods and ease his conscience. In 
his second speech, Socrates grants that the lover is mad but claims 
that this is a divinely inspired madness. To defend his claim that 
there are beneficial madnesses and that not all forms of madness are 
evil and destructive Socrates cites examples. The first is the 
madness like that of the prophetesses at Delphi. The second is the 
type of madness that occurs in cursed families. This madness
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presumably shows the way to relief from the curse. And third is the 
madness of the poets. These examples may not convince us that there 
are beneficial madnesses, probably because we would not consider them 
true madnesses, but they might well have convinced Socrates' 
contemporaries. However convincing the examples may be, Socractes 
then launches his demonstration that love is yet one more beneficial 
form of madness.
To provide this demonstration he first proves that the soul is 
immortal and that the soul is the first principle of motion. He 
argues in a familiar vein: there are things which are moved; either 
they are moved by themselves or by something else; if they are moved 
by something else, that something is either self-moved or moved by 
another and so on until the causal chain is traced to that v/nich moves 
itself--the first principle of motion. This first principle Socrates 
calls all soul. Since Socrates apparently excludes the creation of 
motion ex nihilo. the all soul, by its nature, must perpetually create 
itself without beginning or end. Socrates argues that individual 
souls are similar to the all soul since "the essence and definition of 
soul [is] self-motion." (245e) Clearly we move ourselves and are not 
moved by external causes hence that which animates us has the quality 
of being self-moved and therefore is immortal.
Whatever the strengths and weakness of this argument, Socrates 
uses this proof of the immortality of the soul as the starting point 
for his myth about the cycle of life of the soul. Socrates does not 
return to the argument and somewhat peremptorily ends the topic with 
"As to the immortality of the soul then we have said enough...." (246)
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His interest in the immortality of the soul in the dialogue is merely 
to establish that the soul does have this quality so that he may place 
the soul in the midst of the epic of the immortal gods.
Retreating from argument to metaphor, Socrates describes the
nature of the soul.
"Let it be likened to the union of powers in a team of 
winged steeds and their winged charioteer. Now all the 
gods' steeds and all their charioteers are good, and of 
good stock, but with the other beings it is not wholly so.
With us men, in the first place, it is a pair of steeds 
that the charioteer controls; moreover one of them is 
noble and good, and of good stock, while the other has the 
opposite character, and his stock is opposite. Hence the 
task of our charioteer is difficult and troublemsome."
(246a,b)
When a soul loses its wings it falls to earth and fastens onto 
something solid. This composite of soul and matter is the mortal 
human being.
That the soul has wings is of special interest since Socrates 
says that "more than any other bodily part it shares in the divine 
nature, which is fair, wise and good, and possessed of all other such 
excellences." (246e) The gods' wings allow them to traverse their 
heavenly domains. At the times of feast and banquets their 
strong-winged and easily guided horses allow them to climb to the 
summit of the heavens. The climb is worth the effort; there is a 
great reward for "It is there that true being dwells, without color or 
shape, that cannot be touched; reason alone, the soul's pilot, can 
behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge thereof." (247c) The 
culmination of the journey is a vision of true being in all its 
aspects: "justice, its very self, and likewise temperance, and
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knowledge, not the knowledge that is neighbor to becoming and varies 
with the various objects to which we commonly ascribe being, but the 
veritable knowledge of being that veritably is." ( 247 d , e) On true 
being the gods feast, it being their proper food. When they have 
feasted and had their fill they return home and tend their steeds. 
Such is the life of the gods. Their wings are strong as are their 
horses. On those wings they ascend to the pinnacle of heaven to feast 
on true being. With their wings strong they return home contented. 
Man's lot is not so easy.
The gods ride orderly to the summit, but human souls with their 
unmatched, hard-to-control, steeds travel riotously behind. Through 
the chaotic scramble, only those souls who have attended the gods 
closely catch glimpses of true being. Even these few are consigned 
only to brief glimpses since their steeds are so unruly. But worse, in 
the unbridled excitement of the human charioteers who emulate the gods 
less, some are "sucked down as they travel" and "trample and tread 
upon one another." (248) Fervor leads to disaster. "Thus confusion 
ensues, and conflict and grievous sweat. Whereupon, with their 
charioteers powerless, many are lamed, and many have their wings all 
broken, and for all their toiling they are balked, every one, of the 
full vision of being, and departing therefrom, they feed upon the food 
of semblance." (248b) Finally few human souls even taste the godly 
food of true being. Most make do with appearances of truth. Those 
souls who have seen something of true being are preserved and will 
ride again with the gods. But those hapless souls who, in the 
confusion, have seen only the appearance of true being are doomed to
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forget even what little they have seen. Since it is true being that 
sustains their wings, these souls shed their wings and fall to earth 
to become humans.
The soul imprisoned on earth is not doomed without reprieve. 
After having lived an ordinary mortal life, it is judged. Those that 
are meretricious are home aloft to heaven for one thousand years and 
those that are deemed wretched spend that time "in places of 
chastisement beneath the earth." (249) After the thousand years the 
souls are reborn to human form, if they deserve that lot, and the 
cycle continues. Most souls require no less than ten thousand years, 
that is, ten lives, to regain their wings, but the soul "who has 
sought a f t e r  wisdom unfeignedly" (249), who has chosen the 
philosophical life three times regains its wings and speeds away to 
join the heavenly host. Socrates defends the privilege of the 
philosopher's soul. "Therefore it is meet and right that the soul of 
the philosopher alone should recover her wings, for she, so far as may 
be, is ever near in memory to those things a god's nearness whereunto 
makes him truly god." (249c)
One might fairly demand where in this epic tale of the soul is an 
account of love. To this point in his speech Socrates has given only 
a clue. For the soul wishing to return to the heavenly host he gives 
alternatives; the soul may regain his wings by diligently seeking 
after wisdom or he may also regain them by joining his passion with a 
loved one that is seeking also. On the face of it this seems like 
more work for the beleaguered soul, to love as well as pursue wisdom. 
But this is far from the truth. Loving is an aid to redemption.
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Equally, Socrates seems to have left off his account of love as a 
madness. But it is just here in his narrative that he picks up the 
threads. The philosopher is attentive to the divine and isolates 
himself from the business of ordinary human life. Hence, being so 
possessed by the divine, he is called mad. This is the fourth and 
best form of divine possession. It is also this kind of madness that 
possesses the lover. The lover loves beauty. Not the beauty of this 
world so much as the beauty of that other world of which worldly 
beauty reminds him. In the presence of earthly beauty he remembers 
heavenly beauty and in the rapture of his remembrance is deemed mad.
Socrates explains that our organs for perceiving the aspects of 
true being are dull save for sight. Our perception of justice and 
temperance, for instance, is not nearly so keen. But "Beauty ’.-/as ours 
to see in all its brightness in those days when, amidst that happy 
company, we beheld with our eyes that blessed vision...." (230b) It 
was beauty that "shone bright amidst these visions, and in this world 
below we apprehend it through the clearest of our senses, clear and 
resplendent. For sight is the keenest mode of perception vouchsafed 
us through the body...." (250d) Because beauty shone brightest and 
because we are best equipped to see it among the aspects of true 
being, it is that to which we most readily respond, "...for beauty 
alone this has been ordained, to be most manifest to sense and most 
lovely of them all." (250d)
Those who saw little of true being or who saw it long ago are not 
responsive to a beauty for what it represents— true beauty— but see a 
beauty as a means to satisfy their sexual desires and procreative
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instincts. But those whose memory of true beauty is fresher, when in
the presence of a beauty, are inspired to remember and envision true
beauty. First, the lover shudders at the sight, at the reawakening of
his memory. What happens next bears quoting in full for it is
Socrates' description of the divine madness that overcomes the lover.
...a strange sweating and fever seizes him. For by reason
of the stream of beauty entering in through his eyes there
comes a warmth, whereby his soul's plumage is fostered, 
and with that warmth the roots of the wings are melted, 
which for long had been so hardened and closed up that 
nothing could grow; then as the nourishment is poured in, 
the stump of the wing swells and hastens to grow from the 
root over the whole substance of the soul, for aforetime 
the whole soul was furnished with wings. Meanwhile she 
throbs with ferment in every part, and even as a teething 
child feels an aching and pain in its gums when a tooth 
has just come through, so does the soul of him who is 
beginning to grow his wings feel a ferment and painful 
irritation. Wherefore as she gazes upon the boy's beauty, 
she admits a flood of particles streaming therefore— that 
is why we speak of a "flood of passion"--whereby she is 
warmed and fostered; then has she respite from her 
anguish, and is filled with joy. (251b-d)
But as soon as the beloved has departed the flood of passion stops and
the nubs of the wings begin to dry up. The soul, given some respite
from its earthly prison, now feels itself shrinking back into its
shell. With the withdrawal of the beloved, the soul finds itself
"stung and goaded into anguish." (251d) The thought or sight of the
beloved once again makes the wings being to swell. And so with
advances and retreats of the beloved the soul flourishes and withers
alternately. Driven to distraction, the soul searches out the beloved
and follows him everywhere suffering insult and injury to be in the
beloved's presence.
So goes Socrates' description of the madness of love and the
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desire for the beloved. Next he speaks of the choice of the beloved
and the action and attitude of the lover toward the beloved. The
lover chooses a kindred soul, one who has followed in the train of the
same god in the heavenly journey. A follower of Zeus picks another
follower of Zeus, a follower of Hera another follower of Hera and so
forth. Once the lover has found and come to love the beloved he sets
out to achieve the attitude and disposition of his god. As the lover
reaches out to the patron god in memory, he is possessed by that god
and from this possession he partakes of the nature of this god. Yet
he believes his growing kinship to his patron god is the result of his
association with his beloved. The mistake prompts him to pour out
into the soul of the beloved all beneficences he has received from his
god and thereby also molds his beloved into a closer likeness to their
patron god. The attitude and actions of the lover lead both him and
his beloved to grow into a likeness of their god.
Every lover is fain that his beloved should be of a nature 
like to his own god, and when he has won him, he leads him 
on to walk in the ways of their god, and after his 
likeness, patterning himself thereupon and giving counsel 
and discipline to the boy. There is no jealousy nor petty 
spitefulness in his dealings, but his every act is aimed 
at bringing the beloved to be every whit like unto himself 
and unto the god of their worship. (253b,c)
Before these god-like changes can be wrought, the lover must 
capture the beloved. To do this the lover must tame his own black 
steed. His white horse is obedient to the charioteer's commands, but 
the black steed, "hot-blooded, consorting with wantoness and 
vainglory" (253e) must be forced to heed, not his own will, but that 
of the charioteer. The charioteer and the white steed struggle
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against the black steed's passionate flight to the beloved but let the 
black steed have his way as he rushes to the beloved. Only when the 
beauty of the beloved strikes the charioteer with awe does he rein up 
his steeds. The black steed attempts to approach but the charioteer 
convinces him to delay. In a while the black steed once again 
attempts to approach the beloved. Finally the driver is forced to 
jerk "back the bit in the mouth of the wanton horse with an even 
stronger pull, bespatters his railing tongue and jaws with blood, and 
forcing him down on legs and haunches delivers him over to anguish." 
(254e) This battle of the lover's soul with itself occurs again and
again until the black horse approaches the beloved with fear and "the
soul of the lover follows after the beloved with reverence and awe."
(254e)
The beloved now receives the services of the lover and accepts 
these with good will. As he grows older and as destiny has its sway, 
the beloved puts aside any qualms he may have and welcomes the lover's 
company. He begins to appreciate his lover's kindliness. He absorbs 
it until he can hold no more and then begins reflecting it like a 
mirror. The love becomes reciprocal; each lover's wings grow with the 
nurturance. Even so the beloved has not yet come to understand the 
source and nature of his love. He comes to desire his lover and in 
that desire his own black horse is awakened. With the help of the 
tempered soul of his lover, he succeeds in subduing his black steed. 
"And so," Socrates says,
if the victory be won by the higher elements of mind 
guiding them into the ordered rule of the philosophical
life, their days on earth will be blessed with happiness
19
and concord, for the power of evil in the soul has been 
subjected, and the power of goodness liberated; they have 
won self-mastery and inward peace. And when life is over, 
with burden shed and wings recovered they stand victorious 
in the first of the three rounds in that truly Olympic 
struggle; nor can any nobler prize be secured whether by 
the wisdom that is of man or by the madness that is of 
god. (256a,b)
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2.2 Interpretation
2.2.1 Madness and Method 
It is assumed in the Phaedrus that love creates some form of 
madness. Lysis' speech and Socrates' second speech take madness as a 
leitmot if. Even Socrates' first speech portrays the effects of the 
lover's madness. All the speeches in fact are in accord with 
folklore: the lover's madness prompts him to commit unusual, even 
bizarre acts. Lysis' speech views the lover's madness as foolishness. 
The lover has simply lost his senses. He makes promises he cannot 
keep. He acts irrationally with regard to others, the beloved and 
himself. Presumably his thinking has lurched from the calm and 
rational to the erratic, fevered and irrational. Perhaps the Lysisian 
lover could most aptly be described as having lost possession of his 
senses. He no longer has control over his own self. Yet nothing else 
takes control. Lysis' lover is a man in ruins. The very faculties 
that distinguish him as a human being have disintegrated and he is 
left a disheviled array of ineptly functioning human faculties.
The lover of Socrates' first speech is not so clearly gone mad. 
He is compelled by desire and perhaps that compulsion is his madness 
in the sense that he is no longer in possession; desire is. But being 
possessed by desire has its own logic. The Lysisian lover is simply 
lost. He is schizophrenic, a personality in shambles. The lover of 
Socrates' first speech is more nearly psychotic; there is not a 
disintegration of personality. There is a domination of personality 
by one of its facets. Desire may have taken possession, but the other 
faculties remain intact. Having the powers of reason still at its
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conraiand, desire becomes crafty. Socrates' first lover is a wily man 
bent on the satisfaction of his desires at all costs. Gone is the 
picture of the lover as a pathetic babbling madman. The lover now is 
virtually a demonic force. All the power, the protean energy of 
desire is set loose. With reason as its accomplice, desire with 
premeditated single-mindedness contrives its ends and its ends alone. 
Desire's satisfaction is desire's goal, and the lover's reason and 
arts are its means.
In severe schizophrenia the person is not only characterized by 
personality disintegration but by with a concommitant loss of contact 
with reality. There is no world that stands steadfast in the face of 
the schizophrenic's disintegration; the world is as fragmented and 
disordered as the man and little more than a mirror of the man— the 
ultimate solipsism. The psychotic's world, on the other hand, is not 
shattered; it is misinterpreted. The world seen through the eyes of 
the psychotic is interpreted consistently through the form of the 
psychosis. For example, the paranoid psychotic sees the world as 
apart from himself and sees what others see. But he sees more. The 
world is laden with danger. Innumerable aspects carry threats that no 
one else sees. The psychotic is surely possessed and this possession 
informs his world.
Socrates' first lover, possessed by his desire, is psychotic. 
The world is seen clearly but interpreted only through the eyes of 
desire. Desire is the lover's motivation and its satisfaction is his 
raison d'etre. The psychotic may wreak havoc because he sees the 
world clearly and because he reasons. In fact, desire, like the fear
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of the paranoid psychotic, is directed toward the world. The paranoid 
psychotic must accurately perceive what is threatening and then act 
coherently to avoid or abolish that threat. The lover, possessed by 
desire, must know what he desires and then act methodically to achieve 
satisfaction. Never mind that in some objective sense, what is feared 
is not threatening or what is desired is not finally desirable. 
However much the mind and world of the psychotic or the lover is 
skewed by the possession, reason and the world are largely left 
intact.
The lover possessed by desire, as Socrates describes him, is 
bereft of a moral sense. He is so because satisfaction of his desires 
is his morality. What is good is that which satisfies the desire, 
what is bad is that which frustrates that satisfaction. The 
desire-possessed lover virtually operates in the manner of the ethical 
egoist. There is some (at least tacit) concern with good and bad, but 
it is wholely involved with the satisfaction of the desire and totally 
unconcerned with others. If there is a rift in the world of the lover 
possessed by desire, it is a moral one. Otherwise, his world is our 
world.
If Lysis' lover has lost possession of himself and if Socrates' 
first lover is possessed by a part of himself— his desires, Socrates' 
second lover is divinely possessed. The second lover is mad by virtue 
of his soul's response to beauty. In the beauty of the beloved he has 
found something ultimately valuable— the remembrance of true beauty, 
that facet of true being which, like true being, is the food of the 
gods. Perhaps it can be said that what Socrates' second lover sees is
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a beautiful person— ^  beauty— but that what he experiences is beauty 
itself. In this experience he has not lost possession of himself. He 
has not even been possessed by a part of himself gone berserk. He has 
been possessed by something of ultimate worth, something above and 
beyond himself. If we can accept this premise, then we can understand 
this lover's possession, his insanity, his relationship to the world 
and his actions as a lover.
The first two lovers are madmen in the ordinary sense. I think 
Socrates would suggest that they are mad precisely because their love 
bears no relationship to the divine. Their love is a response to a 
beauty, not true beauty. If we borrow from Socrates' myth for an 
explanation, we shall say that their souls, in the journey of the 
gods, never glimpsed true being and hence have nothing to which to 
relate the beauty standing before them, llhat they see in a beauty is 
a mortal and corruptible form. What is remarkable to them about the 
beauty is his being exceptional; the beauty stands out in contrast to 
the rest of humanity. And more importantly he stands out for no other 
reason. Perhaps the Lysisian lover is shattered and the first 
Socratic lover is overwhelmed by desire by the sheer remarkableness of 
the beauty. Perhaps the Lysisian lover is utterly crushed by the 
irony that such beauty should exist and yet be perishable. And 
perhaps the first Socratic lover is motivated by the same realization 
to have the beauty while it lasts.
However this may be, the second Socratic lover is possessed of no 
mortal madness. His soul is not shaken or overwhelmed by the ironies 
of this life. It is inspired by a vision of the eternal, immortal
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realm beyond this earth's changeable one. He has not lost his senses 
but gained them. The Lysisian lover has no reason left. The first 
Socratic lover's reason is at the mercy of his desire. The second 
Socratic lover comes to think more clearly; his reason is the most 
lucid and the most at his disposal. While the second Socratic lover 
may reel at first glance of the beloved's beauty, he soon realizes the 
importance of that beauty and acts accordingly.
Neither does the second Socratic lover misconstrue the world. It 
is there for him precisely as it is for everyone else. But the world, 
aside from the beloved, is of little importance to him. Even the 
beloved is important only for the beauty that reflects true beauty and 
for his soul that might be developed into its natural (winged) form. 
In spite of his clear view of the world or rather precisely because of 
it, the lover is called mad. As seen by his peers he has left all 
sense behind. He follows his beloved not heeding the demands of life. 
He forsakes his commerce and forgets his family. He acts as one who 
has lost his bearings, hence he is mad. But Socrates contends that it 
is because he has found his bearings that he acts so oddly. It may 
seem rational for the ordinary man to tend to his business and see to 
his family, but the lover sees that duties, pleasures, and conventions 
of the mutable world are unimportant in relation to his soul's well 
being. He is not a madman unable to conduct his affairs; he is the 
picture of sanity using his energies to pursue what really counts— the 
development of his soul toward a commerce with true beauty.
As the source of his soul's growth the second Socratic lover 
treats the beloved with respect, even reverence. Though there is no
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explicit moral theory expressed in the love speeches of the Phaedrus. 
there is at least an implicit utilitarianism. The first speeches 
counsel not to take a lover because he is not good for you. The third 
counsels taking one precisely because he is good for you. The 
Lysisian lover, bereft of his senses, is lacking in moral fiber. The 
first Socratic lover is clearly evil in attempting to ensure the 
degradation of the beloved. The second Socratic lover, though, is 
seen as beneficial both to the lover and the beloved because he 
promotes the growth of both their souls. After all, this madness is 
divinely inspired and must therefore produce morally praiseworthy 
results. The earthly madness of the first two lovers produces 
obnoxious, if not deleterious, results. Only the divinely inspired 
madness of love can produce beneficial results. The second Socratic 
lover achieves this result by treating the beloved as an ends and not 
just a means. He conceives both him and his lover as having souls 
that merit elevation. Just as he attends to his own soul, so does he 
his beloved's. But the morality of the lover is as much a function of 
his desires as his madness. It is these desires that complete the 
emotional characterization of the lover.
2.2.2 Desire And Will 
The first two lovers may be said to be mad with desire. The 
Lysisian lover loses control of himself, loses his senses, is mad 
because he desires. He wishes to bask in his beloved's beauty which 
is to say that his will is his desire. He has no will distinct from 
his desire. The very profundity of his madness makes his will as an
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effective agent apart from his desires impossible. The first Socratic 
lover, on the other hand, inclines his will only to the satisfaction 
of his desires. It is likely that herein lies his madness. He is not 
simply struck with a beauty only to stand in awe. He actively seeks 
to satisfy the desire that beauty inspires. There is no question that 
Plato sees beauty as a positive attribute or that he views the 
recognition of it as virtuous. It is equally clear that what the 
lover sees in the beauty is of importance and that the response to 
that beauty is, among other things, desire. All three lovers desire. 
The first desires, but that is all. The second desires and moreover 
attempts to see to it that that desire is satisfied. The first two 
lovers are both slaves to desire though they are distinguishable by 
virtue of the role of their will in relation to desire. The second 
Socratic lover, too, has a black horse of desire, but the lover's will 
is imposed on the black horse. In terms of Socrates' tripartite soul, 
the Lysisian lover has no charioteer or, at best, has one who stands 
idlly by while the black horse races to the beloved. The first 
Socratic lover's charioteer is in the midst of the fray, not to rein 
in the black horse but to guide him swiftly to the goal. The second 
Socratic lover actively asserts his will against the black steed. Not 
only is his will clearly evident, it clearly restrains desire.
If we asked "Should we desire our beloved?" Plato could only 
respond "It's not a matter of should or shouldn't; you will." And if 
we rejoin "Well, then, what should our attitude and acts be with 
regard to the beloved?" Plato would respond "Carnal satisfaction of 
one's desires is ephemeral. Satisfy them if you must, but realize
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that the satisfaction of desires is not the fulfillment of love." 
Plato is realist enough not to deny the existence of desires or their 
preeminent role in love. They are part and parcel of love. Madness 
could more easily be separated from love than desires. The madness 
comes at the recognition of the beloved and, at least for the second 
Socratic lover, abates with the pursuance of the love's goals with the 
beloved. Further, the divine madness of the second Socratic lover is 
insanity only if interpreted through the eyes of the non-lover. 
Desire, on the other hand, is a part of the lover on any account. It 
will hold its sway if not reckoned with. Without a doubt Plato holds 
that it is virtuous not to let desire have its way and to control it 
by an act of will. Why holding desire in check is virtuous is 
explainable only in terms of the object and objective of love.
2.2.3 To Whom And For What
The object of love seems obvious: the beloved. If we may trust 
our use of the word "love", we may love a man or woman, our land or 
the land, liberty, justice and other abstract concepts, animals and 
God. We may even love that dress or the way you do your hair. Even 
if we exclude this last, rather dubious group of objects, the objects 
of love are amazingly diverse, from the mortal to the immortal, from 
the concrete to the abstract. If love allows all these objects, it is 
quite possible that when we say we love a man or woman, we are not
loving him or her at all. We may, for instance, be loving what he
stand for or some concrete aspect of her.
Of the first two lovers Plato says nothing about what or who it
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is they love. He is far more explicit about the second Socratic 
lover. Yet even when he is explicit Plato leaves many questions about 
who or what is loved.
The Lysisian lover has little to love. It must be either the 
beloved himself or the beauty of the beloved. There is little doubt 
that it is the second. Lysis argues that "Lovers, when their craving 
is at an end, repent of such benefits as they have conferred...." 
(231) and that "A lover more often than not wants to possess you 
before he has come to know your character or become familiar with your 
general personality, and that makes it uncertain whether he will still 
want to be your friend when his desires have waned...." (232e) The 
Lysisian lover cannot be loving the man for he doesn't even know him. 
Even if he did know him, he is at the mercy of his cravings. That 
sounds more like lust than love. But if we allow that the Lysisian 
lover does love, then we must conclude that he loves the beauty of the 
beloved. That is what makes him mad, that is what he desires— to 
revel in that beauty. When that beauty fades or his desires are 
satisfied or abate, he turns, he no longer loves.
Similarly the first Socratic lover loves the beloved's beauty if 
he loves at all. This lover cannot love the person for he commits 
with premeditated malice a variety of disservices to the person. All 
he can possibly love is the concrete beauty of the beloved.
The second Socratic lover is a far more complicated case. It is 
clear that he desires to indulge in the beauty of the beloved as is 
made clear by the insistence of his black steed. But this desire is 
not identified with his love. Quite the contrary; desire is virtually
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a hindrance to the proper expression of love, as is made clear by the 
description of the charioteer's battle with the black steed. Socratic 
love cannot plausibly be a desire for the beloved as an object of 
sexual satisfaction nor even as an object of some sort of aesthetic 
gratification, although the latter is closer to the case.
What inspires the second Socratic lover to love is a "godlike 
face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty." (251) It is his 
presence to this expression of true beauty that makes the lover's 
wings grow. The joy that this presence brings makes the lover yearn 
for the beloved. Presumably at the outset the lover remembers little 
of his heavenly journey and the beauty he saw. All he knows is that 
in the presence of the beloved he is ecstatic, and, in the absence, 
the lover is in agony. Now what shall we say? Is the lover loving 
the beloved or the beauty of the beloved or true beauty? Is he 
deceived in believing that he loves the beloved? What's more, at 
least initially, the lover seems to be acting out of self-love; he is 
pursuing that which gives him pleasure, if so temperate a term may be 
used. Of course, this pleasure as Socrates characterizes it is no 
mere sensual indulgence; rather it is the joy at the soul's growth. 
Even so, this does not alter the fact that the lover's attraction to 
the beloved is self-serving. Few would be willing to condemn the 
lover's self-serving interest in the beloved. Though he desires the 
beloved for what the beloved can do for him, the lover desires to 
obtain spiritual growth from the beloved. Further, in part because 
the lover confuses the beloved's beauty with true beauty, the lover 
seems to have a misplaced reverence for the beloved. What ought to be
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accorded to true beauty is accorded the beloved. With this reverence 
comes the chastity vouchsafed the devout lover. With it, too, comes 
the lover's unstinting attempts to foster the beloved's growth. This 
self-serving love, born of true beauty, is wholely benign. The 
reverence and devotion borrowed from true beauty insures that the 
lover acts not only in his ownbest interests but also in that of his 
beloved's. Without true beauty's inspiration the love is nothing more 
than a sordid affair.
Now he whose vision of the mystery is long past, or 
whose purity has been sullied, cannot pass swiftly hence 
to see beauty's self yonder, when he beholds that which is 
called beautiful here; wherefore he looks upon it with no 
reverence, and surrendering to pleasure he essays to go 
after the fashion of a four-footed beast, and to beget 
offspring of the flesh, or consorting with wantonness he 
has no fear nor shame in running after unnatural pleasure.
(250e)
True beauty delivers the lover from mere lust and the satisfaction of 
hedonistic desires. Socrates seems to be saying that, when the lover 
desires the beloved as a man, then his desire can only be called lust, 
not love. But when the object of the lover's desire is true beauty, 
then the lover loves the beloved as the manifestation of true beauty. 
The object of love, then is not the beloved qua man but the beloved 
qua manifestation of true beauty.
If the object of love is the beloved as the manifestation of true 
beauty, what is the objective of love? Socrates tells us that our 
souls, in their heavenly sojourn, followed in the train of one god or 
another. It appears that Socrates accounts for our differences in 
personality by having our souls follow the appointed god literally in 
the heavenly journey and follow, figuratively, the nature of that god
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on earth. Be this as it may, our patron god determines whom we come
to love and how we comport ourselves toward everyone, but particularly
the beloved. We choose a lover by finding someone who has the same
patron god as we, who has the same disposition as we (these being the
same for Socrates). Once followers of a certain god finds someone of
similar disposition "and come to love him they do all in their power
to foster that disposition." (252e) Socrates reiterates this point in
the next paragraph.
Every lover is fain that his beloved should be of a nature 
like to his own god, and when he has won him, he leads him 
on to walk in the ways of their god, and after his 
likeness, patterning himself thereupon and giving counsel 
and discipline to the boy. There is no jealousy nor petty
spitefulness in his dealings, but his every act is aimed
at bringing the beloved to be every whir like unto himself 
and unto the god of their worship. (253b)
The objective of love is to fashion both lover and beloved into the
mold of the god they worship insofar as that is humanly possible.
It is important to note that making the beloved into a more
nearly perfect likeness of a god is not a simple didactic process.
The lover, at least initially, is unaware of what he is really doing.
He is not teaching from experience but is a fellow learner with the
beloved. Speaking of the followers of a god, of the lovers who are
attempting to foster a godly disposition in the beloved, Socrates says
And if they have not aforetime trodden this path, they now 
set out upon it, learning the way from any source that may 
offer or finding it for themselves, and as they follow up 
the trace within themselves of the nature of their own god 
their task is made easier, inasmuch as they are 
constrained to fix their gaze upon him, and reaching out 
after him in memory they are possessed by him, and from 
him they take their ways and manners of life, in so far as 
a man can partake of a god. (252e,253)
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This is not a self-conscious task, as Socrates immediately notes 
that"...all this, mark you, they attribute to the beloved...." (253) 
The lover, inspired by the beautiful vestiges of the patron god in the 
beloved, is prompted to promote the growth of the vestiges. He does 
this by piecing together the traces of the god that reside in himself. 
By responding to the vestiges of the god in himself, he grows to be 
more like the god. What he draws from the god does not just enhance 
him; what he gains he pours out to the beloved and hence promotes the 
beloved's growth. The lover does "counsel and discipline" (253b), but 
this can hardly be an explicit counseling in the ways of the god since 
the lover attributes his own growth not to the god but to the beloved. 
The counseling must be what the lover knows consciously: such, things 
as justice, moral responsibility and aesthetic appreciation. 
Presumably these teachings in turn would have (unbeknownst to the 
lover) their inspiration drawn from the god. As the process of mutual 
growth continues the beloved, as he is able, becomes an active part of 
this mutual growth contributing in much the same way as the lover.
What may have appeared at the outset as a beautiful, lyric myth 
has become, upon examination, quite complicated. The ecstatic sort of 
madness and the desire associated with love Socrates explains as the 
response to the beauty of the beloved. But neither the madness nor 
the desire is of the ordinary sort. The madness and desire are 
inspired not just by the beautiful body; this would be merely lust. 
They are inspired by the manifestation of true beauty in the beauty of 
the beloved. The lover, unaware of what has really inspired his 
madness and desires, attributes these emotions and emotional states to
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the effect on him of the beloved pure and simple. The reverence he 
holds for the beloved by virtue of the beloved's manifesting true 
beauty prevents the lover from committing any untoward acts. The 
lover instead acts toward the beloved as if he were in the presence of 
a god. He must curb his carnal desires in order to pay homage to this 
"god." Without knowing it, the lover has chosen someone with the same 
disposition, who follows the same god as he. The image of this god 
and the beauty quicken his soul. His soul, reminded of its heavenly 
journey and of the god it followed, begins to grow. This growth 
provides growth to the beloved as well since the lover believes his 
growth is caused by his proximity to the beloved and therefore acts to 
return the gracious gift. The beloved, receiving these boons from the 
lover, responds in kind growing and giving as each increases in beauty 
and godliness.
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2.3 Analysis I: Desire And Altruism
2.3.1 A Brief A iysis Of Desire 
A primary non-cognitive reaction to the experience of value in 
the beloved by the lover is desire. All three of the lovers in the 
Phaed rus have this in common. That the lovers desire the beloved is 
not surprising; a fundamental characteristic of desire is that it is 
desire of something perceived as valuable and surely all of the lovers 
perceive the beloved as valuable. That desire is desire for something 
valuable can be most clearly seen in specific, circumscribed objects 
of desire and the desire attending them. I want (desire) this car 
because I perceive it as having some value— it is fast or luxurious or 
sleek.. Ï have already placed value on speed, luxury or aesthetics and 
desire this car because I perceive it as having the quality I value. 
I want this tennis racket because it has good balance and I know the 
value of a well-balanced racket to ray tennis game. I have always 
wanted a Van Gogh because I value (admire) his bold, dynamic use of 
color. Just as I may desire things, I may desire situations. In the 
summer heat I desire a cool, shady spot because I place value on my 
comfort, tihen I study, I want decent lighting because I know it is 
better for my eyes. Even more abstract situations may be desired. I 
want freedom of speech because I value self-expression. I want 
justice done because I value fair treatment of myself and my fellow 
man. I want understanding and tolerance for they are virtues without 
which society cannot endure.
From the simplest, most personal desires to the most abstract.
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the desire is a desire for something valued. This, of course, does 
not mean that what is valued is of value to the person, I may rank a 
chocolate sundae as a top gustatory experience, but as a diabetic I 
must consider the sundae not only of no positive value but of negative 
value. What is valuable in some respect or another need not be what 
is valued. Desire is desire for what is valued and not necessarily 
for what is valuable. I m a y  not even know what is best for me (what 
is valuable to my well-being), but I do have desires nonetheless and 
those desires are of something valued by me.
Perhaps the classic model for desire has been the personal 
appetitive desires. I want food or shelter or sex. When I say I want 
an ice cream cone or a new coat, I speak in two terms: me and the 
object desired. What is obscured in the two-term grammar of such 
declarations of desire is the distinction between who does the 
desiring and for whom the desiring is done. The elliptical forms "I 
want X" and "You desire Y" are convenient and efficient communicators 
in day to day interchanges. It is taken in such locutions that I 
desire X for me and that you want Y for you. And of course, this is 
often precisely what we mean. But there are a whole variety of cases 
in which the desirer and the person desired for are not the same. We 
are out shopping together. While looking over a rack of coats I 
exclaim "I want that one." Having noticed that I am looking at the 
size 44's and knowing that I wear a 40, you protest "But that's not 
your size." "Of course it isn't; I don't want it for me. I want it 
for my brother. His birthday's soon." The expanded form of the 
desire declaration here is "X wants Y for Z" where X is the desirer, Y
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the object desired, and Z the person or thing for whom it is desired. 
When I want an ice cream cone, I want it for me. And you want a new 
dress for you. Yet I may want a dress for you (alternatively: I want 
you to have a dress) and you may want an ice cream cone for me (again: 
you want me to have an ice cream cone) . Not only can we want 
something for someone, we can want something for something. I can 
want felicitous wording for the club constitution or an ornate facade 
for the opera house. Clearly there is no need for a desire to be
reflexive; I do not have to want something for me. This possibility
leaves the door open for altruistic desires, but it only opens the 
door. In determining an altruistic desire, why I desire X for Y is as 
important as the fact that I desire for Y .
The reasons for a desire can tell us as much about a desire as
any aspect of the desire. Of course all desires have as their reason 
the object valued. I want an ice cream cone because I place some 
value on it. You want a new dress because you place value on your 
wardrobe. The "because" here simply functions to announce a category 
of objects valued by the desirer. Frequently we do give very minimal 
reasons for a desire. Why do I want a drink right now? I don't know 
I just do. All I can tell you about my urge for a drink is that I 
feel like one. The reason I give for my desire is nothing more than a 
restatement of it. I want because I want. I didn't think about 
wanting a drink. I just found myself wanting one.
But we give more interesting reasons for desiring than this. I 
want a new car because the old one is falling apart and gets lousy gas 
mileage, because I want to take my vacation in a comfortable vehicle.
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because I promised the wife one this year if we could afford it. ... 
The list could be endless. I do have reasons for some desires and 
those reasons can be complicated. I want to get my wife a new coat 
because she needs one and I want her to be well dressed and I love her 
and besides it may incline her favorably toward my buying the golf 
clubs I saw yesterday. Our reasons for a desire can range from the 
sophisticated to the virtually non-existent.
How sophisticated our reasons are is a measure of how rational 
our desires are. But the rationality of a desire is not an indication 
of its altruism. You see an elderly woman trying to mount some stairs 
with a package as you pass by in your car. You find yourself wanting 
to help her. VJhy? Because she needed it? Because you wanted to? 
But you probably did not want to because of some well thought out 
convictions about the role of the elderly in 20^^ Century American 
society. We may all want to help some charity or another because we 
think we ought to do our part, because of a rationally held belief. 
Yet all of our altruistic desires need not be of this sort. To desire 
altruistically requires that the desire is not reflexive but does not 
require a rational set of reasons for the desire.
2.3.2 Loving for oneself
Amidst the variables of desire where does Plato's love fall? 
Socrates tells us that the lover, upon meeting the beloved, is struck 
by the beloved's beauty, a beauty that makes the lover's soul's wings 
begin to grow. It is the pleasure of feeling his wings grow through 
the agency of the beauty of the beloved that the lover seeks.
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At last she [the soul] does behold him, and lets the flood 
pour in upon her, releasing the imprisoned waters; then 
has she refreshment and respite from her stings and 
sufferings, and at that moment tastes a pleasure that is 
sweet beyond compare. Nor will she willingly give it up.
(251e)
Socrates is realist enough to acknowledge that his lover, as much if 
not more than any other man, experiences sensual desires. His 
description of the soul as having both black and white, evil and good 
horses, attests to this. But while he admits that the lover has 
sensual desires, he does not consider these desires to be a beneficial 
part of love. They are to be fought and controlled. The Socratic 
lover, for all his sensual passion, is chaste.
It is not clear in Socrates' initial description (251) whether 
the lover at the outset of love is struck by just the spiritual desire 
to behold the beauty of the beloved or by a combination of sensual and 
spiritual desires. In his subsequent discussion of the charioteer and 
his horses, Socrates acknowledges the presence of both the black and 
white steeds from the first approach to the beloved as he must since 
both are permanent constituents of the soul. Yet his first 
description has the lover's soul struck by the beauty of the beloved 
in a wholely noble and pure beginning of love.
Presumably Plato's response to this ambiguity in the text would 
be to explain the differences as differences in emphasis. In his 
description of the onset of love Socrates wishes to distinguish the 
lover from the wanton man. Here Socrates compares the wanton man's 
purely sensual desire to the lover's spiritual desire. That is not to 
say that the lover does not have sensual desires, just that he has
39
more than sensual desires. When Socrates considers the lover alone he 
acknowledges both sensual and spiritual desires.
Since Socrates finds the wanton man's desire for sensual 
pleasures base and ignoble, he must condemn the lover's desire for 
sensual pleasure as well. And so he does. It is not that he finds 
having only sensual desires objectionable; having sensual desires, 
along with more noble ones, are no less objectionable. Sensual 
desires are, without qualification, of negative worth. Even if the 
lover is suffused with the light of true beauty, his nobler parts 
cannot transmute the sensual desire into anything praiseworthy. Not 
only are sensual desires totally and completely corrupt without 
redemption, even the lover who fosters his nobler parts is condemned 
to contend with his black steed for all eternity.
Socrates emphasizes the lover's struggle for nobler virtues, but 
even as the lover desires the beautiful so too does he desire the 
sensual. Though he is called upon to overcome the desire, the lover 
does have a sensual desire for the beloved. He wants the beloved for 
the express purpose of sensual gratification. Just as the wanton man 
wants the beloved so that he may enjoy the beauty for himself, so does 
the lover. One of the lover's desires, then, is the self-aggrandizing 
desire for pleasure. He wants the beloved's beauty for his own 
enjoyment, and he presumably wants because the beauty is pleasurable.
Socrates condemns this desire on the part of the lover. We might 
surmise that he condemns it because it 1) is self-serving and 2) is no 
more rational than any appetitive desire. I, the lover, want for me 
and I want for no better reason than it feels good. Socrates could
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find this o b j e c t i o n a b l e ,  first, b e c a u s e  t h e  d e s i r e  is 
self-aggrandizing and does not have the altruistic character of X 
wanting Y for Z (XAZ). and second, because, as a proponent of rational 
discourse, Socrates would likely not find "I want X because it will 
give me pleasure" adequate justification for wanting X. It might well 
be that while X feels good to me, it is not good for me. The 
distinction between appearance and reality was hardly foreign to 
Socrates. Being a strong proponent, of it he could hardly be 
satisfied with a justification that left off at the level of 
appearances.
Socrates might argue in this vein, but I think not. If Socrates 
so argued, he would be in the uncomfortable position of criticizing 
his spiritual desires on the same grounds as the sensual desires. The 
lover has sensual desires of the form "I want the beloved for me 
because he will please me." His spiritual desires have the same form: 
"I want the beloved for me because he will please me." The lover 
finds that in the presence of the beloved he experiences something 
like pleasure but perhaps closer to ecstasy or rapture. In any case 
he finds the experience pleasurable not withstanding the pain 
accompanying the sprouting of his wings. Whatever pain (in addition 
to the pleasure) the presence to the beloved causes, it is nothing 
compared to the anguish of the beloved's absence. And so the lover 
seeks out the beloved to assuage the anguish and to revel in the 
ecstasy. But note that what he desires is for himself. It is his 
anguish he wishes to relieve and his own ecstatic experience he wishes 
to have. This may be spiritual pleasure and pain, but it is his and
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he seeks out one and attempts to avoid the other. Very much like the 
wanton man, the lover seeks out his own gratification, albeit 
spiritual. Socrates, then, could hardly condemn the wanton man of 
ego-centrism and praise the lover who is no more altruistic. The 
wanton man and the lover may want different things, but they both want 
them for themselves.
The lover's spiritual desires are for himself, but why? What 
reasons does he offer for this desire? Socrates gives only hints. 
The description of the lover in the first throes of love does not lead 
one to believe that the lover has any but the simplest reasons: he 
wants to b e l o v e d ' s  company because he finds it spiritually 
pleasurable. Yet, as the love grows the lover's reason's for desiring 
seem to become more complicated as will be seer, later. But the 
initial stages of love seem marked with a lack of reason. The 
beloved, as he in turn begins to love, finds himself in much the same 
position as the lover originally did. Socrates describes the first 
pulses of love in the beloved in the following way. "So he loves, yet 
knows not what he loves; he does not understand, he cannot tell what 
has come upon him.... ' ( 255d) In all fairness to Plato, it must be 
acknowledged that this passage is followed by a description of the 
beloved's growing sensual desires for the lover, yet the word "love" 
is used and seems to apply to the total experience described in the 
passage. The conclusion 1 draw is that neither the lover nor beloved 
initially has any more reason for his spiritual desire than that the 
presence of the beloved pleases him. If this is true, then Socrates 
once again finds his lover in the same position as the wanton man.
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Each wants for himself and for no more sophisticated reason than the 
beloved's beauty pleases him.
If the lover and the wanton man both want for themselves because 
it feels good, what then distinguishes them? The answer must be that 
what distinguishes them is the nature of what they desire and of their 
own character that prompts them to love one thing rather than another. 
Wanting sensual pleasure is the product of the base and ignoble 
elements of one's character. When these elements are all that 
comprise the character, the result is a wanton man who only desires 
sensual delights, the base and ignoble counterparts in the world to 
his depraved character.
The lover, of course, is of good character. His good character 
prompts him to desire good and noble things. Socrates deems the 
sensual bad and the spiritual good and hence it follows that his 
lover, being of good character, desires what ..s g o o d --s p i r i t u a 1 
elevation and the pleasure gained therefrom.
Socrates' description of the first pulses of love compares well 
with standard descriptions of this phase. Not only is the lover 
struck and driven to distraction by his love, he finds himself 
desiring the beloved more than any thing in the world. He wants the 
beloved for himself because he is in ecstasy when the beloved is near. 
What the lover knows, what is most apparent to him, is that the 
beloved is an extraordinary source of pleasure, so great that nothing 
can compare to it. The superlatives of love are reserved for this 
stage when you make me happier than I ever knew was possible, and she 
is delirious with joy. The glowing metaphors of love bespeak the joy
43
the lover receives from beholding the beloved. It is the lover's own 
consumâte pleasure that draws him to the beloved. "I cannot be happy 
without you." " You almost make the day begin." The lover is most 
aware of his own joy and is convinced that he has been graced. The 
lover, in the midst of his ecstacy, acts for his own benefit— or what 
he sees as his own benefit. And further, that the pleasures of love 
are truly a boon is self-evident to the lover; he sees no further 
reason for loving than the feelings he experiences. His experiences 
are palpably and thoroughly good. So overwhelming and complete is 
love that it is inconceivable that it could be other than it appears. 
Hence it needs no examination or justification; the experience is 
self-jus c if ying or perhaps is above justification. It is clear and 
distinct, so pure and lucid that questioning it is as absurd as asking 
whether my hands are before me.
Socrates, then, has captured at least some important features of 
the onset of love. The delirium of love's first blush, the 
extraordinary value placed on the beloved, the desire for the beloved 
that knows only itself and knows no reason, all these bespeak the man 
rapt with himself, captured by the beginning of love, but this is 
surely not its end. There are times when love dies with the madness 
and so death and disillusionment are its end, but there are also loves 
that develop. Love, as Plato knows, may grow from madness' 
breathtaking flights. Though Socrates speaks only briefly of this 
state, I believe that Plato sees the development of love as more 
important than its onset. It is in the growth of love that the lover 
develops. He becomes wise and godlike. These are virtues that
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Socrates can heartily endorse. The onset of love may give the lover 
experience beyond compare, but the development of love gives the lover 
character beyond value.
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2.3 Analysis I: Desire And Altruism
2.3.1 A Brief Analysis Of Desire 
A primary non-cognitive reaction to the experience of value in 
the beloved by the lover is desire. All three of the lovers in the 
Phaedrus have this in common. That the lovers desire the beloved is 
not surprising; a fundamental characteristic of desire is that it is 
desire of something perceived as valuable and surely all of the lovers 
perceive the beloved as valuable. That desire is desire for something 
valuable can be most clearly seen in specific, circumscribed objects 
of desire and the desire attending them. I want (desire) this car 
because I perceive it as having some value— it is fast or luxurious or 
sleek. Ï have already placed value on speed, luxury or aesthetics and 
desire this car because I perceive it as having the quality I value. 
I want this tennis racket because it has good balance and I know the 
value of a well-balanced racket to my tennis game. I have always 
wanted a Van Gogh because I value (admire) his bold, dynamic use of 
color. Just as I may desire things, I may desire situations. In the 
summer heat I desire a cool, shady spot because I place value on my 
comfort. When I study, I want decent lighting because I know it is 
better for my eyes. Even more abstract situations may be desired. I 
want freedom of speech because I value self-expression. I want 
justice done because I value fair treatment of myself and my fellow 
man. I want understanding and tolerance for they are virtues without 
which society cannot endure.
From the simplest, most personal desires to the most abstract.
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the desire is a desire for something valued. This, of course, does 
not mean that what is valued is of value to the person. I may rank a 
chocolate sundae as a top gustatory experience, but as a diabetic I 
must consider the sundae not only of no positive value but of negative 
value. What is valuable in some respect or another need not be what 
is valued. Desire is desire for what is valued and not necessarily 
for what is valuable. I may not even know what is best for me (what 
is valuable to my well-being), but I do have desires nonetheless and 
those desires are of something valued by me.
Perhaps the classic model for desire has been the personal 
apetitive desires. I want food or shelter or sex. When I say I want 
an ice cream cone or a new coat, I speak in two terms: me and the 
object desired. What is obscured in the two-term grammar of such 
declarations of desire is the distinction between who does the 
desiring and for whom the desiring is done. The elliptical forms "I 
want X" and "You desire Y" are convenient and efficient communicators 
in day to day interchanges. It is taken in such locutions that I
desire X for me and that you want Y for you. And of course, this is
often precisely what we mean. But there are a whole variety of cases 
in which the desirer and the person desired for are not the same. We 
are out shopping together. While looking over a rack of coats I 
exclaim "I want that one." Having noticed that I am looking at the 
size 44's and knowing that I wear a 40, you protest "But that's not 
your size." "Of course it isn't; I don't want it for me. I want it 
for my brother. His birthday's soon." The expanded form of the
desire declaration here is "X wants Y for Z" where X is the desirer, Y
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the object desired, and Z the person or thing for whom it is desired. 
When I want an ice cream cone, I want it for me. And you want a new 
dress for you. Yet I may want a dress for you (alternatively: I want 
you to have a dress) and you may want an ice cream cone for me (again:
you want me to have an ice cream c o n e ) . Not only can we want
something for someone, we can want something for something. I can 
want felicitous wording for the club constitution or an ornate facade 
for the opera house. Clearly there is no need for a desire to be 
reflexive; I do not have to want something for me. This possibility 
leaves the door open for altruistic desires, but it only opens the 
door. In determining an altruistic desire, why I desire X for Y is as 
important as the fact that I desire for Y .
The reasons for a desire can tell us as much about a desire as
any aspect of the desire. Of course all desires have as their reason 
the object valued. I want an ice cream cone because I place some 
value on it. You want a new dress because you place value on your 
wardrobe. The "because" here simply functions to announce a category 
of objects valued by the desirer. Frequently we do give very minimal 
reasons for a desire. Why do I want a drink right now? I don't know 
I just do. All I can tell you about my urge for a drink is that I 
feel like one. The reason I give for my desire is nothing more than a 
restatement of it . I want because I want. I didn't think about 
wanting a drink. I just found myself wanting one.
But we give more interesting reasons for desiring than this. I 
want a new car because the old one is falling apart and gets lousy gas 
mileage, because I want to take my vacation in a comfortable vehicle.
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because I promised the wife one this year if we could afford it .... 
The list could be endless. I do have reasons for some desires and 
those reasons can be complicated. I want to get my wife a new coat 
because she needs one and I want her to be well dressed and I love her 
and besides it may incline her favorably toward my buying the golf 
clubs I saw yesterday. Our reasons for a desire can range from the 
sophisticated to the virtually non-existent.
How sophisticated our reasons are is a measure of how rational 
our desires are. But the rationality of a desire is not an indication 
of its altruism. You see an elderly woman trying to mount some stairs 
with a package as you pass by in your car. You find yourself wanting 
to help her. Why? Because she needed it? Because you wanted to? 
But you probably did not want to because of some well thought out 
convictions about the role of the elderly in 20*-^ Century American 
society. We may all want to help some charity or another because we 
think we ought to do our part, because of a rationally held belief. 
Yet all of our altruistic desires need not be of this sort. To desire 
altruistically requires that the desire is not reflexive but does not 
require a rational set of reasons for the desire.
2.3.2 Loving for oneself
Amidst the variables of desire where does Plato's love fall? 
Socrates tells us that the lover, upon meeting the beloved, is struck 
by the beloved's beauty, a beauty that makes the lover's soul's wings 
begin to grow. It is the pleasure of feeling his wings grow through 
the agency of the beauty of the beloved that the lover seeks.
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At last she [the soul] does behold him, and lets the flood 
pour in upon her, releasing the imprisoned waters; then
has she refreshment and respite from her stings and
sufferings, and at that moment tastes a pleasure that is 
sweet beyond compare. Nor will she willingly give it up.
(251e)
Socrates is realist enough to acknowledge that his lover, as much if 
not more than any other man, experiences sensual desires. His 
description of the soul as having both black and white, evil and good 
horses, attests to this. But while he admits that the lover has 
sensual desires, he does not consider these desires to be a beneficial 
part of love. They are to be fought and controlled. The Socratic 
lover, for all his sensual passion, is chaste.
It is not clear in Socrates' initial description (251) whether 
the lover at the outset of love is struck by just the spiritual desire 
to behold the beauty of the beloved or by a combination of sensual and 
spiritual desires. In his subsequent discussion of the charioteer and 
his horses, Socrates acknowledges the presence of both the black and
white steeds from the first approach to the beloved as he must since
both are permanent constituents of the soul. Yet his first 
description has the lover's soul struck by the beauty of the beloved 
in a wholely noble and pure beginning of love.
Presumably Plato's response to this ambiguity in the text would 
be to explain the differences as differences in emphasis. In his 
description of the onset of love Socrates wishes to distinguish the 
lover from the wanton man. Here Socrates compares the wanton man's 
purely sensual desire to the lover's spiritual desire. That is not to 
say that the lover does not have sensual desires, just that he has
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more than sensual desires. When Socrates considers the lover alone he 
acknowledges both sensual and spiritual desires.
Since Socrates finds the wanton man's desire for sensual 
pleasures base and ignoble, he must condemn the lover's desire for 
sensual pleasure as well. And so he does. It is not that he finds 
having only sensual desires objectionable; having sensual desires, 
along with more noble ones, are no less objectionable. Sensual 
desires are, without qualification, of negative worth. Even if the 
lover is suffused with the light of true beauty, his nobler parts 
cannot transmute the sensual desire into anything praiseworthy. Not 
only are sensual desires totally and completely corrupt without 
redemption, even the lover who fosters his nobler parts is condemned 
to contend with his black steed for all eternity.
Socrates emphasizes the lover's struggle for nobler virtues, but 
even as the lover desires the beautiful so too does he desire the 
sensual. Though he is called upon to overcome the desire, the lover 
does have a sensual desire for the beloved. Ke wants the beloved for 
the express purpose of sensual gratification. Just as the wanton man 
wants the beloved so that he may enjoy the beauty for himself, so does 
the lover. One of the lover's desires, then, is the self-aggrandizing 
desire for pleasure. He wants the beloved's beauty for his own 
enjoyment, and he presumably wants because the beauty is pleasurable.
Socrates condemns this desire on the part of the lover. We might 
surmise that he condemns it because it 1) is self-serving and 2) is no 
more rational than any appetitive desire. I, the lover, want for me 
and I want for no better reason than it feels good. Socrates could
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find this o b j e c t i o n a b l e ,  first, b e c a u s e  the d e s i r e  is 
self-aggrandizing and does not have the altruistic character of X 
wanting Y for Z (XjtZ), and second, because, as a proponent of rational 
discourse, Socrates would likely not find "I want X because it will 
give me pleasure" adequate justification for wanting X. It might well 
be that while X feels good to me, it is not good for me. The 
distinction between appearance and reality was hardly foreign to 
Socrates. Being a strong proponent, of it he could hardly be 
satisfied with a justification that left off at the level of 
appearances.
Socrates might argue in this vein, but I think not. If Socrates 
so argued, he would be in Che uncomfortable position of criticizing 
his spiritual desires on the same grounds as the sensual desires. The 
lover has sensual desires of the form "I want the beloved for me 
because he will please me." His spiritual desires have the same form: 
"I want the beloved for me because he will please me." The lever 
finds that in the presence of the beloved he experiences something 
like pleasure but perhaps closer to ecstasy or rapture. In any case 
he finds the experience pleasurable not withstanding the pain 
accompanying the sprouting of his wings. Whatever pain (in addition 
to the pleasure) the presence to the beloved causes, it is nothing 
compared to the anguish of the beloved's absence. And so the lover 
seeks out the beloved to assuage the anguish and to revel in the 
ecstasy. But note that what he desires is for himself. It is ; Is 
anguish he wishes to relieve and his own ecstatic experience he wishes 
to have. This may be spiritual pleasure and pain, but it is his and
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he seeks out one and attempts to avoid the other. Very much like the 
wanton man, the lover seeks out his own gratification, albeit 
spiritual. Socrates, then, could hardly condemn the wanton man of 
ego-centrism and praise the lover who is no more altruistic. The 
wanton man and the lover may want different things, but they both want 
them for themselves.
The lover's spiritual desires are for himself, but why? What 
reasons does he offer for this desire? Socrates gives only hints. 
The description of the lover in the first throes of love does not lead 
one to believe that the lover has any but the simplest reasons: he 
wan t s  to belo v e d ' s  company because he finds it spiritually 
pleasurable. Vet, as the love grows the lover's reason's for desiring 
seem to become more complicated as will be seen later. But the 
initial stages of love seem marked with a lack of reason. The 
beloved, as he in turn begins to love, finds himself in much the same 
position as the lover originally did. Socrates describes the first 
pulses of love in the beloved in the following way. "So he loves, yet 
knows not what he loves; he does not understand, he cannot tell what 
has come upon him....' ( 255d) In all fairness to Plato, it must be 
acknowledged that this passage is followed by a description of the 
beloved's growing sensual desires for the lover, yet the word "love" 
is used and seems to apply to the total experience described in the 
passage. The conclusion I draw is that neither the lover nor beloved 
initially has any more reason for his spiritual desire than that the 
presence of the beloved p leases him. If this is true, then Socrates 
once again finds his lover in the same position as the wanton man.
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Each wants for himself and for no more sophisticated reason than the 
beloved's beauty pleases him.
If the lover and the wanton man both want for themselves because 
it feels good, what then distinguishes them? The answer must be that 
what distinguishes them is the nature of what they desire and of their 
own character that prompts them to love one thing rather than another. 
Wanting sensual pleasure is the product of the base and ignoble 
elements of one's character. When these elements are all that 
comprise the character, the result is a wanton man who only desires 
sensual delights, the base and ignoble counterparts in the world to 
his depraved character.
The lover, of course, is of good character. His good character 
prompts him to desire good and noble things. Socrates deems the 
sensual bad and the spiritual good and hence it follows that his 
lover, being of good character, desires what is good--spiritua 1 
elevation and the pleasure gained therefrom.
Socrates' description of the first pulses of love compares well 
with standard descriptions of this phase. Not only is the lover 
struck and driven to distraction by his love, he finds himself 
desiring the beloved more than any thing in the world. He wants the 
beloved for himself because he is in ecstasy when the beloved is near. 
What the lover knows, what is most apparent to him, is that the 
beloved is an extraordinary source of pleasure, so great that nothing 
can compare to it. The superlatives of love are reserved for this 
stage when you make me happier than I ever knew was possible, and she 
is delirious with joy. The glowing metaphors of love bespeak the joy
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the lover receives fron beholding the beloved. It is the lover's own 
consumate pleasure that draws him to the beloved. "I cannot be happy 
without you." " You almost make the day begin." The lover is most 
aware of his own joy and is convinced that he has been graced. The 
lover, in the midst of his ecstacy, acts for his own benefit— or what 
he sees as his own benefit. And further, that the pleasures of love 
are truly a boon is self-evident to the lover; he sees no further 
reason for loving than the feelings he experiences. His experiences 
are palpably and thoroughly good. So overwhelming and complete is 
love that it is inconceivable that it could be other than it appears. 
Hence it needs no examination or justification; the experience is 
self-justifying or perhaps is above justification. It is clear and 
distinct, so pure and lucid Chat questioning it is as absurd as asking 
whether my hands are before me.
Socrates, then, has captured at least some important features of 
the onset of love. The delirium of love's first blush, the 
extraordinary value placed on the beloved, the desire for the beloved 
that knows only itself and knows no reason, all these bespeak the man 
rapt with himself, captured by the beginning of love, but this is 
surely not its end. There are times when love dies with the madness 
and so death and disillusionment are its end, but there are also loves 
that develop. Love, as Plato knows, may grow from madness' 
breathtaking flights. Though Socrates speaks only briefly of this 
state, I believe that Plato sees the development of love as more 
important than its onset. It is in the growth of love that the lover 
develops. He becomes wise and godlike. These are virtues that
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Socrates can heartily endorse. The onset of love may give the lover 
experience beyond compare, but the development of love gives the lover 
character beyond value.
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2.4 ANALYSIS II: THE SEARCH FOR ALTRUISM
2.4.1 Love unto Wisdom 
Near the beginning of Socrates' first speech is a discussion of 
love and desire. After admitting that love is some sort of desire and 
that men do desire that which is fair without being lovers, the first 
Socratic lover asks how we are to distinguish the lover from the 
non-lover. To answer his own question the first lover draws a 
distinction :
... there are two sorts of ruling or guiding principles 
that we follow. One is an innate desire for pleasure, the 
other an acquired judgment that aims at what is best.
(237d)"
He goes on to elaborate.
Sometimes these internal guides are in accord, sometimes 
at variance; now one gains the mastery, now the other.
And when judgment guides us rationally toward what is 
bvSt, and has the mastery, that mastery is called 
temperance, but when desire drags us irrationally toward 
pleasure, and has come to rule within us, the name given 
to that rule is wantonness. ( 237d-e,238a)
He points out that there are many names for wantonness and that
When irrational desire, pursuing the enjoyment of beauty, 
has gained the mastery over judgment that prompts to right 
conduct, and has acquired from other desires, akin to it, 
fresh strength to strain toward bodily beauty, that very 
strength provides it with its name —  it is the strong 
passion called love. (238b-c)
When Socrates recants his first speech and produces his second lover,
he does not immediately appear to use the distinction drawn in his
first speech. He argues that there are beneficial madnesses and that
love is one of them. Yet he has not so much rejected the distinction
as recast it . He is no more favorably disposed toward desire's
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satisfaction for its own sake in the second speech than in the first. 
This he condemns fairly explicitly in both speeches. And in each he 
offers up reason as a guiding principle. What Socrates denies in the 
second speech is that great desire is incompatible with reason. In 
fact he claims reason reaches its apogee when it is propelled by the 
all consuming desire of love.
If we left our second Socratic lover with his madness and desire, 
we would have a case of little more than infatuation. The lover would 
be much like the child who is fascinated with the glittering lights of 
a Christmas tree. Socrates has more in mind for his lover than 
divinely inspired madness. The good character that leads the lover to 
want more than sexual gratification also leads him to perfect that 
character and that of his beloved's through the inspiration of divine, 
mad love.
Socrates explains the differences in human character by telling 
us that we followed different gods in our heavenly journey. This 
explanation serves, not only to explain why Paul is more bellicose 
than Bill and why Sally is more demure than Betty, but also how each 
of us is in some respect and degree like a god. It is important to 
see that this is a two pronged explanation. One prong allows for the 
f o u n d a t i o n  of a rudimentary theory of personality based on 
characterological differences. This part of the explanation is very 
much a part of the practice of modern science; there is an attempt to 
explain the facts as they are without recourse to evaluation. Things 
are as they are because of certain factors. Good, bad or indifferent 
these factors determine the facts. Mo value judgment is being made.
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only an attempt to explain pure and simple.
But Socrates' explanation is not just an elementary scientific 
theory. It is also a philosophical theory of how humans evaluate 
themselves and how, whatever the differences in character explained by 
any scientific theory, humans through this evaluation improve 
themselves. Our charactero logical models in the Phaedrus are, after 
all, gods, and since we are built on a godly model, it is reasonable 
to expect us to approach that godly model more and more nearly through 
the course of our lives. Of course we don't all perfect ourselves as 
we age and Socrates acknowledges this by admitting that the wanton man 
exists. Socrates is more than aware that some men are more fallen 
than others. Nonetheless he maintains our ability to approach a 
god-likc state. Fallen souls though us may be, we still retain a 
vestige of our god-like character.
There may be other ways to regain our godliness, but in the 
Phaedrus Socrates advocates love as a means to this end. I think it 
would be granted on all hands that being in love prompts us to put our 
best foot forward, but Socrates has something more than simple 
posturing in mind. The appearance of a "god-like face or bodily form 
that truly expresses beauty" (251a) brings the lover to "veneration 
and worship." (252d) For the sake of this godly beauty the lover 
draws upon his resources literally to make himself better. And the 
resource he has at his disposal is his own god-like character.
Perhaps it is well to pause a moment now to comment on Socrates' 
use of the words "veneration" and "worship." These are part of a 
group of words, including adoration and reverence, that describe an
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attitude of honor and awe at the sacredness or the divine quality of 
the object. The group is particularly appropriate to Socrates' 
description of the lover. The lover has perceived the divine or 
sacred in the beloved and is properly in awe of it. He honors the 
divine and gives it respect. What other attitude can be conceived for 
a person who has seen beauty, who has seen a god? The lover has 
transcended the mundane to find something far above the ordinary 
routine of life. If you were to find beauty amidst squalor and 
banality, would you not treasure that discovery? Surely this is what 
the lover has found. Whether in French or English, he tells his 
beloved that he adores her. He says that he worships the very ground 
on which she walks. So it seems that Socrates is right; the lover has 
caught sight of the divine and is struck with awe and reverence for 
his discovery.
Yet in the Phaedrus these are but a few well placed words. 
Socrates does not pursue the topic. And since he does not, I will not 
at this point, but reserve it for a latter discussion.
What is important at the moment is to see that the lover, having 
been struck by beauty, venerates it and in his veneration is drawn to 
fulfill the divinity in his own character. This is not a case of one 
man making another what he is today. The beloved is not an agent in 
the ordinary sense; he does not consciously or unconsciously act to 
inform the character of the beloved. In fact he does not act at all. 
He simply is. He is beautiful and he i_s_ divine, and that is quite 
enough for the lover. In the presence of the divine and beautiful the 
lover takes it upon himself to fashion himself after that divinity.
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(Remember that for Socrates the divinity of the lover is of the same 
type as that of the beloved; they are followers of the same god.) It 
is by being divine and beautiful that the beloved acts as a catalyst 
for the lover's improvement. In the beloved's catalytic role the 
lover can preserve his integrity. He has not been created by the 
beloved; he is not the product of the beloved's tutelage. He is the 
product of his own character. He improves and becomes more divine 
because he began with a good (godly) character. The beloved provides 
only the source of inspiration through which the betterment occurred . 
In some way all Plato is saying is that we improve when exposed to 
good circumstances with the proviso that we must be aware of the 
goodness to be influenced by its presence. Being provided with good 
circumstances does not cause us to improve; it allows us to improve. 
Perhaps there is no precise way to describe the relation of lover and 
beloved. Perhaps we would have to resort to a Heideggerian rejection 
of the sub j ec t-ob j ec t split to talk of the relationship accurately. 
For present purposes, though, it is enough to recognize that the 
lover-beloved relationship falls into that vast expanse between a 
causal interaction between lover and the beloved and a merely 
gratuitious presence of the beloved to the lover. The beloved does 
not cause the lover to improve; neither is the beloved superfluous to 
the lover's improvement.
Yet where is the altruism in the lover's self-improvement? The 
beloved is certainly not acting altruistically. From the forgoing 
description he cannot be said to be acting at all. And even if the 
beloved's gift of inspiration to the lover could be considered an act
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of giving to another, it does not fit the criteria for an altrusitic 
act. For an act to be altruistic the actor must be consciously acting 
in another's sehalf. The tree that provides nesting space for birds 
and squirrels is not acting altruistically. The earthworm whose 
castings nourish plants is not altruistic. Neither is the nan who 
loses a dollar on the street only to be found by a starving man. 
Fortuituous circumstances yes, altruistic no. The act must be 
conscious to be altruistic. I must give to you or do for you because 
I think what I give or do is in your own best interest. This 
consciousness need not be self-consciousness, though. I do not have 
to think "I am going to do this for the other's welfare" for the act 
to be altruistic. The man who rushes out in the street to save a 
snail child from an on-rushing auto can be said to be altruistic, yet 
he acts too quickly to be self-conscious. What he has done is act 
intentionally (which requires consciousness) for the other's welfare. 
On these conditions the beloved cannot be acting altruistically.
The flames of love may be fanned and the lover fast upon 
self-improvement and the beloved not even be aware the lover is alive. 
The beloved cannot be said to be acting altruistically because he 
lacks the intention to so act. Can the lover be acting altruistically 
for his part?
Neither in the inspiration he receives from the beloved nor in 
the self-improvement he fosters in himself is the lover altruistic. 
He is altruistic, however, in his actions that follow in the wake of 
the inspiration and the self-improvement. Socrates tells us that the 
lover is unaware that his self-improvement is the consequence of
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drawing on his own resources and that he attributes his improvement to 
the beloved, albeit mistakenly. As a result the lover behaves toward 
the beloved as if the beloved was the source of the lover's 
improvement. "But all this, mark you, they attribute to the beloved, 
and the draughts which they draw from Zeus they pour out, like 
bacchants, into the soul of the beloved...." (253a) Here is the 
lover's altruism. He intentionally acts in the beloved's own best 
interests; he creates in the beloved "the closest possible likeness to 
the god they worship." (253a) The lover acts to promote the growth 
of the beloved. This is not the apparent good of pleasure, but the 
real good of personal growth. The lover does not pander to the 
beloved. He does not, like an obsequious servant, cater to the 
beloved's every whim. His love reaches beyond any apparent good to 
the actual good of se If-improvement.
The lover has passed through the self-centeredness and 
self-indulgence of the beginnings of love to altruism. The lover, 
mistaking his own achievements in self-improvement as being caused by 
the beloved, acts to repay the non-existent debt to the beloved by 
giving the beloved the same growth the lover himself has experienced. 
The beloved presumably finally succumbs to the lover's attentions and 
begins to love. The beloved in turn becomes a lover and, with the 
same experiences and motivations the lover, comes to act in the 
l o v e r ' s  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s .  W i t h  this r e c i p r o c a l  love of 
self-improvement, Socrates' tale of love comes to an end. The lovers, 
if they both have conquered their dark horse, "have won self-mastery 
and inward peace. And when life is over, with burdens shed and wings
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recovered they stand victorious in the first of the three rounds in 
that truly Olympic struggle...." (256b)
It has been argued by Gregory Vlastos^ and Harry Neuman^, among 
others, that Platonic love is self-serving and not altruistic. To 
defend their claim they have appealed to the Svmposium and in 
particular Diotima's speech. If the Symposium is kept in mind, then 
Vlas to s and Neuman's position is defensible; the Svmpos ium doe? 
concentrate on the lover's self-serving interests. Even the Phaedrus 
is not a paean to altruism, but I believe I have shown that there is 
at least a shred of altruistic concern in the Phaedrus. It is not so 
much a question of whether altruism plays a role in the story of love 
in the Phaedrus as a quescicii of accuracy. However much we nay wish 
altruism to be the central feature of love, however nuch we nirht 
condemn Plato for not emphasizing it, how much a part of love is 
altruism and how well has Plato characterized that part?
The first question is whether love can encompass other than 
altruistic desires. Using the schematic for desire mention earlier, 
there are at least four possibilities: 1) I love you and desire 
someone or something for myself (reflexive desire), 2) I love you and 
desire something for you (if that something is for your well being, 
then this is an altruistic desire), 3) I love you and desire something 
for us (combined altruistic and reflexive desires), 4) I love you and 
desire something for someone or something other than either of us (a 
desire unrelated to my love for you). The second and fourth cases are 
the least problematic. I don't believe anyone would question my love 
for you if I concommitantly desired the recovery of an ill friend or
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the preservation of a nationial landmark, to mention only a coup 
possible desires falling into the fourth category. The seco 
possibility seems an even more obvious combination of love and desire 
Not only is the the desire compatible with my love for you, altruistic 
desires for you seem to be a necessary part of my love for you; I 
could not properly claim to love you if I did not desire (something 
like) your health and personal growth. The common notion of love 
seems to require that I want some good things for you if I love you. 
If I do not want some good things for you, then I might well be told 
that I don't understand what love is or that I am a damn liar. 
Altruistic desires for the beloved appears to be an integral part of 
the notion of love.
My reflexive desires as a lover are more problematic. My wanting 
to further my career and my love for you, may be incompatible if, for 
instance, furthering my career interferes with my attempt to achieve 
my altruistic desires toward you. But it is possible that I can have 
altruistic desires for you and desire career advancement for myself. 
The practical course of things may find these desires incompatible, 
but not necessarily. And a possibility is all that is necessary: it 
is possible that I desire such things as career advancements for 
myself and love you. My love and my reflexive desires are not 
incompatible in the same way that my desire to hurt and to help you in 
the same respect at the same time are.
My desire for career advancement may concern the beloved directly 
in a variety of ways, but some of my reflexive desires concern the 
beloved far more intimately. I want to feast my eyes on you and have
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sex with you. Now not only am I claiming to love you and to have 
reflexive desires, you are the obiect of those reflexive desires. Yet 
there does not seem to be anything necessarily incompatible with 
loving you and having reflexive (sexual) desires of which you are the 
object. I can have sexual desires for you and not love you— the most 
common term for this is "lust"— and if I have only sexual desires for 
you then we would not ordinarily classify my desire as love at all. 
But I can love you and desire you so long as ray desire does not take a 
form that is detrimental to your well being. The only clearly 
incompatible desires are desires to hurt you and benefit you at the 
same time in the same respect. I may wish to satisfy my sexual 
desires and yours at the same time; here there is no incom.pa t ib i 1 it y . 
But if satisfying my sexual desires means mortifying you then my 
sexual desires of that sort cannot be a part of my love for you.
Considerations of sex leads us to the third category, my wanting 
for us. If I want a beautiful home, a meaningful relationship, or 
passionate sex for us, 1 can still love you. Indeed we often take 
such desires as indicative of love. And again there seems to be no 
problem with both loving you and desiring for us so long as what I 
want for us does you no harm.
This discussion of the four categories of love and desire yields 
the following results. When we love, we must have some altruistic 
desires toward the beloved. We may have (and usually do) have desires 
for others and for ourselves, and these need not be incompatible with 
our love so long as they do not conflict with our basic altruistic 
desires toward the beloved. The lover mav even have desires for both
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himself and the beloved, but again the stipulation is that these 
cannot be incompatible with the altruistic desires for the beloved. 
Finally, sexual desires, as a special case of reflexive desires, can 
be compatible with love so long as they are compatible with basic 
altruistic desires for the well being of the beloved. There is, then, 
a wide range of desires possible when we love so far as the logical 
possibilities are concerned. Of course practical consideration may 
limit these desires and their compatibility radically, but to this 
point we have only considered the logical possibilities. Now the 
question of whether Plato's description of love is accurate with 
regard to desires and altruism can be evaluated with some precision.
One thing should be clear from the outset: Plato, like man y 
romantic novelists, emphasizes the first throes of love. A romantic 
novel describes to us the trials lovers must overcome to be together 
and, if there is no tragic end, the novel ends in some version of "And 
they lived happily ever after." So too, Plato tells us of the initial 
stages of love, describing to us the battle that leads to love's 
success, only to leave us with an ellipse. The description of the 
living out of the tried love is sketched in only a few sentences. I 
suppose that Plato takes it that we all know what it is like, through 
mutual love, to grow in knowledge, wisdom, beauty, and truth or, if we 
don't, that we will by the time we pass through the initial stages of 
love as he prescribes. What we must get clear, it seems, is what it 
takes to get to that nourishing mutual love. This emphasis on the 
onset of love might well produce a lack of emphasis on the altruistic 
elements of love since we would expect the altruism to be most evident
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in the day to day acts of an established mutual love. And indeed, 
such an emphasis is just what we find in the Phaedrus. Primarily 
Socrates addresses what the lover wants for himself.
Plato's position that the lover first wants for himself is not 
contradicted by the lore of love. Tales of love frequently tell of 
the lover's desire for the beloved. He wants the beloved as his own. 
To have the beloved is his goal, one which he will achieve at nearly 
any price. The desire for self-gratification may not characterize the 
onset of every love, but it does describe a sufficient number of cases 
that we would grant are love to conclude that reflexive desires can 
be, often are a part of the initial stages of love. Since the facts 
of the matter are that love does include self-serving desires, we can 
hardly fault Plato for acknowledging these and indeed for giving a 
vivid description of them. The reflexive desires, like all desires, 
are based on the perception of value in the thing desired. To ask 
that someone desire for another without at the same time desiring for 
himself requires that the lover be blind to the value of the beloved 
for himself. To ask that the lover only desire al trust ical ly is to 
ask that he both value the other (so that he may want for the other) 
and not value the other (as in any way capable of gratifying the 
lover). This is not logically impossible because in both valuing and 
not valuing the same person the lover may be valuing in different 
respects. I somehow recognize your value as a person and desire what 
is good for you yet also recognize that what makes you valuable as a 
person is of no particular value (use?) to me.
This possibility is hard to conceive. If I come to value you as
a person, I ara hard pressed to find circumstances under which I would 
not wish to enjoy this value at all, in any way, at any time. It is 
as simple as this: if I thought that you were a wonderful person, how 
could I help but want to be around you and enjoy you— for my own 
gratification? I admit that this psychological urge to want what I 
value is not logically necessary, but the connection between what 1 
value and what I desire is frequent and compelling. Plato in 
describing the desire of the lover is no more than recognizing a 
common state of affairs between what I value and what 1 desire. If 1 
love you, then 1 value you, and if 1 value you, then it is very likely 
that 1 will desire you for my own gratification.
Plato goes on to claim that, while p 
ordinary, tay se:eual desires for you are in conflict with my love for 
you. This conflict is grounded in his claim that the satisfaction of 
sexual desires are not beneficial for either the lover or the beloved. 
And sexual desires are not beneficial because they keep the lover's 
attention on the corruptible, corporeal world rather than on that 
which is intrisically valuable— truth and beauty themselves. A person 
is loved in so far as he is a manifestation of these enduring 
spiritual values, and in so far as 1 am drawn to a person for other 
than these spiritual values, then 1 am being drawn away from what is 
intrinsically good. Hence, my desire for the sexual gratification 
your body can offer is incompatible with my desire for truth and 
beauty that association with your soul can offer.
In so far as we accept Plato's assumption that a person is 
composed of body and soul, then 1 think we are forced to accept the
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conclusion that satisfaction of sexual desires is incompatible with 
the satisfaction of "spiritual" desires. But Plato's assumption that 
a sou 1 plus a body equals a person need not be accepted. It is of 
course true that we can and regularly do distinguish between the 
mental and the corporeal. But that does not seem to require that we 
leap to the conclusion that there are physical things and spiritual 
things. I do not wish to argue against metaphysical dualism here, but 
I do want to assert that, given Plato's limited argumentation for a 
dualism, we need not accept the assumption that a person is a 
composite of soul and body. Rather, we may consider the person, not 
his alleged body and soul, as primitive. As we can distinguish 
between the color and brilliance of a diamond and yet not consider the 
Cv.ir or brilliance as things of which the diamond is composed, so too 
can we consider the soul and body distinguishable aspects, but not 
parts, of a person. If we assume that the person and not his body and 
soul is primitive, then the incompatibility between sexual and 
spiritual desires disappears. Whether I want to revel in your beauty 
so that I might aspire to greater heights or want the sexual pleasure
of your company, the criteria of the compatibility of these desires
with my love for you is no longer based on the alleged intrinsic good 
of spiritual elevation but on the goodness of the person as a whole. 
When I consider you as a person, my reflexive desires, whether sexual 
or spiritual, can be compatible with my altruistic desires for you.
To the extent that Plato insists that sexual desires are
incompatible with my love for you, we must consider Plato to have 
drawn an unjustified conclusion. At the very least, his account of
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love and sex is based on unsubstantiated grounds, and we must part 
company with Plato. Sexual reflexive desires and altruistic desires 
can be compatible though they need not be.
We can for the moment ignore Plato's position with regard to 
sexual desires and reassert and reemphasize that even in loving the 
beloved his lover does have reflexive desires. That is, Plato's lover 
both has altruistic desires (of spiritual growth) for the beloved and 
reflexive desires (of spiritual growth) for himself. At least at the 
"spiritual plane" Plato sees no problem with both loving you and 
wanting for myself. Plato idealistically assumes that in every case 
my wanting my own spiritual growth is compatible with my wanting your 
spiritual growth. This is a pleasant thought but surely not the case. 
Even if we assume that the lover wants only spiritual goods for 
himself and his beloved (and hence,according to Plato, the lover only 
wants intrinsic goods), these desires need not be compatible. Again, 
we have established that reflexive desires can be compatible with 
altruistic desires, but we have not established that that they always 
will be. Plato tries to assure this by making the lovers followers of 
the same god. If we have the same sort of personality, then surely, 
Plato reasons, we will have the sane goals, and if we have the same 
goals, then the reflexive and altruistic desires will not be in 
conflict. Plato's scheme seems to work if the lover's are something 
like philosophers. You and I, as philosophical lovers, work and share 
in the growth of our wisdom. The ideas and insight that constitute 
wisdom can be had by both of us. Any new insight I come upon for 
myself I can share with you. Then we both have gained and our
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reflexive and altruistic desires are not in conflict. But should we 
be lovers whose personalities tend toward the acquisition of power, 
however benign and ben if icent that power, we may find ourselves 
wanting the same position of power. In the case where both of us want 
to be president of the United States (presumably for the welfare of 
the country), our reflexive desires for ourselves and our altruistic 
desires for the beloved would conflict. Sometimes I would want to be 
president and want you to be president, clearly incompatible desires 
at a given time. Plato is concerned with personal growth, and he sees 
this growth as a growth of wisdom, but wisdom is not a limited 
commodity. All may have it. Whenever growth is toward a limited 
commodity, e.g. positions of power, one lover's having that commodity 
may prevent the other from having it. In such practical circumstances 
even the best of lovers would have his reflexive and altruistic 
desires in conflict. So here, too, we must differ with Plato and 
reassert that the reflexive and altruistic desires of the lover can be 
compatible, but practical circumstances may find these desires in 
conflict.
In so far as Plato acknowledges that both reflexive and 
altruistic desires are a part of love, we can grant that he has aptly 
characterized love, but he makes two important errors in his 
description of desire's place in love. First, under the influence of 
his metaphysical dualism, he claims that sexual desires are 
incompatible with "spiritual" desires. His claim can be rejected by 
denying the metaphysical dualism; by asserting the primacy of the 
person, not the soul, sexual reflexive desires can be compatible with
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the basic altruistic desires of the lover. Second, by virtue of his 
idealism, Plato assumes that a lover's reflexive and altruistic 
desires are never incompatible. This claim mistakes what is possible 
for what is actual. That is, while it is certainly possible for 
reflexive and altruistic desires to be compatible, the particular 
circumstances of the lovers may make those desires practically 
incompatible.
2.4.2 In Summary
Plato has provided a fairly comprehensive description of love 
from its first throes to its fruition and many of his descriptions and 
explanations are on the mark. I'.is accuracy is particularly notable 
since much of his account is given as an explanatory myth. He 
describes Che "madness" that most of us would recognize as often 
accompanying the first throes of love. Metaphorically Plato ties this 
madness to the recognition of the godliness of the beloved. Stripped 
of the metaphor, the madness can be seen as a response to the 
perception by the lover of the extraordinary value of the beloved.
The same perception of value that prompts the lover's madness 
also fires his desire. Plato recognizes the place of desire in love 
although his symbolism carries the burden of the description. 
Nonetheless, Plato does explicitly acknowledge that the lover has both 
sexual and non-sexual reflexive desires for the beloved as well as 
altruistic desires for the beloved. His definition of love might 
read: Love is a human condition in which the one who loves experiences 
the true value of another as the manifestation of truth and beauty.
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The experience of this value results in what is often considered a 
madness. In addition, the lover, because of the value he sees in the 
beloved, both reflexively desires the beloved for himself and 
altruistically desires the promotion of the beloved's welfare and 
growth. Sexual desires are one set of the lover's reflexive desires, 
but these should not be acted on since they conflict with both the 
lover's other reflexive desires for his own growth as well as his 
altruistic desires for the beloved's growth.
My criticism of Plato's account would alter the definition in the 
following ways: Love is a human condition in which the one who loves
experiences the true value of another as a person. The experience of 
this value results in what is often considered a madness. In 
addition, the lover, because of the value he sees in the beloved, both 
reflexively desires the beloved for himself and altruistically desires 
the promotion of the beloved's welfare and growth. Sexual desires are 
one set of the lover's reflexive desires and may be compatible with 
his other reflexive desires and his altruistic desires for the 
beloved, depending on the circumstances.
As informative as this amended definition may be, it is not 
wholely satisfying. Partly because of his use of myth and partly 
because of his philosophical inclinations, Plato has left several 
questions unanswered. What is the nature of the value the lover 
experiences in the beloved? Who is this person that is the beloved? 
Can love be characterized as an emotion even though the primary 
reactions of the lover to the beloved is madness and desire?
I will take up each of these questions starting with the nature
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of the value the lover experiences. It is Scheler who comments most 
explicitly on value and the lover and it is his work that I will look 
at next .
CHAPTER III
HOW DO I LOVE THEE? LET ME CODHT THE WAYS I DON'T: 
SCHELER'8 LOVE AS ACT
2.1 Love is not a feeling
Au the heart of what I understand to be Plato's definition of 
love and of my revision of it is the experience of value. The lover, 
before he can desire or be deemed mad, must somehow recognize the 
value of the beloved, and he must do so in a way different than the 
non-lover. The non-lover may grant that the beloved is valuable as a 
musician, a member of the firm, a pasta maker, or as a sex partner. 
The non-lover may acknowledge the value of the beloved in innumberable 
ways and yet not love. T e  lover, on the other hand, "sees" the 
beloved in a special light and values the beloved in a special way— or 
so it seems. To some extent Plato addresses the issue of what the 
lover "sees" in the beloved. He claims the lover "sees" godliness and 
eternal beauty shining through the beloved. Yet while this does give 
us an indication of what is to be seen in the beloved, it does not 
really address the nature of the "seeing". This "seeing" seems to be 
like no other and seems to be at the heart of love. Even so Plato 
passes over it to speak about what is seen and what happens once the 
seeing has occurred. This special act of perception (if that is what
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it is) Chat lies at the heart of love is glossed over. Plato takes 
the interplay of desires as the focus of love and yet he grants that 
something unusual has happened that is logically prior to and is the 
cause of those desires. Plato leaves us with the question "What is 
love?" if we consider that question not as about the acts specifically 
related to love but as about the original relation between the lover 
and beloved that provides the ground for the consequent acts.
It is the original relation established between the lover and 
beloved that I want to investigate now. The question to be answered 
is "What is the original relation between lover and beloved; how is 
the lover related to the beloved when the lover com.es to love?"
Max Scheler in The Mature of Sympathy and "Ordo Anoris" attempts 
to analyze love. Since he believes love is an act and that acts are 
essentially indefinable, his analysis tends to be a via nesativa. an 
analysis of what love is not. Even so, and in spite of himself, he 
seems to provide a definition. So with Scheler we have arguments for 
what love often is thought to be but is not and some argumentation for 
what love is. These arguments are not particularly well formed. Her 
does Scheler provide a structural relationship between them. Hence it 
is helpful to have in mind what Scheler claims love is before 
examining his arguments .
Scheler provides the following definition of love.
...love is that movement wherein every concrete individual 
object that possesses value achieves the highest value 
compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein 
it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its 
nature
Without some notion of Scheler's general position such a definition is
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virtually meaningless. For the moment, a brief explanation of 
Scheler's view will be sufficient to orient the uninitiated. By 
claiming that love is a movement, Scheler is emphasizing its nature as 
act. If love is a movement, an act, then it can be distinguished from 
feelings and (Scheler thinks) emotions or anything else that can be 
called passive. Love is, however, a peculiar kind of act. The 
remainder of the definition indicates that love is that act through 
which something attains its most nearly perfect form. I have 
interpreted Scheler's definition as saying "love is that act through 
which something attains its most nearly perfect form" because for 
Scheler, while love is active in bringing forth the value inherent in 
a thing, love is not specifically directed to value enhancement as a 
goal. Love, by some means, does bring about the enhancement of value, 
but this enhancement is not a matter of pedagogy. By loving (though 
this is not love's goal), the beloved becomes more nearly perfect 
example of what it is.
S c h e l e r  d efines love by way of its consequence— value 
enhancement. The value which a thing has and is enhanced through love 
seems to be a Platonic form. Scheler's position is that every thing 
has a value inherent in it and that there is a heirarchy of things by 
virtue of their value. A worm has less value than a man, a man less 
value than God. Love of any given thing, therefore, brings forth 
whatever value is appropriate to that thing. Values are objectively a 
part of a thing as much as its color or shape and are g i ven 
objectively. It is up to us to discern the value appropriate to a 
thing and, when we love, bring forth the value a thing already has.
Depending on your frame of reference, the definition seems Platonic, 
Christian, idealistic, or humanistic. To the philosopher, it most 
likely seems vague and unsatisfying. For the moment, though, the 
definition, with my limited comments on it, will have to do as an 
introduction to Scheler's notion of love.
One of Scheler's concerns is to distinguish love from feelings 
and emotions. His arguments to this effect are fragmentary and I will 
fill in the details of these arguments with as much fidelity to 
Scheler's thought as is possible. Scheler rejects the possiblity that 
love is a feeling or emotion (Scheler does not distinguish between the 
two in The Nature o f Svmoathv) before considering any other 
possibilities. His demonstration in The Nature of Sympathy, if it can 
be called such, that love is not a feeling is dispatched in no more 
than two brief paragraphs. Scheler first points out chat our love for 
someone does not alter in spite of all the pain or pleasure the 
beloved may cause. From this brief comment, it appears that Scheler 
is assuming 1) that love endures over a reasonably long period of time 
and that at any rate love ordinarily endures longer than most of what 
we would consider feeling states, 2) that feeling states are 
relatively fleeting, and 3) that love can coexist with various feeling 
states .
Scheler then asks us to consider love as the cause of emotional 
states. That is, as a con sequence of our pursuing our love we 
experience emotional states. Scheler evidently believes that by 
inspection of our experiences of love that we will be compelled to 
admit that love has caused some of our most dramatic emotional states
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and that, this being the case, it is impossible that love itself be a 
feeling. No doubt Scheler would say that just because love so 
quickly, thoroughly and dramatically throws us into elation or 
despair, anxiety or euphoria, we tend to confuse the cause and effect 
conflating them into a unit. Nonetheless, seeing that love causes us 
to feel requires nothing more than a little careful reflection. 
Clearly, too, we would seem to have to admit that love is active 
insofar as it produces emotions and that emotions are (in some sense) 
the passive product of love.
Little else is said in The Nature of Sympathy to show that love 
is not a feeling. Scheler does allude to the distinction subsequently 
but produces nothing further by way of demonstration of the 
distinction. He does, however, consider the subject more fully in 
"Ordo Amoris."
Scheler takes very much the same position in "Ordo Amoris" as he 
does in The Nature of Sympathy stating that
Love and hate, therefore, can never be reduced, as 
people have so often tried to do, to the release of 
p a s s i v e  f e e l i n g s  in the p r e s e n c e  of objects of 
representation and thought.^
His elaboration in "Ordo Anoris," however, involves his distinction
between feelings, affects and passions. It also contains a criticism
of a theory of feelings that claims that feelings are the result of
volitions .
X will discuss his distinction between feelings, affects and 
passions first since the distinction will be central to an exposition 
of his arguments that claim that love is not a feeling or emotion.
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Scheler does not provide us with a definition of feelings, but he does 
say that they have no va lue-intentions. This quality is clearly a 
result of his conception of then as passive. They are something that 
we just experience. We may attend to them and we may seek to have 
them again, but the feelings themselves are passive objects of 
consciousness, not a characterization of the intentional act of 
consciouisness. And since feelings are not intentional they can 
hardly be intentions toward some value.
Scheler's claim that feelings are p a s s i v e  o b j e c t s  of 
consciousness seems reasonable. When we feel hungry or thirsty we are 
aware of certain bodily states. What we are aware of is not a 
characterization of consciousness. Rather the feelings of hunger or 
thirst are objects of consciousness. A certain set of sensations, I 
have learned, indicate that I need food and are to be called "hunger." 
These sensations are more intimate, perhaps, than my view of the 
Eiffel Tower, but nonetheless these sensations are every bit as much 
the object of my consciousness as the Eiffel Tower. As we go "out" 
from bodily sensations, Scheler's contention becomes clearer. For 
instance if, while walking barefoot on a lawn, I feel a sudden surge 
of pain in my right foot, I may well find that that searing pain is 
the sole object of my consciousness. I may glare at the offending 
piece of rusty tin and I may inspect my wounded foot; each of these 
are likely objects of my consciousness under the circumstances. But I 
may just as well be aware of the pain itself as it brings tears to my 
eyes. The pain is not a characterization of my mode of consciousness; 
it is the object of my consciousness. Similarly, the thrill of a
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roller-coaster ride, the refreshing taste of a cold beer on a hot day, 
and the pleasantness of the sound of the band in the park on a 
sutTiner's eve are all feelings and objects of my consciousness. 
Perhaps that I find all these things indicates their passivity. I 
find that I am hungry, that I am in pain, that the ride is thrilling, 
that the beer tastes good, and that the sounds of the band are 
pleasant. I happen upon these things and become aware of them as I 
happen upon them. They are no more nodes of my consciousness than the 
vivid siren I hear or the vibrant sunset I happen to see. My feelings 
are objects of consciousness and as such are passive.
The affects Scheler defines as "the acute discharge of strong 
feelings of essentially sensuous and vital p r o v e n i e n c e I t  sounds 
as if Scheler is treating affects as sub-category of feelings —  those 
feelings with a particularly visceral quality. But is he? Like 
feelings, they are value blind and have "no characteristic intentional 
relation"^ to the objects which evoke them. Like feelings they are 
passive and fleeting. But unlike feelings they are "accompanied by 
strong driving impulses and organic sensations which pass into the 
expression."^ Scheler has previously mentioned pain presumably as an 
example of feelings. So, I take it, the "organic sensation" of pain 
is not quite what he has in mind with regard to affects. He also 
calls them "very c o m p l e x . A l l  this brings to mind violent emotions. 
Anger might be an example, better yet rage. Perhaps elation.
Scheler does not give us much to work from. Let us assume that 
by feelings he means relatively uncomplicated sensations of pain and 
pleasure. Surely then he must mean by affects those states we
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ordinarily call emotions. My anger at yon. My frustration with my 
child. My envy and my lust. My pity and empathy. Let us assume that 
these sorts of emotions are what he means by affects. Scheler calls 
them "acute and essentially passive."7 Are they?
There is no doubt that a particularly rude person may bring me to 
anger. Or that my child's willfulness in the grocery store may 
frustrate me in a moment. Certainly our emotions can have an acute 
onset. And just as similarly may have an acute termination. The rude 
lady in response to my angry words may say "I'm sorry. It's been a 
rough day; I'm just not myself today." And my anger is gone with her 
words and her pitiable expression. And a "Daddy, do you still love 
me?" will erase my frustration. Emotions mav have acute onsets and 
terminations . But I've been angry at you for days and pity her 
whenever I see her or think of her. It seems that Scheler is thinking 
of the simplest cases of emotions when he calls them acute. Or 
perhaps it is that when these emotions involve our thoughts and 
volitions, when they occur in the context of the rest of our lives, 
they take on characteristics that they do not have in some sort of 
"pure" or "ideal" form. Yet what we call emotions do occur embedded 
in the totality of our lives, and therefore, even if there are 
"impure" emotions, they are still emotions and do not have the 
property of being acute.
Scheler also claims that emotions are passive. On the face of it 
this just doesn't seem true at all. Some people display their anger 
so violently Chat Mt. St. Helens would be humbled. Surely these 
violent emotions cannot be called passive. Scheler might claim that.
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though the display of emotions might be violent and dramatic, they are 
in their essence just as passive as a violent pain; emotions are 
passive when considered as objects of consciousness. But emotions are 
not objects of consciousness. Emotions have the characteristic of 
conscious acts; they are directed and intentional. I am angry ^  you. 
She is envious o_f her. Clearly anger, envy, frustration, pity, and 
the like are nodes of consciousness. I can think about my anger, but 
this is a second order intention dependent on the first order 
intention of my being angry at you. Scheler is wrong to call emotions 
(affects) passive. Emotions as intentional acts cannot be considered 
passive.
If Scheler's comments about emotions are brief, his comments 
about passion are even briefer. He says that "passion is a lasting 
capacity and by its nature is ac t ive and aggressive."® Further, he 
says that "passion, although one-sided and isolating, has an eye for 
value and is a strong and perpetual movement of our drives in the 
direction specified by this value" and that "passion has its starting 
point in the deeper vital center of the 'soul.'"9 He says nothing 
more, other than to cite two aphorisms. His few comments are enough, 
however, to indicate that he is using "passion" as we usually do. We 
do ordinarily mean by "passion" a consuming drive toward some goal 
(say, the creation of art, succoring the needy, and probably a fervent 
dedication to a cause) that is deemed highly valuable. We do see 
passion as active and as aggressively prompting us to the achievement 
of the goal of that passion. And we do see passion as a virtual 
obsession that pursues its goal with little regard for other goals and
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values.
How do Scheler's argunents that love is not a feeling or an 
emotion fair in light of his understanding of feelings, emotions, and 
passions? Scheler's first argument is that love endures even while 
the lover encounters various feelings occuring during the course of 
that love. He says that "Our love for someone does not alter, for all 
the pain and grief the loved one may cause us" and that "a beloved 
object offers more abundant possibilities of joy as well as sorrow. 
Surely this is true. From every source, personal experience, 
observation of friends and family, histories and romantic novels and 
stories, the tale is always the same. During the course of a love a 
person nay suffer greatly and experience great joy. It is true of 
both feelings and emotions that they come to be and pass away during a 
love. Simple pleasures and pains may be mine when I love my wife: 
pleasure at nothing more than seeing her form, pain when she is angry 
and will not speak to me. Emotions, too, come and go: my anger at her 
willfulness, my pride at her achievements. The feelings and emotions 
come and go and all the while I love my wife. If it is true that, 
while I love, a variety of feelings and emotions related to my love 
come and go, then it is just as true that feelings and emotions come 
and go that are not related to my love. There is the pleasure at my 
baseball team's winning the pennant and the pain of the dentist's 
drill, my anger at that rude motorist and my pride in a big promotion. 
These are unrelated to my love for my wife, say, but are feelings and 
emotions all the sane. Without a doubt Scheler is right; love does 
have an endurance that feelings and emotions do not ordinarily have.
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But the tact that love has an endurance that feelings and emotions do 
not have allows for a variety of relationships between love and 
feelings and emotions. About all that my expansion of Scheler's 
argument demonstrates is that love is not one of the feelings or 
emotions mentioned. It is still possible that love is a feeling or 
emotion. Because feelings and emotions are fundamentally different, 
in spite of Scheler': comments to the contrary, demonstrations that 
love is not a feeling and is not an emotion have to be handled 
separately.
It love is a feeling, then it must have the properties of a 
feeling. Love does, as a matter of fact, fail to have one essential 
property that feelings do have. IThat is always the case when we have 
feelings is that we feel shew,. Feelings are precisely our experience 
of them. I have cut ir.y foot and it hurts. That pain exists so long 
as I feel it. If my attentioin is distracted, if I use self-hypnosis, 
or if an anesthetic is applied I am no longer in pain, and that is the 
sane as saying I no longer feel the pain. We do have expressions such 
as "That wound is painful," but here we are characterizing the wound, 
not the pain. When we say "That wound is painful" we are either 
saying that we are virtually continuously experiencing some pain or 
that without proper caution and care the wound is liable to produce 
more pain. The first possibility is that we are continuously feeling 
the pain and is, therefore, no argument against my assertion that 
feelings must be felt. The second possibility does not claim that 
there are unfelt feelings (pains). It simply asserts that more pain 
can be produced by inattention to the wound. Probably we are claiming
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that the wound has the propensity to produce more of the same kind of 
pain. But we are not claiming that there is unfelt pain, only that 
the wound has certain characteristics (namely, the ability to produce 
pain). In no case do we claim or actually have feelings (pains) that 
are not felt. It is only by confusing the perseverance of the source 
of the feelings (e.g., the wound) and its ability to produce feelings 
with the feeling itself that we can arrive at the conclusion that 
there are unfelt feelings. The situation of feelings of pleasure is 
similar to the situation of feelings of pain. I view a beautiful 
sunset and feel a certain pleasure in its beauty. I feel the pleasure 
so long as I view or continue to think about the sunset and I stop 
feeling the pleasure and it ceases to exist when ny view and my 
thoughts of the sunset cease. I may think about the beauty of the 
sunset again and recapture some of the pleasure I found in viewing it, 
but the pleasure is not stored away with my memory of that sunset. 
What the memory is capable of producing is a new feeling of pleasure 
that is very similar to the first though perhaps less vivid. Like the 
wound, my memory of the sunset is capable of producing a feeling 
though neither the wound or the memory of the sunset is (even in part) 
a feeling .
Love, on the other hand, can be distinguished from loving 
feelings. On a particularly romantic evening I may feel very loving 
toward my wife whom I love. I both love and feel loving toward my 
wife. But if she rejects my amorous advances, I will feel hurt. I 
now no longer feel loving only hurt, but I still love her. Perhaps I 
am not quite being honest with myself; maybe there is a residue of
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loving feelings even while I feel hurt. Perhaps, but the next day at 
work 1 am totally engrossed in my work and have no thoughts of or 
feelings toward my wife. If someone, for some inexplicable reason, 
walked into my office and asked out of the blue "Do you love your 
wife?" I would respond "yes." Clearly love is not a feeling that 
persists for years on end. Those loving feelings do recur during 
those years, but I do not consistently feel them.
There is another possiblity. Just as the wound and the memory of 
the sunset have the propensity to produce pain and pleasure, so too 
may my wife have the propensity to producing loving feelings in me. 
And so it seems she does; often she is capable of "making" me feel 
tenderly, lovingly toward her. Shall we then say that when I say I 
love my wife I am stating that she is the consistent source of loving 
feelings? Can it be that my love for my wife is nothing more than the 
set of loving feelings I "receive" from her and that saying "I love 
you" is nothing more than a report that I get these loving feelings 
from her? When I say "I love you," I do not appear to be making only 
a report of my awareness of the fact that my wife generate loving 
feelings in me. True enough, I will tell her that she delights me and 
tell you that she is a constant source of pleasure to me. These 
surely are reports of how ray wife affects me and in such reports I am 
stating that my wife has the capability of producing certain positive 
feelings in me. But when I tell her I love her, I am doing something 
more than reporting my feelings or my awareness of the source of those 
feelings; I am making a claim that I am actively taking a particular 
attitude toward her. I say "actively taking a particular attitude
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toward..." to be as general as p o s s i b l e  and yet have some 
characterization of the force of "I love you." No matter how "I love 
you" is positively characterized, it is not a report of the feelings 
(sensations) my beloved generates in me or my awareness of my beloved 
as the source of them. "I love you" may be a report of my attitudes, 
but that is a report about me not about a propensity the beloved may 
have. It is conceivable that "I love you" reports the fact that I 
find the feelings you generate in me desirable and hence that I find 
you desirable as the source of positively valued feelings. This 
reading of "I love you" has the virtue of being a report about the 
lover's attitude about the beloved. If "I love you" is not about the 
lover but about the beloved, then the report "I love you" should be 
the same type of report as "She's witty," "She's charming," and "She's 
fun to be around." If the report is about the beloved, then like 
these other reports the report "I love you" ought to be open to 
inspection and verification- But the report "I love you" is not 
generally open to inspection and verification. It is quite possible 
that I love you and am willing to say so, but that no one else loves 
you and certainly would not say so. Both I, as the lover of you, and 
others who are non-lovers of you may even agree on your objective 
attributes, and yet it is still not the case that all of us would 
claim to love you. Unless we presuppose some highly idiosyncratic 
appreciation of the beloved by the lover that is simply not available 
to others, we are forced to conclude that "I love you " is not a 
report about the qualities of the beloved. And it s e e m s that even if 
we do suppose some highly idiosyncratic appreciation of the beloved by
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the lover, we are forced back to the admission that "I love you" is , 
at least in part , a report about the lover in some respect.
It is possible, 1 suppose, that what we take ourselves to be 
saying when we say "I love you" grossly misconstrues the actual event 
or experience of love. It could be the case that when I say "I love 
you" I think I am making some sort of report about me even though the 
love I have is something entirely different. When I say "I love you" 
do I think I am reporting about me when in truth I an reporting about 
your propensity to generate loving feelings in me? Besides the fact 
that this reading of "I love you" does not coincide with our 
introspections about love, there are three facts that seem to tell 
against the position that claims that the lover is saying (meaning) 
one thing and doing another. First, there does not seam to be any 
single loving feeling. There is no particular feeling that all lovers 
feel. I can have the same kind of pain as you and will get it from 
the same type of source. But some loves seem to generate ethereal 
feelings and others far more earthy feelings (without degenerating 
into mere lust). I personally cannot point to, cannot remember the 
loving feeling that I would be reporting about when I say "I love 
you." The only possible recourse for one who claims that I think I a m  
reporting one thing although another is happening when I say "I love 
you" is for him to claim that there is a group of feelings bearing a 
family resemblance. When I say that "I love you," then I might be 
reporting that you are the source of any one of a number of feelings 
all of which could be considered loving. For this claim to be 
plausible and to keep it from degenerating into a babbling relativism.
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the feelings in question must bear a resemblance to one another. 
Perhaps, as Scheler suggests, love has three forms: vital (sensual), 
mental (intellectual), and spiritual. Scholer did not mean for his 
forms of love to be forms of loving feelings, but let us borrow his 
categories to claim that a given set of loving feelings might be 
locatable on a three dimensional axis consisting of these qualities. 
Your love is strongly spiritual and intellectual and weakly sensual. 
My l o v i n g  feelings are predominately sensual with moderate 
intellectuality and spirituality. A love that is only sensual might 
appear to have no resemblance to a love Chat is completely spiritual, 
nonetheless one resembles my loving feelings and the other yours. 
Other loving feelings would bear resemblance to ours and, in fact, all 
loving feelings would bear resemblance to many other loving feelings 
such that all loving feelings would fall within the three dimensional 
"space" of sensuality, intellectuality, and spirituality. Thus when I 
say "I love you," I am reporting that I have loving feelings falling 
somewhere within the "space" of loving feelings.
On the face of it such a position has some plausibility; after 
all, the beloved is the source of the lover's loving feelings, and it 
is quite possible that the lover is telling the beloved just this when 
he says "I love you." One could take the position that "I love you" 
reports the fact that the beloved has the propensity to produce loving 
feelings, but there is a problem; the position claims an objectivity 
for the loving feelings that does not seem to exist. Even allowing 
that the beloved has the propensity to produce, not ^  loving feeling, 
but a range of loving feelings, the claim is being made that, as the
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rusty piece of tin has the propensity to produce pain in whoever might 
be cut by it, so the beloved has the propensity to produce loving 
feelings in whoever might come in contact with her. This is clearly 
not the case. I may have the propensity to produce loving feelings in 
you, but there is no one else who is similarly affected. I simply do 
not have the propensity to produce loving feelings in anyone who comes 
along or even those who know me well. Whatever qualities I have that 
might prompt loving feelings in you are, at least sometimes, 
experienced by others and yet, while they may recognize ny virtues, 
they do not love me. And so it seems that "I love you" may be a 
report about the propensity I have to produce loving feelings in you, 
but that it is not a report about a propensity I have to produce 
loving feelings in anyone with reasonable contact with me.
The report "I love you", then, is not a report about my 
propensities at all, but about the lover's propensities toward the 
beloved . The lover is inclined to feel loving toward the beloved, not 
just anyone. The lover has a propensity to feel loving toward the 
beloved. It might be objected that the propensity of the beloved to 
produce loving feelings is not so much like the propensity of rusty 
tin to produce pain in those who step on it as like the propensity of 
a painting to produce positive aesthetic feelings in viewers. After 
all we are not talking about some simple physiological reaction such 
as pain; we are talking about feelings more akin to aesthetic 
appreciation. But still this will not do. Even though everyone may 
not respond with great enthusiasm to Monet or Corbet, there is a 
collection of people who do so respond. There arc several, perhaps
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nany, people who agree that Monet is aesthetically elevating and who 
concur on why he is elevating. The same cannot be said of loves. 
There are few people who are loved by many and, in any case, even when 
several people do love the same person, they would rarely, if ever 
agree, on what qualities the beloved has that give her the propensity 
to produce loving feelings. Loving feelings produced by a given 
beloved are, for the most part, particular to the lover. There is 
little reason to assume that the propensity to produce loving feelings 
is an objective quality of the beloved. There is every reason to 
assume that the loving feelings are a subjective reaction to the 
beloved on the part of the lover.
Beside mis por Craying the objective quality of the propensity to 
producing loving feelings, the position that "I love you" only reports 
the ability of the beloved to produce loving feelings ignores the 
altruism of love. If you tell me that you love mo and I am to 
understand by that that I have the propensity to produce loving 
feelings in you, I want to respond "That's nice but so what?" I do 
not exist to make you feel good and loving. I am glad that I do. I 
would certainly rather make you feel good than bad, but having 
acknowledged that , how am I to respond to your profession of love? 
Just because I make you feel good surely I am not obligated and 
probably not even inclined to devote myself to making sure that you 
continue to have loving feelings. What is missing from the report 
that I have a propensity to produce loving feelings in you is any 
indication that the lover will act in any particular way toward me. 
Yet, since love has an altruistic element, surely the profession that
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I love you should have the force of indicating the lover's altruistic 
intent. When I say "I love you," I am, among other things, telling 
you that I treasure you and that since I do that I will treat you 
well. But the mere report that you have a propensity to produce 
loving feelings in me does not indicate, hint or imply an attitude on 
my part as lover. The position that "I love you" is a report of a 
propensity to produce loving feelings, whether considered objectively 
or subjectively, is simply too weak. When I say "I love you," I am 
saying that you make me feel good, but I am saying more. I am saying 
that I have altruistic inclinations toward you. Any account of love 
that reduces love to a report of what makes the lover feel good cannot 
account for a distinction between the lover's preferences with regard 
to pleasure and his love. Saying "I love you" becomes little more 
than a report that this object gives more pleasure than others or 
gives a particular kind of pleasure that other objects cannot foster. 
Hence, the position that "I love you" is a report of the beloved's 
propensity to produce loving feelings is inadequate because it does 
not take into account the altruistic element in love and hence it does 
not distinguish reports of love from reports of pleasures.
Loving feelings are, of course, an important part of love. 
Plato's account of love depends on the lover's experiencing the "flood 
of passion." Without that flood of passion the lover would never be 
goaded into approaching the belove or acting on his love. Loving 
feelings must, at the very least, act as a report to the lover that 
something special and important is afoot. The transparent goodness, 
the overwhelming positive quality of loving feelings, tells the lover
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that he is in the presence of something he should pursue. Without 
recourse to reason and cognitive processes the lover is presented with 
evidence that what he is about is good and beneficial. There is no 
denying that literature has repeatedly told us that love can end in 
tragedy, but the tragedy arises from impossible circumstances or flaws 
in the lover's character. The love itself is not tragic and the 
loving feelings hold out the promise and possibilities of the love, 
however limited by character and circumstance these possibilities may 
be.
Loving feelings are an important part of love and yet are not
love. It is possible that love is an emotion and that loving feelings
attend love as angry feelings attend anger and fearful feelings attend
fear. If love is not a feeling, then can it reasonably be considered
an emotion?
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2.2 Emotions and love
The relationship of emotions and love pose entirely different 
consideration than the relationship of feelings and love. Being active 
and a mode of consciousness, they need not be felt to be the mode of
consciousness we are in. When 1 pity you or am proud of you or am angry
at you, you are the object of my intentional act. The anger, pity, or 
pride characterize how I intend you; the emotions characterize the act. 
When I feel, I must be aware of the feeling since it is (at least the 
momentary) object of my awareness. When I have an emotional disposition 
toward you, I must be aware of you since you are the object of my
intentional act. My awareness, however, need not be of the emotion,
since it characterizes the awareness itself rather than the object of 
awareness. I may, of course, be aware of my anger in at least one, and 
perhaps two, ways. First and most clearly, I can have a second order
intention. I may be angry at you, but I may also be aware that I am
angry at you. But being aware that I am angry at you is a second order 
intention founded on the first order intention of my being angry at you. 
And if I am aware Chat I am angry at you, then I may be aware in two 
distinct ways. I may be aware of my acts (e.g., "My God, I must be 
angry at him; I just punched him in the gut."), or I may be aware of the
feeling of anger (e.g., the knot in the pit of my stomach, the pounding
in my chest, the flushed, heated feeling in my entire body). Second, I 
may be aware of my anger non-thetically, as Sartre calls it. That is, 
along with my awareness of you as the object of my anger, I am also 
aware of my angriness but not as a specific intentional act. In essence 
non-thetic awareness is the awareness of angriness that I have when I am 
positionally taking you as the object of my anger. This is a rather dim
95
and amorphous sort of awareness that might best be characterized as the 
experience of the act of anger.
To put it mildly, Che emotions are more complex than feelings. The 
complexities I have pointed out make it impossible to use the same 
argument against love being an emotion that I developed to show that 
love is not a feeling. The simple attribute of feelings, that they must 
be felt to be feelings, is not at all an attribute of emotions. I may 
have emotions and not know that I have them. I may not even feel angry 
when 1 am angry. Each of us surely have had the experience of friend 
approaching us and saying, "Gee, you sure were anxious (or nervous) the 
way you kept squirming in your chair," or "Heavens, the way you wadded 
up that paper and threw it in the waste basket you must have been 
angry," and only after your friend's comment were you aware that you 
were anxious or angry.
Just b e c a u s e  emo t i o n s  are a m o d e  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  a 
characterization of the intentional act, love appears to be much more 
like emotions than feelings. Neither emotions or love have to be felt 
to be. On occassion I have seen people confuse the feeling of anger 
with anger and the feeling of love with love. If not you, then someone 
you know has denied their anger by claiming that they did not feel angry 
or they denied their love because they did not feel loving. 1 can think 
of one case vivid in my mind in which a mother was angry at her son. 
The mother and son were arguing bitterly. Finally, in the hope of 
aborting the argument, I asked the mother "1 know you're angry at him, 
but do you love him?" She hesitated and then replied no. But the next 
day, when her anger has passed, she was once again able to say she loved 
her son.
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In ny r.ind at the moment of her hesitation, I could see her searching 
her mind for a loving feeling and when she found none she concluded that 
she did not love. Nothing was further from the truth; she simply had no 
loving feelings (and had angry ones instead), but she did have love. 
But this confusion need not occur between the feelings of love or anger, 
say and the love or anger. I am on a coffee break at work and am 
complaining to a friend about my wife. "She made me so angry last night 
I could have strangled her. I just don't see how she can do things like 
that. How can she be so thoughtless?" Then my friend rejoins "I know 
you're angry at her; do you still love her?" And I say "Yes, of course, 
but boy does she make me angry." We may confuse the feelings of love or 
anger with the love or anger, : - t we are also quite capable of 
distinguishing between the two. Finally, because emotions and love do
not have to be felt to be, v/e must qualify our assent to Scheler's first
argument. Scheler is right with regard to feelings and love; love can 
not be a feeling because feelings as passive objects of consicousness 
must be felt to be and this is not true of love. Love can be and not be 
felt. But also Scheler is wrong with regard to emotions and love for
neither one needs to be consistently felt to be.
In his second argument, Scheler suggests that love cannot be a 
reeling or emotion because love causes feelings and emotions. Scheler's 
comments are as follows.
Quite a different set of facts is involved once the 
love and ha te-re1 ationships are regarded as causes of 
emotional states (and not as their effects). It now becomes 
plain that the pursuance of these acts is itself the deepest 
o^ f all sources of iov and sorrow. bliss and desoair.il
Here Scheler is arguing for the causal primacy of love and hate, for he
assumes that his first argument established that love is neither a
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feeling or an enotion. But wc have already seen that his first argument 
only establishes that love is not a feeling. Whether love is an emotion 
is still an open question. Hence, I will take the argument in a 
slightly different light than Scheler intends. On the face of it, it 
would appear that, if Scheler can demonstrate that love causes feelings 
and emotions (or, for that matter, that feelings and emotions cause 
love), then he has established that they are different things. If love 
causes emotions, then surely it cannot be one. We would finally like 
the argument to do two things: first, to show love and feelings or 
emotions have a causal relationship and as such cannot be the same sort 
of thing and, second, love is the cause of feelings and emotions (rather 
than the other way around).
A few general comments arc in order. First, it is obvious that 
love does not cause all our feelings and emotions. Scheler says as much 
when he comments that "a beloved object offers more abundant 
possibilities of joy as well as sorrow."1- (my emphasis) When we come 
into the world, we have feelings and express emotions long before we are 
sufficiently developed to love. Also there are those who happen not to 
be in love at the moment and yet are perfectly capable of feelings and 
emotions. Further, as I pointed out earlier, even while I love, I have 
feelings and emotions that are not directly related to that love. It 
follows that love does not cause all of our feelings and emotions, but 
at best it causes some subset of them.
Without a doubt love does (perhaps indirectly at times) cause 
feelings and emotions. I am in anguish because I love you and you have 
rejected my overtures. I am delighted if I love you and you get 
recognition that vou have worked long and hard for. If I did not love
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you, your rejection of me could not have hurt nearly as much and perhaps 
not at all. By the same token, if you are an acquaintance in whom I am
not interested, then your just recognition would be of little concern to
me; it certainly would not elicit my delight. There is a subset of 
feelings and emotions caused by love and that subset is those that are 
experienced in ny relationship to you as my beloved.
It is important to note that love causes emotions in the experience 
of you as mv beloved . It is not the case that all my feelings and 
emotions concerning you, my beloved, are caused by my love. I may take 
gratification in your promotion because I feel that women have been 
dealt with unfairly in the past and therefore your promotion represents 
a partial righting of a social worng. My gratification is not of you as 
my beloved; it is for seeing social justice being executed. And then 
you may have the annoying habit of squeezing the tube of toothpaste from
the middle. It annoys me no end. It annoyed me when my roomate in
college did it. It will always annoy me. My love for you did not cause 
my annoyance nor has it changed it one wit. These examples indicate 
that those feelings and emotions that love causes are limited not only 
to those arising from the love object but are further limited to those 
concerning the love object as the love object.
Even though we allow that love causes a subset of our feelings and 
emotions, does this fact demonstrate that love is not an emotion? The 
answer, I think, must be no. For the argument to work, it must be the 
case that emotions cannot cause other emotions, that feelings cannot 
cause feelings, that emotions cannot cause feelings, and that feelings 
cannot cause emotions. Scheler does not demonstrate this and cannot 
because feelings and emotions do cause one another. I will give
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examples of each possibility to show that Scheler's argument does not 
work as he thinks it does.
Emotion causing emotion. You tell me about your sad lot in life 
and your story elicits pity in me. Then I find out that you are an 
inveterate liar and that not one shred of your story was true. As a 
consequence I am utterly angry at you for attempting to elicit pity and 
getting it. I may even be angry at myself for being duped. However you 
wish to explain my anger, had I not pitied you I might well not have 
been angry subsequently. Feeling causing feeling. I have been out 
working and now feel cold, wet, tired, and hungry, and I feel miserable 
because I am cold, wet, tired, and hungry. Although I have agreed with 
Scheler that feelings are passive, some feelings may be a causal factor 
in having other feelings. This can be the case insofar as we understand 
causal as "contributing to." Hy feelings of coldness, wetness and 
soforth, as a matter of fact, do contribute to my feeling of misery, a
feeling that X would probably not have if I did not feel cold, wet,
tired, and hungry. Emotion causing feeling. Emotions by their nature 
cause feelings. My anger causes me to feel angry. My pity causes me to 
have feelings of pity. Some may object here that the emotion and the
feeling of it are too closely related to call the relationshp causal and
that, in any case, this is not the sense of causal that Scheler intends. 
Very well, but an emotion may cause feelings not directly related to the 
emotion. I may be angry at you, a perfect stranger, for some rudeness 
on your part. As a result I may find your person very unpleasant— the 
way you stand, or the way your nose turns up— features that others under 
other circumstances I have found pleasing. Surely, if I had not gotten 
angry, I would not feel the unpleasantness, perhaps revulsion, that I do
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feel in your presence. Feelings causing emotions. Perhaps the most 
common cases of this sort concern our sexual feelings. I an sexually
aroused and find you a willing partner. Because of the pleasure you
have given me, all sorts of extravagant emotions may occur. I might be 
grateful toward you or I might despise you, but no such emotions could 
occur without my having had the pleasure of your company.
To these examples the general objection might be made that, for the
examples to work, we must suppose some attitudes and values to the
people involved. No doubt, but these attitudes and values are only a 
part of the causal explanation as well. No claim is being made that 
feelings and emotions alone can cause themselves and one another. 
Furthermore, in the case of love the same objection can be raised. I 
love you and also hold the belief or attitude that lovers ought to be 
considerate and thoughtful. Simple courtesy will do for other 
relationships, but loving ought to include consideration and 
thoughtfulness. You, as my beloved, have frequent lapses of 
consideration and thoughtfulness. This always irritates me and often 
brings me to the point of anger. In this case both my love and my 
attitudes are causal factors in my irritation and anger just as the 
feeling or emotion along with attitudes were the causal factors in the 
above cases. It does not appear that love is special in this way. 
Feelings, emotions, and love can all be causal factors in the 
determination of other feelings and emotions.
What makes matters worse is that not only is love not unique in the 
ability to cause feelings and emotions— even a subset of feelings and 
emotions--, but it is also likely that feelings and emotions can cause 
love. If I do not fall in love with you at first sight, chat is, if I
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do not fall in love without your eliciting in me any définit feelings or 
emotions, then in all likelihood you have made me feel certain feelings 
and have certain emotions. Partly or. the basis of these, I form my love 
for you. Perhaps this is nothing more than admitting that love does not 
occur in a vacuum. It would be very difficult for most of us to fall in 
love with someone whom we found disgusting, revolting and obnoxious. A 
pleasant visage, a comely form, a bright wit, and so forth make it 
easier to fall in love. These and a thousand other pleasing and 
emotionally rewarding attributes entice us and in so doing may provide 
the ground for love. Hence, to some degree, feelings and emotions may 
cause love. Surely they are not the only cause, but they may contribute 
to our coming to love someone.
Scheler's argument that love is not a feeling or emotion because it 
causes them, doesn't hold water. In the sense that Scheler uses "cause," 
love, feelings and emotions are all capable of causing one another. 
Love is not unique because it causes feelings or emotions nor can love 
be distinguished from feelings or emotions on the grounds that it causes 
them. Scheler, however, must be allowed this: a love, because it
routinely endures longer than either feelings or emotions, has the 
capacity to cause more feelings and emotions than any single feeling or 
emotion and as a mater of fact does cause more. But here we are talking 
in terms of quantity, not quality. Scheler's argument hinges on a 
difference in quality between love and feelings and emotions.
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3.3 Another look at emotions and love
Perhaps Scheler has overlooked the possible range of types of 
emotions. There are relatively simple emotions. The angry growl when 
someone steps on your foot or the experience of fear at a strange and 
unidentifiable noise in the dark seem to be examples of brief, 
spontaneous emotions. On the other hand, the envy she feels everytirae 
she sees her acquaintance in that new fur coat or the anger he feels 
every time he hears that political hack speak are examples of emotions 
that have some endurance and therefore lack spontaneity. It is almost 
as if in the latter cases the individuals choose to continue to be 
envious or angry. The character of choosing in these enduring 
emotions points to an essential feature of choosing. When I choose, I 
choose on the basis of some values. And in the case of these more 
enduring emotions not only does there seem to be a choice involved but 
a judgement as well. When she envies her acquaintance, the envy seems 
to be based on a judgement: she doesn't deserve a fur coat anymore 
than I . And even this judgment is based on a valuation: fur coast are 
desirable, valuable because they signify the social standing of the 
wearer. Presumably the lady in question could have placed value on 
something besides social standing or on some other status symbol and 
yet she persists in that valuation and thereby to some degree judges 
her acquaintance and chooses to envy her. Had she chosen to value 
otherwise she would not have been envious of the fur coat, and 
presumably she has the choice to value otherwise at any time. Her 
envy, then, is a choice based on a value judgement; she values 
something someone else owns and wishes ill to the person as a means of
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establishing her valuablcness within her heirarchy of values. The 
same considerations extend to the case of enduring anger. The 
political observer seems to choose to be repeatedly angered by the 
politician, and there is surely a value judgement being made. The 
observer has criteria of relevance and consistency; he values 
political words and actions that divine the heart of the issues and 
give the issues a logically consistent interpretation. The 
politician, he judges, either utters empty banalities or endorses 
logically inconsistent lines of action. On the basis of his value 
judgements he becomes angry whenever he hears the politician speak. 
Yet he could choose not to be angry and rather coldly analyze the 
politician as a foe to be defeated. In this case as well, there are 
value judgements being made on which the choice to be angry is 
founded.
It could be objected that these choices to have emotions are 
hardly on the same level as a choice about which flavor of ice cream 
to have. And indeed there arc some differences. Little hinges on my 
choice of flavors of ice cream and my choice may be based on nothing 
more than choosing whatever I had last time. What my friends are 
having may sway my choice, and I am willing to rescind my choice 
without much ado. On the other hand, my emotional choices carry a 
great deal of importance to me. I do not quickly change my mind. In 
fact, I almost seem impelled to have certain emotional reactions in 
given circumstances. "I can't help it; that hack always irks me." 
The political observer pleads compulsion and a lack of choice. He is 
at the mercy of forces beyond his control. Or so he would have us
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believe. Perhaps a better account of the differences between choices 
of ice cream and emotional choices would explain the differences as 
differences in the centrality of values involved. Choices of ice 
cream would ordinarily be considered matters of preferences. I simply 
prefer chocolate right now. 1 am making a decision on the basis of 
personal taste. And while I can have good reason for choice based on 
personal taste, just as often nothing more is at stake than how feel 
at the moment . But in matters of politics and social standing, some 
of my most deeply held values are at issue. To change my emotional 
reaction to a political figure often seems to require a change in my 
value system that I am unwilling to make. Choosing ice cream does not 
involve an abiding value; choosing my emotional reaction does. Hence, 
the compulsion so often felt in an emotional reaction is the result of 
a resistance to change values and value systems. It is not at issue 
whether, in a given case, one ought to alter one's values. I am 
merely claiming that the choice of values affects emotional reactions.
In enduring emotional reactions are, in part, propensities to 
react to actions that in some way comment on (attack, praise, etc.) 
held values. The brief, spontaneous emotional reactions are not so 
clearly related to held values. When I growl in anger at someone's 
stepping on my foot or am fearful when I hear strange, unidentifiable 
noise in the dark, it is not obvious that I hold as a value others' 
keeping off my feet or silence in the night. In the case of anger, I 
can be angry without having any rational beliefs about the source of 
the anger. I can account for my growl as a simple knee jerk reaction 
that calls into play no particular values. Perhaps I do believe that
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one shouldn't step on other's feet. Perhaps I have beliefs about 
respecting other's persons and territory. I could concoct an 
explanation that starts with the rationally held value that person's 
territories ought to be respected and account for my anger at the 
person who steps on my toes as a reaction to an infringement of that 
value. But the fact of the matter is that I don't knowingly have such 
a value and my reaction was just that— a reaction to the insult to my
foot. Something hurt my foot and I will try to remove the cause.
Equally the fear of the noise in the dark does not seem to entail a
choice or a judgement; 1 just react. Perhaps there is a value
involved. I may believe that strange noises in the dark pose a threat 
to my well-being, something I value dearly. But I have never 
particularly thought about the value I place on my well-being and 
certain ly have given no thought to noisy nocturnal threats to that 
well-being. It appears that, in the case of brief, spontaneous 
emotions, choice, judgement, and value play at best an attenuated 
role.
There are some observations that can be made about these two 
types of emotions. There seems to be no reason to assume that they 
are anything more than conceptually distinct. In people's lives 
emotions range from the brief and spontaneous to the enduring and 
calculated. Every emotional reaction does not appear to fall neatly 
into one or the other of the categories. Indeed, the same emotional 
reaction could be of either type. The angry growl could have a 
rational basis with concommitant values, or it could be spontaneous. 
Then too, it might be argued that even most brief and spontaneous
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emotions imply choice, judgement and value. After all, even the most 
primitive and simplistic emotions have as their "aim" the preservation 
of life or some status of life. The value is being placed on life in 
the simplest expressions of anger or fear, and there must be some 
judgement that the object of the fear or anger are life, or 
life-status threatening. Further, there is some choice being made for 
life or some life status and against some real or imagined threat. 
And yet while such objections hold a measure of truth, it is also true 
that the briefer, more spontaneous emotional expressions do not carry 
the same degree of rational choice and judgement and value placement. 
It is simply true that some of our emotional reactions are based on 
more conscious and rational grounds than others and that, not 
surprizing1 y , the more rational and conscious the grounds for an 
emotion, the more likely it is to be an enduring emotion.
Scheler's definition of affects does not seem to take into 
account the scope and complexity of emotions. He claims that the 
affects are
...the acute discharges of strong feelings of essentially 
sensuous and vital provenience. These affects are 
combined in typically different ways on each occasion and 
arc exhibited in typical expressions, accompanied by 
strong driving impulses and organic sensations which pass 
into the expression. Accordingly, they possess a 
chareteristic value-blindness in regard to the objects 
which evoke them and have no charcteristic intentional 
relation to these objects.13
The claims that emotions are essentially of "sensuous and vital
provenience" and that they are "accompanied by strong driving
impulses" are surely true of of the briefer, more spontaneous emotions
and at least often true of the more enduring emotions. It seems.
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Chen, that Scheler has the briefer enotions in mind. If he does, then 
it is easy to see why he does not consider them intentional. The 
expression of anger when someone steps on my foot has as its object 
whoever inflicts the pain, and I know not who nor care in the moment 
of anger; whoever it is, is going to hear about it. Similarly with 
the moment of fear: 1 am afraid of whatever caused the noise in the 
dark. The fear pounds in my heart while there is still yet no 
specific object of my fear. Primitive fears and angers seem to 
function as preparation for action. Something is amiss in the 
organism's environment and the organism is going to ready itself for 
whatever may come. This readying for action quality of brief, 
spontaneous emotions inclines one to think of emotions not so much as 
intentional acts as physiological reactions. Nonetheless, while 
Scheler's r e j e c t i o n  of b r ief e m o t i o n s  as i n t e n t i o n a l  is 
understandable, it is wrong. Even the more enduring and complex 
emotions may have ambiguous, minimally defined objects. 1 am angry at 
whoever fowled up my billing. 1 was angry yesterday when 1 received 
the bill, and 1 will still be angry when 1 find out who it was.
Emotions are intentional as has already been argued, but are they 
value-blind as Scheler claims? The briefer, more spontaneous emotions 
seem to imply only the most rudimentary values, those of the general 
well-being of the organism and of its current homeostasis, but the 
more enduring and complex emotions frequently and clearly require 
values for their very existence. It is true that the envious lady 
might not be able to clearly eloborate the value she places on fur 
coats and social standing, but such valuations are necessary to make
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sense of the envy. The briefer, more spontaneous emotions may only 
require that the individual judge that something is amiss in the 
environment (simple perceptual judgements that like the emotion verge 
on being more reaction than judgement), but the more enduring, complex 
emotions require a variety of value judgements to be in effect. So it 
seems that even with regard the his claim that emotions are 
value-blind, Scheler is thinking of the briefer, more spontaneous 
emotions. If Scheler is allowed to reformulate his claim to read that 
love is not one of the briefer spontaneous emotions, is his claim more 
sound? Further, given the distinction between brief and enduring 
emotions, is love more like one than the other?
While love often, if not always, has a spontaneous quality and 
hence similar to brief and spontaneous emotions, it is nothing if not 
enduring and so like the enduring emotions. And yet love does not 
have the features of an enduring emotion. Enduring emotions are based 
on judgements about value heirarchies. The choice in an enduring 
emotion comes from the possibility of choosing other values and hence 
being able to judge and then react with different emotions to the same 
object, objects, or kind of objects. But there is something very 
peculiar about the kind of value involved in love. In the most 
rational cases of enduring emotions, the individual can defend his 
emotion by reference to his value system. I can explain my anger at 
the politician by appealing to my values; I value straightforward, 
insightful, coherent political action and only those actions which 
fulfill those (among other) criteria can properly be called political. 
The politician harbors none of those values yet claims to be a
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cop-petent politician. No wonder he makes me angry. I can even defend 
my criteria of political action further by, perhaps, prudential 
appeals to what must be the case for political action to be for the 
common weal. In the case of the envious lady, she may claim a 
rational basis to her emotion on the grounds of who has the right to 
which expressions of social status. The fur-coated lady is in no 
better a social situation than the lady who envies her, and yet she 
wears the emblem of a higher social standing. The envious lady may go 
on to claim that not only is her social position comparable to the 
other lady but she has performed many social services to the community 
that ought to be honored far more than the simple monetary worth of 
the fur-coated lady. Clearly multiple reasons can be given, and these 
reasons are based on appeals to a value system. Furthermore, not only 
can the enduring emotions be defended on rational appeal to a value 
system, these emotions have a universal quality. Not only does this 
politician, embodying the negative values that he does, anger me, but 
every politician who does not meet my criteria will anger me and each 
politician will anger me more or less depending on how well or poorly 
he meets my criteria for a politician. By the same token the envious 
lady will be more or less envious of another depending on how much or 
little the other is judged to deserve the social standing she is 
accorded. The enduring emotions can and often do make a rational 
appeal to a value system and all such emotional reactions are governed 
by the same criteria. Love, on the other hand, is not often justified 
at all. The claim is often made that love is its own justification. 
Furthermore, if love were an enduring emotion, then one ought to love
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anyone that meets the criteria of love. Not only do we not actually
love people who have similar traits and qualities that we might value,
wc often love different kinds of people, and if we attempt to defend
or explain our various loves, we use different criteria for each
person. The rational appeal to a value system does not seem to be a
part of love nor does the universality of such appeals. Scheler makes
this point in the following way.
There may be emotional acts which presuppose the passing 
of a judgement (or rather, an evaluation). Respect, for 
instance, seems to me to be one of these. It presupposes 
that initial detachment from the object, which alone makes 
it possible for a value-iudeement to precede the onset of 
the emotional act; and it also requires a specific 
awareness of the presence of the value by which it is 
evoked. But this detachment is just what is lacking in 
love and hatred. They are entirely primitive and 
iir.med iate modes of emotional response to the value-content 
itself . . . .- m
Scheler goes on specifically to comment on the lack of rational
justification in love.
N o t h i n g  s h o w s  this better than the extraordinary 
perplexity which can be seen to ensue when people are 
asked to give 'reasons' for their love or hatred. It is 
then that one sees how these 'reasons' are invariably 
looked for after the event, and how the whole inventory of 
them is never sufficient to account for the nature and 
intensity of the acts they are alleged to justify. It is 
also noticeable that though other objects may have 
v a lue-qua 1ities identical to those alleged as reasons for 
love or hatred, no such emotions are addressed to them.l^
Scheler addresses the issue again latter in The Natu re of 
Sympathy in the Chapter "Love and Personality." His positive thesis, 
which I have avoided mentioning so far and which I will address 
properly later, is that "Love and hatred necessarily fasten upon the 
individual core in things, the core of value...1^ That is, as an
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individual I have an essence, and it is that indefinable essence apart
from my definable, observable traits and actions that is what is
loved. Since my essence is indefinable, unlike my personality traits
and my actions, it is not susceptible to rational judgement.
Hence the utterly misguided 'rational ism' of seeking to 
account for one's love for an individual person in any 
such terms as those relating to his qualities, acts,
achievements or dispositions. Indeed the very attempt to
do so has the effect of bringing the phenomenon of 
individual personal love sharply home to us. For we 
always find out in the process, that we can imagine every 
single one of these details to be altered or absent, 
without being a whit more able, on that account, to leave
off loving the person concerned. We also realize that if
we consider these qualities and activities separately, and 
add up our liking for each of them, their total value for 
us is nothing like enough to justify our love of the 
person. There is always a surplus we cannot account for.
.... Moreover, the curious inconstancy or the reasons we
are accustomed to offer ourselves in justification of our
love for somebody, is a further indication that all such 
reasons are merely trumped-up after the even, and that 
none of the provides the real explanation.^'
All of the arguments Scheler presents are variations on a theme, 
but I count five distinct lines of argument, two of which occur in 
both passages. Scheler's one sentence arguments leave a lot to bt 
desired, but I think his intent and general direction are clear. Love 
cannot be what I have called an enduring emotion since it does not
have the quality of being the reaction to a judgement of a value
system. Whatever reasons we give for our love are not really reasons 
at all but excuses. That is, we do not first rationally judge (at any 
level— conscious or unconscious) and then love; we love and then try 
to make our love plausible to others by offering "reasons", reasons 
that more plausibly could be called excuses. Perhaps the weakest of 
the arguments Scheler offers in defense of this position is what I
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would call the eidetic variation argument. Scheler claims that a 
lover could imagine the beloved without any one of the qualities the 
lover gives as a reason for loving and yet would love. We do not need 
to quibble with Scheler's claim. For the most part we would not like 
to think and not want to claim that the loss of our beloved's 
sparkling wit or flaxen hair or any other single attribute would be 
sufficient for us to stop loving. I think it is plausible to argue 
that the husband who leaves his wife after a masectony either didn't 
really love his wife but her body instead or that he was such a weak 
person that his love was overcome by aesthetic or social (what will 
the guys at the office say?) considerations. The alternative is to 
say that all he loved was a pair of breasts, and when there was no 
longer a matched set, he no longer loved. With such cases in mind I 
think we can agree with Scheler that love is not based on a given 
quality of the beloved. And this does seem to be at variance with the 
enduring emotions. If I discover that the politcian I took to be 
meally-mouthed is really wiley, that his bland and fatuous public 
persona was merely a ruse to maintain power while he conscientiously 
affected positive political change, then my anger vanishes along with 
the reason for it. Of course there are unreasonable fears that are 
not easily conquered. Even when I know that bull snakes are not 
dangerous, I still cannot help being a little alarmed when I approach 
one. Only diligent effort to desensitize myself could free me from my 
unwarranted fear. But such emotions are not so much the problem with 
Scheler's argument as the assumption that the reasons for love stand 
independent of one another. Perhaps the loss of any one reason is not
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enough to nakc the lover stop loving, but there might be a combination 
of reasons the loss of which would be sufficient. Not only might 
there be a simple additive calculus at work— the more reasons lost, 
the less the love, it is possible that the reasons function as a 
network. When one or two key reasons for loving are lost, then the 
network of reasons collapses and the lover stops loving. I know of no 
demonstration that would show that the loss of reasons in combination 
or configuration would not destroy a love. Nonetheless, Scheler's 
suggestion that we add and subtract reasons for love to show that no 
one reason is sufficient for love does indicate an artificiality about 
the reasons given for loving. The reasons for love seem to be a way 
to make our love plausible to others, a way to get a handle on an 
experience that does not have ordinary reasons.
Somewhat mere convincing is his claim that the reasons for loving 
someone aren't enough to justify the love. No, I would not risk my 
life for a keen wit or flaxen hair, but neither would I risk my life 
for someone who had a keen wit and flaxen hair and a bright smile and 
the compassion of a saint and. ... I wouldn't, that is, unless it is 
my practice to risk my life for anyone whosoever. Yet lovers have 
risked lives and fortunes, sacrificed aspirations and jobs— just about 
anything a lover values is included— for the sake of a love. Let us 
assume that these lovers have sacrificed not merely for fear of being 
alone and lonely, for the sake of maintain financial security or 
social standing, or for the assurance of a good meal on the table 
every night. Let us assume that these lovers risked and sacrified not 
for some utilitarian gain, but for beloved. Is there anything about
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the beloved so irreplaceable that that quality is reason for risk and 
sacrifice. There are a lot of beautiful wonen, witty women, rich 
women, women of every description. The lover does not have such a 
rare commodity that he has reason for his extravagant feelings and 
actions. The qualities of the beloved might justify admiration, 
respect, approbation, affection, but they hardly seem sufficient to 
justify love. Perhaps there are a handful of people in the world at 
any given time that are such superb examples of humanity that their 
qualities are sufficient to justify the extravagances of love, but I 
have not met them and they cannot account for the other loves in the 
world. It just does not seem plausible to claim that what is done for 
the sake of love is justified by the qualities of the beloved. There 
may be reasons for a love, but they are not adequate to justify it.
The inadequacy of reasons argument suggests and leads to the 
universality argument offered earlier. The inadequacy of reasons 
argument points out that the reasons we give for loving are not 
adequate to explain our emotions and actions toward the beloved. The 
universality argument points out that the lover does not even act in 
accordance with his reasons. That is, if I as a lover give as a set 
of reasons a group of qualities the beloved has and claim that the 
beloved's having those qualities are the reasons I love, then given 
another person with those same qualities I should love the second 
person as well. Such a prediction works with the enduring emotions. 
The envious lady will be envious of any woman wearing a fur coat in 
similar circumstances to the original lady wearing the fur coat. And 
I will be angry at any politician that utters banalities and pap. But
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though I tell you I love you for your intelligence and well 
proportioned body, I will not love (I may desire, but I will not love) 
just any woman with those qualities. Scheler suggests respect as a 
contrast to love. I respect anyone who is courageous. Being 
courageous is sufficient reason for my respect, yet having a keen 
intellect my is reason for loving you, just you. Love's reasons are 
most often specific to the person loved and hence do not obtain the 
universality that is common in enduring emotions. It begins to look 
as if Scheler is right; the reasons given for loving are fabricated 
after the fact and have little to do with the loving.
The u n iversa 1 izabi1ity of the reasons for enduring emotions 
suggests Scheler's fourth argument that the reasons for enduring 
emotions require a pre-existing value system that is not present in 
love. All other things being equal, another object with the same 
qualities as the ones 1 give as reasons for having an enduring emotion 
toward that object should elicit the same emotion. That this is so 
implies that 1 have a value system to which I appeal (in some sense) 
when 1 react to a given object. 1 place value on courage, 1 find 
merit in those who are courageous, and 1 deem those who are courageous 
deserving of my respect. The value I place on courage underpins my 
respect. Without such a valuation 1 would have no grounds for my 
respect. Eut just as my reasons for loving are not universilizable, 
neither are they founded on my value system. Of course, 1 would not 
name as reasons for my loving, qualities 1 deplore; 1 will choose my 
reasons from those qualities that 1 positively value. But almost any 
qualities that I positively value will do as reasons for my loving.
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There is no consistent appeal to a quality or set of qualities as my 
grounds for loving various people. The only constraint is that the 
qualities come from the large pool of qualities that I positively 
value. And even this constraint is sometimes breached. Not only will 
I endure qualities in the beloved that I either hold no value for at 
all or negatively value, some qualities that 1 have found unattractive 
I nay come to treasure in the beloved and even give as reasons for my 
love. I have never thought highly of a sharp tongue, but my beloved 
is so charming when she gets her feathers ruffled that I find I can't 
help myself loving her for it. The case of the inordinate fear of 
snakes may have escaped the other arguments, but it does plausibly 
fall into the pre-existing value system argument. However irrational 
my reasons for fearing snakes may be, the grounds on which I fear them 
imply a pre-existing value system. I fear anything that is cold, 
ugly, slimy and venomous. Never mind that all snakes are not 
venomous; I can't tell the difference between snakes. And even when I 
can tell a bull snake from others and have been assured that they are 
not venomous, it is because I can't quite get it out of my head that 
it could be venomous that makes me fear it. I disvalue being bitten 
by a poisonous animal so much that, even when I a cognitively aware 
that this animal is not venomous, the mere suspicion that it is is 
sufficient to arouse my fear. Unlike such fears, love often 
perversely sets our value systems on their ears. It might be claimed 
that the kind of person an individual claims he would like to love and 
the kind he will love can be two entirely different kinds of people. 
I might rationally, consciously hold a set of values that I say I
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would like to see in my beloved, but what I "really" want is someone 
entirely different. Hence, since the qualities I allege are the ones 
I value are not the ones I actually value, r,.y actual value system has 
not been undermined despite my protestations. I suspect such 
objections are based on a psychological view of love. My ego and 
superego lay claim to a respectable and socially acceptable set of 
values, but deep down my id wants a girl just like the girl that 
married dear old dad. My response is that this sort of situation 
does, no doubt, occur, but that to the extent I love my wife because 
she is like my mother (in constrast to my consciously held values) I 
do not love my wife as herself at all but as a surrogate for my 
mother. I would discount such cases simply because the one who is 
supposedly loved is not loved at all. Hence, since this is not a case 
of love, it is not an exception to the argument that loves are not 
based on pre-existing value systems. I do not wish to deny that 
preferences, tastes, even my value system is learned or that a 
beloved's attributes often coincide fairly well with preferences, 
tastes, and value systems. The claim is simply that an individual 
need not have any particular set of qualities that the lover's value 
system positively values for that individual to be loved. If the 
beloved does not necessarily "fit" into the lover's value system, then 
love need not have a rational basis and cannot be an enduring emotion 
that is grounded in reasons based on the individual's value system.
Scheler's last argument is less satisfying than the others 
because it based on less substantial evidence. Scheler claims that a 
lover, when asked why he loves, will respond either with perplexity
Ilf.
or, if the question is asked over a period of tine, will respond with 
inconsistent answers. If these are the cases, then Scheler has some 
grounds for claiming that love does not have rational basis. Now it 
seems true that those who have loved often have a hard time coming up 
with reasons for their love. The frequency with which this is the 
case indicates that there is not a rational foundation to the love. 
Yet this need not be so; not everyone is articulate enough to give 
reasons for his emotions and so the perplexity may not be at the lack 
of reasons but at an adequate way to express them. I am not sure what 
Scheler has in mind when he refers to inconsitent reasons for love. 
Certainly I will give different reasons on different occasions for my 
love. But this does not constitute inconsistency; it merely indicates 
that I have more than one reason for loving. And I cannot think of an 
instance, although I am sure there must be some, in which a lover 
gives one reason on one occasion and a logically incompatible reason 
on another occasion. In any case such inconsistencies could easily be 
chalked up to the pressure to provide acceptable reasons to a given 
audience (I give my parents one set of reasons and my friends 
another), among other possibilities. Scheler's fifth argument, while 
providing some evidence for his claim that love does not have a 
rational basis, is not conclusive.
Considered collectively, Scheler's five arguments are persuasive. 
Love is not an enduring emotion because it does not have the rational 
basis in value systems that enduring emotions have. Having said this, 
I must admit two things. First, I have augmented Sender's arguments. 
I believe ny additions to his arguments are entirely in line with
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Schcler's intent. Hence, ray augmentations do not fundementa1ly alter 
or misrepresent Scheler's intent. Second, I have put the arguments to 
a slightly different purpose than Scheler intended and hence, while 
Scheler's general intent to deny that love is a feeling, an emotions 
or a judgement is preserved, the intent of the specific arguments 
against the rationality of love is not. Scheler's arguments against a 
rational basis for love are just that— arguments to show that love is 
not a matter of reason and judgement. My expansions of Scheler's 
arguments have shown that it is highly implausible to consider love as 
a judgement--entirely in accord with his intent, but I have also put 
these arguments to further use. I have used them to defend Scheler's 
general contention that love is not an emotion. Scheler's own 
arguments that love is not an emotion are inadequate as I showed 
earlier. By refining the notion of emotion Scheler uses and adding 
the distinction between the simple, brief and reactive emotions and 
the more enduring and complex emotions, I have demonstrated that love 
is like no other emotion. Hence, love should not be considered an 
emotion. Reason, judgement and value come into play in enduring 
emotions, but these three elements of enduring emotions need not be a 
part of love . Since love need not have these elements and enduring 
emotions do, either love is an exceptional and extraordinary emotion 
like no other or it is not an emotion at all. Perhaps because love is 
laden with so much emotion, one would still like to call it an emotion 
in spite of evidence to the contrary, but care needs to be taken to 
keep from being disingenuous. If love is to be called an emotion, it 
should also quickly be noted that love does not conform to the way the
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other emotions act. This is such an extraordinary proviso that I 
would prefer to say that love is not an emotion so as not to confuse 
it with what we might expect of other emotions.
1 2 1
2.4 Scheler's definition of love
Scheler claims that love is not a feeling, an emotion, or a 
judgement. Ho is correct; love is none of these things. Either his 
arguments or arguments developed from his arguments have demonstrated 
that love does not fit well into these categories. Few would be 
troubled by the claim that love was not a judgement, that it was not a 
matter of reason. More, I think, would would be disturbed by the 
claim that love is not an emotion. The many strong feelings and 
emotions, both negative and positive, experienced during love tend to 
make us think of it as the emotion that supports the rest. Yet, even 
if grudgingly, we concede with Scheler that love is not an emotion, we 
are left with the question, what then is love? The candidate that 
co;nes to mind most readily is desire. Plato uses desire extensively 
in his explanation of love. But desires, it was argued, require a 
logically antecedent valuation. Value is placed on the object of 
desire before the object can be seen as desirable. I cannot simply 
desire another. I must first perceive the value of the other to 
desire him. This formulation of desire suggests that love is some 
form of perception.
Three of the four traditional categories of human faculties have 
been eliminated. Love is not cognition; we do come to love as we 
would come to the conclusion of an argument. Love is not affection; 
for all the emotional quality of a love, love itself is not an 
emotion. Love is not volition. By volition we can mean desire 
(wanting) or choosing. We often if not always desire the beloved but 
the desire is based on antecedent valuations, hence desire is the
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consequence of love, not the source of love or its definition. But 
neither is love a choosing. Kone of us can walk down the street, pick 
out a person, and choose to love him. I can decide to learn to 
appreciate a person's qualities, but all the appreciation, admiration, 
or respect I can come to muster as a result of my decision will never 
amount to love. Love, then is neither kind of volition. All that is 
left is perception.
In spite of appearing to be forced to conclude that love is some
kind of perception, Scheler does not. Rather, he conceives of love as
an act and gives no faculty to which love acts might belong. He does
not attribute love to any faculty in part because he claims love is an
act and as an act (he also claims) it is essentially indefinable.
Trie ultimate essences of love and natied, as inherent in 
acts, can only be entiibited: they cannot be defined.^^
It does not seem to strike him as important that other acts have
corresponding faculties. But if worst came to worst Scheler could
always claim that love acts are not characterizable as pertaining to
any of the ordinary faculties but are subsumable under the as yet
unnamed faculty of love. So perhaps it is merely odd that Scheler has
no problem accepting other categories of acts and arguing against love
falling into any of those categories. What is more disturbing is his
apparent vacilation about his own definition (perhaps description is a
better word, although he looks for all the world as if he is giving a
definition). The following seems to be the description or definition
he settles on.
■ . .love is that movement wherein every concrete individual 
object that possesses value achieves the hie hes t value
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coir.patible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein 
it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its 
nature.^ ^
Here love is considered an act which brings to fruition the value 
qualities possible to a thing. Perhaps this characterization is not 
as revealing as it could be, but it is clear from it that Scheler does 
not consider love as falling under any of the traditional categories. 
In other passages, though, Scheler either contradicts or confuses the 
above characterization. In one passage he référés to love and hatred 
as "these emotions"^® and in another he calls them "...entirely 
primitive and imraed iatc modes of emotional response to the value 
content it se If. So it seems that Scheler is at the very least 
modifying his denial that love is an emotion. But he does not only 
characterize love as emotional; he also calls it "a unique attitude 
towards objects of value..."-' and "the most personal of attitudes."--* 
It by attitude he means something like "taking a position toward", 
then this characterization would seem to be compatible with the 
emotional charcterization ; love might be considered as an emotion 
insofar as an emotion is an active taking up of a position toward. 
Yet chacterizing love as an attitude hardly seems compatible with 
characterizing it as a movement. Attitudes tend to be rather 
stationary and static while movements are surely dynamic. Similarly 
we do not ordinarily think of attitudes as acts although Scheler calls 
love both. Scheler may be giving a clue as to how love can both be an 
attitude and a movement in a passage in which he claims that love (and 
hatred) "necessarily fasten upon the individual core in things,the 
core of v a l u e : . . . F e r e  love is a fastening onto— surely an act— and
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yet there is a sense in which an attitude fastens onto a thing. By 
taking a position toward a thing we have "hooked" into a particular 
view of it. Our attitude considers a thing from a particular aspect 
for the most part to the exclusion of other aspects and by this homing 
in on a thing through a particular aspect we make contact or come into 
contact with it in a way that is not possible when the object is 
considered through no particular respect (aspect). Still, this isn't 
very helpful; the fastening onto an aspect of an object is an act but 
once achieved the fastening becomes an attitude which does not seem to 
require a particular act to maintain.
Scheler uses another cluster of concepts to characterize love in
the following passage.
For love is that movement of intention v.'h.ereby, from a 
g i e n value A in an object, its higher value is 
visualized. Moreover, it is just this vision of a higher 
value that is of the essence of love.^^
Here love is characterized as both a movement and a visualization.
There is no problem insofar as both are acts, but a visualization
hardly seems the same kind of act that a movement is. A movement
suggests, at least in Scheler's work, a complex interaction. How else
would a thing's higher value be realized? A vision of thing, even of
its "core of value," is an activity for the viewer, but not for the
viewed. What is viewed is most often totally uneffected by the
viewing. (Here 1 am not talking about perceptual theories that
consider how a thing or at least the appearance of it is changed by
the perception of it.) As unrelated as viewing and movement seem,
Scheler does relate them in the paragraph following the above quote.
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Love only o c c u r s  when, u pon the v a l u e s  a l r e a d y  
acknowledged as 'real' there supervenes a movement, an 
intention, towards potential values still 'higher' than 
those already given and presented. These additional 
values are not yet manifested as positive qualities, being 
merely envisaged concurrently as potential ingredients of 
a corporate structural pattern. In so doing, love 
invariably sets up, as it were, an 'idealized' paradigm of 
value for the person actually present, albeit conceiving 
this at the same time as an embodiment of his 'true' 
nature and 'real' value, which only awaits confirmation in 
feeling. To be sure, this 'paradigm' is implicit in the 
values already disclosed empirically in feeling— and only 
the fact that it is so implicit keeps it free from 
interpolation, empathie projection, etc., and hence from 
delusion. But, for all that, it is not empirically 
'latent' in them, save as an appointed goal, an objective 
ideal challenge to a better and more beautiful fulfilment 
of the whole.ZG
In this account of love, the lover first sees the beloved much as 
anyone else ■•■ov.ld. The lover, for example, could presumably give the 
same report of the physical characteristics of the beloved as any 
acquaintcr.ee of the beloved might. But in addition to seeing what 
everyone else can see, the lover presumably "sees" in a movement (or 
in an intentional act, which here amounts to the same thing) the 
beloved as he might appear "in the best of all possible worlds." The 
seeing and the movement, then, are generally (Scheler hedges on the 
movement always being from lower to higher elsewhere) from the 
actually given complex of qualities of the beloved to what that 
complex could ideally become. Scheler believes that the values that a 
thing has are objectively present in the thing and hence are not 
relative, are not conferred by the viewer, and are observable just as 
much as the thing's physical properties are observable. Hence he can 
claim that this idealization of the beloved is not fantasy of the 
lover, but an actual vision of the fulfillment of the qualities of the
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beloved. This last description of love characterizes love as a mental
act of visualizing the beloved as the best the beloved could possibly
be. Mental here is opposed to ordinary physical vision and is not to
be taken as rational or cognitive. In fact this is where Scheler's
characterization of love as emotional fits in. This visualization,
this movement is felt, not thought. I think Scheler would not mind
calling it an intuition of the heart for he subscribes to Pascal's
claim that the heart has reasons that reason does not know.
This last formulation of love has some plausibility and makes
some sense, but, juxtaposed to what I take to be Scheler's most
specific and succinct characterization of love, the formulation leaves
some u n c o m f o r t a b l e  a m b i g u i t i e s .  S c h e l e r ' s  most f o r m a l
characterization of love read:
. . .love is that movement wherein every concrete individual 
obicct that possesses value achieves the highest value 
compatible with its nature and ideal vocation: or wherein 
it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its 
nature.
The key words are "achieves" and "attains." The characterization 
makes it sound as if something has happened and the implication is 
that a movement is not love until the object of love has achieved its 
ideal state or highest value or ideal vocation. Perhaps it is 
quibbling, but Scheler needs to introduce a sense of on-going 
achievements toward that ideal state. No one I know of has achieved 
his ideal state and hence, according to the characterization, no one 
has been loved. This is surely not the case; some people have loved 
and been loved. It is clear, then, that Scheler needs to amend the 
characterization to imply a going towards the ideal state. But even
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with this amendment the characterization clasl'.es with Scheler's 
description of love as some sort of felt perception of the beloved's 
true value. It is one thing to visualize the value of something. It 
is quite another to take the necessary steps (however unpremeditated, 
however unpedagogical as Scheler would have it, those steps may be) to 
make this visualization an actuality. What Scheler seems to have 
overlooked is the distinction between the love act and loving acts, 
that is, those acts that follow as a consequence of love. The 
"natural", unpremeditated perfecting of the beloved nay come fast in 
the footsteps of love, but as sure as there is unrequited love this 
need not be so. I ar. inclined to agree with Scheler that loving 
someone tends to improve, to perfect, to make them, more who they 
ideally are. Something of ciiis sort does often happen in a loving 
relationship. And I would agree with Scheler that the blossoming 
forth of a person in a love relationship is a natural consequence of 
loving the person and not a pedagogical exercise. But this movement 
of the beloved toward perfection is not the same as the lover's 
movement, as the lover's felt vision of the beloved's ideal self. 
Both the lover and the beloved are necessary for the first movement, 
but only the lover is necessary for the latter. In fact the lover's 
movement or felt vision of the beloved's ideal self seems to be 
sufficient for love whereas the beloved's movement toward his ideal 
self is not sufficient unto itself and requires Che lover's felt 
vision for the beloved's movement to be a movement of love. 
Presumably I could work toward perfecting myself without the aid of a 
lover, but insofar as the movement toward perfection is love it
12?
requires Che lover's felt vision.
Scheler cannot have it both ways. Either love is the lover's
felt vision of the ideal state of the beloved or it is the movement of
the beloved toward perfection. Since Scheler is not here to choose, I
shall choose for him; love is the lover's felt vision of the ideal
state of the beloved. And I so choose because this makes the most
sense of Scheler's position. For the reasons mentioned above, the
lover's felt vision requires no specific antecedent act, but the
beloved's movement toward perfection does. It seems clear that the
loving acts of the lover are a consequence of his felt vision of the
idealized beloved, that is, of his love act. But choosing to
c liar ac C e r i z e love- as a felt vision of the beloved in his most ideal
state creates other problems for Scheler. Such a felt vision even if
understood metaphorically is a perception if only a metaphorical
perception and Scheler seems to deny that love is a perception since
he expressly denies love is an apprehension.
...preference and rejection belong to the sphere of 
value-aoorehension . . . ■ whereas love and hatred cannot be 
reckoned as acts of apprehension a l l . ... They may 
indeed serve as a basis for the apprehension of value (as 
we shall see), but they are not themselves apprehensions 
of this kind
Scheler claims that preference is an act of emotional cognition and 
that "preference always assumes the existence of two values A and B, 
of which one is then preferrred to the other."29 Presumably Scheler 
sees preference as a comparison test. Having tasted two wines, I find 
that I prefer one because it is smoother and more full bodied. The 
pleasantness of the wine is the emotional aspect of preference; this
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uino pleases me. I find that this wine pleases me more than another 
and hence I prefer it. This comparison of the tastes of the wines is 
the cognitive element of preference. This seems to be a reasonably 
good characterization of preference and also seems to distinguish love 
from preference. Love does not have the cognitive element that 
preference does. We do not weigh the qualities of one individual 
against another and at the end of our comparision declare that we love 
one rather than the other (although, we might declare we prefer one to 
the other). In so far as Scheler takes apprehension to mean this 
cognitive, rational weighing and comparing the goodness of the 
qualities of two object, then I must agree; love is not an 
apprehension. But we need not consider apprehension as an act with an 
explicitly cognitive clement. We may instead consider apprehension in 
its root meaning of grasping ahold of or seizing something. Further, 
it is just this grasping ahold of that precedes the cognitive element 
of preference, just as Scheler suggests. It is only when I firmly 
have ahold of the Castes in my mind that I can compare them. If I 
just swa 1 low the wines without attending to their taste, then I will 
not be able to compare them and hence not be able to prefer one. When 
I have fully gotten ahold of, when I have apprehended the flavors of 
the wines, I have attended to them and am capable commenting this 
one's particularly fruity bouquet.
The felt quality of love is only one of the perceptual metaphors. 
In addition to the tactile quality is a visual quality. Scheler 
speaks of the higher value being visualized and of "this vis ion of a 
higher value that is of the essence of love ."3 0 pc also says that
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"love is a movement, passing from a lower value to a higher one, in 
which the higher value of the object or person suddenly flashes upon 
u s . .. .  ^ Of course no one who has ever loved has ever seen in the
strict and literal perceptual sense anything about the beloved other 
than what an impartial observer might. What the lover "sees" that 
others do not is the value the beloved carries. Assuming that the 
lover and the non-lover are in the same position to see in the strict 
and literal sense, their perceptions of the beloved should not differ 
significantly. Both would agree that the beloved is 5'10" with 
brunette hair and so forth. And assuming that the lover and non-lover 
were equally astute observers of human behavior, they would both agree 
that the beloved is intelligent, keen '.;itted and sc on. As wo have 
seen the lover cannot explain his love on the basis of the qualities 
he has seen in the beloved for the simple reason that the non-lover 
may see them too and yet not love. Hence there are three 
possibilities: the lover sees in a different way than the non-lover or 
the lover actually sees more than the non-lover or the lover is 
delude, fantazing or idealizing. The first possibility is either 
uninteresting or a restatement of the claim that the lover sees in a 
different way. If the lover sees more than the non-lover and if 
seeing more is merely a matter of fact, then the possibility is 
uninteresting because all that is needed for the non-lover to see this 
"more" is further contact and proximity to the beloved. Given this 
further contact, the case is reduced to the original case in which the 
lover and the non-lover see the same person and yet the lover loves 
and the non-lover does not. The second interpretation of the claim
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ti'.ac Che lover does not see differently but sir.ply more is first
patently true since the lover has to be seeing something that the
non-lover isn't if the lover isn't merely fantas izing . Second, the
seeing more than must cone from a way of seeing unavailable to the
non-lover. This, then, is just another way of saying the lover sees
differently than the non-lover. The other possibility is that the
lover is deluded, fantasizing, or idealizing the beloved. Some have
taken this position, notably Stcndal. Such theories are based on the
claim that the lover makes a nisattribution of qualities to the
beloved. Lovers are human and surely do make mistakes, but there are
cases of lovers who have no delusions about the beloved's qualities
and yet love. Shakespcares 130'^ "' sonnet makes this point.
?!y mistress' eyes art notr.ing like the sun;
Coral is far more red than her lips' red:
If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun;
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head.
I have seen roses damask'd red and white,
But no such roses see I in her cheeks;
And in some perfumes is there more delight 
Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks.
I love to here her speak, yet well I know 
That music hath a far more pleasing sound:
I grant I never saw a goddess go,
My mistress, when she walks, treads on the ground:
And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare 
As any she belied with false compare.
The lover can be under no delusions and yet love, thus the second
possibility is at least sometimes false. Besides, accepting this
second possibility that love is nothing more than a fantasy or a
delusion would make short shrift of this investigation. The task
still remains then to describe this different sort of seeing that is
love .
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3.5 Singer: Appraisal and bestowal
The lover sees the beloved in a different way than the non-lover. 
And this different way is intimately related to the value the lover 
places on the beloved. There is no doubt that the lover values the 
beloved. The sacrifices the lover makes and the risks he takes make 
it apparent that the lover highly values the beloved, often above all 
else. It is just as clear that the disagreement between the lover and 
the non-lover is a disagreement about the value of the b e l o v e d .  
They agree on the various attributes of the beloved and may even agree 
on a ranking of the relative value of the attributes and on the total 
relative worth of the aggregate valuabIcness of the traits in 
comparison to other? with other combinations of traits. In spite of 
their accord , the lover loves, and the r.on-lovcr does not. For the 
moment wo can avoid the issue of the justifiability of love and the 
ou es t ion of whether it is an a-rational, perhaps phantasmagoric, 
placement of value by the lover. Instead we may ask, however 
justifiable or fantasic the lover's placement of value, what is the 
e;:perience like?
A description of the loving, of the experience that is love, is 
perhaps better suited to the full-bodied, suggestive and evocative 
language of literature. The feelings that love's throes prompt are 
not so easily captured by philosophical discourse and need not be. 
Uhat philosophical discourse can do, that literature most often does 
not, is capture the connections and relationships of the love act. 
When the philosopher speaks of love he may not quicken the pulse, but 
he should provide a better view of the phenomena.
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Scheler clairas that love "represents a unique attitude towards 
objects of v a l u e a n d  expands this c lain with the following 
con-.ir.ent s .
They [love and hatred] may indeed serve as a basis for the 
apprehension of value (as we shall see), but they are not 
thenseIves apprehensions of this kind. Moreover, these 
attitudes are not directed intentionally towards value, 
let alone 'higher' value, as when we prefer one value to 
another; they refer to objects inasnuch and insofar as 
these possess value. It is never values we love, but 
always something that possesses value.
Scheler is contrasting the initial placement of value on a thing and
value considerations about a thing with the relationship to a thing as
valuable. Value apprehension for Scheler implies the act of emotional
cognition present in prefering. In the act of value apprehension as
in the act of prefering, the value of an object is consciously
considered and, as consciously considered, is cognitive albeit a
cogniton about emotive responses. It is of course true that we can
consciously consider the value of one or more things. It also must be
true that the objects must be presented to us, often by perceiving
them. (We need not perceive the object. Given sufficient familiarity
with that kind of object, we can be told that an object did, does,
could, or will exist and consider its value in terms of its kind.) If
the object has been perceived, then what value it may have may be
considered. Such evaluations may be considered aporaisaIs after
Irving Singer's distinction in The Nature of Love Plato to Luther.
Singer distinguishes between objective and individual appraisal, 
he describes objective appraisal as follows.
But what is it to value or evalute? Think of what a 
man does when he sets a p r i c e  upon a house. lie
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establishes various facts— the size of the building, its 
physical cone it ion, the cost of repairs, the proximity to 
schools. Ke then weights these facts in accordance with 
their importance to a hypothetical society of likely 
buyers. Experts in this activity are called appraiser; 
the activity itself is appraisal or appraising. It seeks 
to find an objective value that things have in relation to 
one or another community of human interests. I call this 
value "objective" because, although it exists only insofar 
as there are people who want the house, the estimate is
open to public v e r i f i c a t i o n......  In other words,
appraising is a branch of empirical science, specifically 
directed toward the determinging of value.
But now imagine that the man setting the price is not 
an appraiser, but a prospective buyer. The price that he 
sets need not agree with the appraiser's. For he does 
more than estimate objective value: he decides what the 
house is worth to him. To the extent that his preferences 
differ from other people's, the house will have a 
d i f f e r e n t  v a l u e  for him. By i n t r o d u c i n g  s u c h  
considerations, we relate the object to the particular and 
possibly idiosyncratic interests of a single person, his
likings, his needs, his wants, his desires.....
Deciding what something is worth to oneself we may call an 
"individual appraisal." It differs from what Che 
appraiser dees; it determines a purely individual value, 
as opposed to any objective value.
Whether an objective or an individual appraisal is being made,
conscious, presumably rational, consideration goes into the appraisal.
Since an evaluation, an appraisal (of which Scheler's preference is a
species) is calculated, conscious and rational and since love clearly
is not, Scheler and Singer agree that love itself cannot involve this
sort of valuing, although both would also agree that love is one basis
for such appraisals The rejection of appraisals by both Scheler
and Singer, however, do not lead them to the same conclusion.
Singer's tactic is to claim that there is another type of valuing.
This further type of valuing I call bestowal. Individual 
and objective value depend upon an oibject's ability to 
satisfy prior interests--the needs, the desires, the 
wants, or whatever it is that motivates us toward one 
object and not another. Bestowed value is different. It
135
is created by the affirmative relationship itself. by the 
very act of responding favorably, giving an object 
emotional a pervasive importance regardless of its 
capacity to satisfy interests. Here it makes no sense to 
speak of verifiability; and though bestowing may often be 
injurious, unwise, even immoral, it cannot be erroneous in 
the way that an appraisal might be. For now it is the 
valuing alone that makes the value.
Think of what happens when a man comes to love the 
house he has bought. In addition to being something of 
use, something that gratifies antecedent desires, it takes 
on special value for him. It is now his house, not merely 
as a possession or a means of shelter but also as 
something he cares about. a part of his affective life.
Of course, we also care about objects of mere utility. Wc 
need them for the benefits they provide. Eut in the 
process of loving, the man establishes another kind of 
relationship. He gives the house an importance beyond its
individual or objective value. It becomes a focus of
attention and possibly an object of personal commitment. 
I'erely by engaging himself in this manner, the man bestows 
a value the house could not have had otherwise
Bestowal, Singer claims, is much the same in interpersonal love, the
only obvious difference being chat the object of love is a person.
The lover g r a t u i t o u s l y  places value on the beloved without
consideration for how much the beloved might "deserve" or merit that
valuation. By claiming that love is freely placed valuation. Singer
has circumvented problems concerning the justification of love. For
Singer, love isn't justified; it has no reason. In addition we have
the heartening notion the the lover graciously grants, as a sovereign
m.ight grant dispensation to his subjects, his valuation. There are no
conditions. The young beauty need not worry about getting old and
haggard; her husband didn't marry her for her beauty. He loves her
"just because." His love is not contingent on her unblemished
complexion and finely chiseled features.
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difficulty in describing the love act. But bestowal is problematic 
just because it is freely given. Love becomes a capricious act. 
Surprize! Today I love you; tomorrow I nay not. Perhaps shear force 
of habit perpetuates the bestowal, but this is hardly reassuring. 
Furthermore, it is hard to see the value of loving if it is mere 
caprice. Wc do not find someone who freely (without reference to his 
own needs or desires) confers value upon chocolate almond mocha ice­
cream particularly admirable or praiseworthy. I am not a better nan 
for having conferred value upon it. In fact I would be considered 
eccentric for conferring value on it on whim. And yet we do feel that 
love is praiseworthy, if sometimes unwise, and we usually grant that 
the lover is the better for having loved . "i'.y is love praiseworthy if
it confers value willy-nilly? There is some virtue in placing 
objective value as other appraisers would. The skillful appraiser has 
learned discernment, surely of some value. But it is insulting to be 
told that value has been conferred upon me, that you have bestowed 
value on me when you have found no outstanding reason for conferring 
it. Shall I respond "You insu lent twit! How dare you confer value on 
me. I am already valuable. I do not need your bestowal like alms for 
the poor." Not only is there nothing praiseworthy in bestowing value 
as one might throw rice at a wedding, it is an insult and a 
condescension. No, if you love me, I want you to appreciate me for 
who I am, I want you to recognize how valuable I am. Yes, I want you 
to bestow value on me, but not capriciously. I want you bestow the 
value on me t'nat you see I am due.
At this point the demand of the beloved, that she be recognized
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for the valuable being that she, is suggests a perceptual theory of 
the love act rather than a gratuitous bestowing of value, nonetheless 
Singer's claiia that love is a bestowal is not without merit. If love 
is a perception of some kind, it is not iust a perception. The 
perception must be followed by an act of valuation. The non-lover 
perceives the beloved and places some value by virtue of the beloved's 
attributes. If there is any consistency to valuations, the lover must 
go through the same two steps: perception and valuation. In the 
non-lover these two steps can and often are temporally separated. The 
ju'.-es of a beauty contest size up each contestant making note of the 
attributes that he has seen. Once he has seen all contestants, he 
compares how t’lioy appeared to him, and on the basis of his perceptions 
he Judges their relative beauty (presumably beauty is considered 
valuable and hence he is mailing a value judgement). Singer claims 
that such valuations are not love but objective appraisals. Scheler 
makes the same claim a bit more clearly; there is a rational, 
judgemental clement in such valuations that is not present in love. 
In love the valuation falls so closely on the heels of the perception 
that there is no time for value judgements. The lover sees the 
beloved and in the seeing values the beloved. The intimacy of the 
perceiving and the valuing is what is captured in Singer's bestowal. 
The time consuming act of making a value judgement helps distinguish 
the perception from the evaluation in an act of appraisal. Since no 
such rational act is involved in love the perception and the valuation 
virtually collapse into an unit. The ind is t ingu ishability (from a 
practical standpoint) of the perception and valuation of love makes
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love- look like an act of bestowal. Without a clear act of evaluation 
separate from the perception, the overwhelmingly positive valuation of 
love stands out and overshadows the perception involved. The 
impression is then of a valuation without a judgement or the 
antecedent perception needed for judgement. The impression is that 
the love act is a bestowal of value.
Singer resorts to the description of love as bestowal because he
sees no distinguishable acts of perception and valuation in love.
Scheler would agree insofar as Singer claims there is no rational act
of evaluation as a component of the love act. But Scheler's view that
there is an objective hierarchy of values means that he would deny
that love is a gratuitous act. Yet, since this hierarchy is not
directly perceivable to ti’.c senses and since it is not immediately
evident Co cognition, Scheler is forced to claim, as Pascal does, that
the heart has its reasons that reason does not know. It is true that
Scheler tries to clarify what he means by "heart" as he does in the
following passage.
The figurative expression "heart" does not designate, as 
both Philistines and romantics think, the seat of confused 
states, of unclear and indefinite agitations or some other 
strong forces tossing man hither and thither in accord 
with causal laws (or not). l!or is it some static matter 
of fact silently tacked on to the human ego. It is the 
totality of well-regulated acts, of functions having an 
intrinsic lawfulness which is autonomous and rigorous and 
does not depend on the psychological organization of man; 
a lawfulness that operates with precision and exactness.
Its functions bring before our eyes a strictly ob i ect ive 
sphere of facts which is the most objective, the most 
fundamental of all possible spheres of fact; one which 
remains in the universe even if Homo sapiens is destroyed, 
just as does the truth of the proposition 2 X 2 = 4. 
Indeed, it is more independent of men than the validity of 
that proposition.^^
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Vet this passage still contains the perceptual metaphor "bring before 
our eyes." Scheler has not escaped metaphor, only explained one in 
terms of another. Even his clarifications do not clarify; I have no 
idea what he means by "the totality of well-regulated acts" and so 
forth. I understand what he wants. He wants a being that has the 
capabilities, the functions to reflect the order of the universe much 
as Kant's description of man's ability to percieve space and time were 
an attempt to reflect these dimensions in man. But critisize Kant as 
you might, no one would contend that man does not have the faculties 
to perceive space and time. Scheler does not have that much ground to 
stand on. He must not only argue for the structure of the phenomena 
but for the existence of it as well.
The above brief passage is not, of course, Scheler's only attempt
to defend his position. A little later in "Ordo Amor is" he makes
these comments.
People no longer understand the whole of emotional life as 
a meaningful s)-mbo 1 ic language. They no longer see that 
objective connections are unveiled in the language that, 
in their changing relationship to us, govern the sense and 
meaning of our life. Rather, they take our emotional life 
to consist in a series of totally blind happenings which 
run their course in us like any natural processes; 
happenings which eventually one must have a technique for 
managing in order to get some use from them and avoid 
harm. However, they do not think that we have to learn to 
listen to these happenings when we are considering what 
they "mean," what they wish to say to us, what they advise 
against what their goals are, or to what they point.3 9
Here Scheler sounds like an existentialist bemoaning modern man's
plight and railing against his stupidity. Still we can agree with him
to some extent that our emotional lives has been reduced to
conditioned response to be behaviorally modified when they are no
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louf^er useful and that the meaning of our emotions is lost to the 
extent we treat ourselves like lab animals to be conditioned. Never 
mind that there are severe problems with Scheler denying that love is 
an emotion on one passage and implying in the other that love is an 
emotion. In the end he resorts to a metaphysical structure that may 
be defensible but unnecessary. Love can be described without 
reference to an Ordo Amor is or to some extraordinary faculties for the 
perception of value. What is worse is that his theories add little 
more to our understanding of the nature of love than has already been 
g leaned .
The lover perceives the beloved in some special way. Intimately 
tied to the act of perception is the act of valuation in the love act. 
Fro- an examination of Singer's distinctions we have seen that a 
valuation requires a logically prior perception if the valuation is to 
be grounded and not utterly capricious. We can, of course, perceive 
and not value, as I do when I drive down the road with no thought to 
what passes by and only a little to staying on the road. We can 
perceive and then value. Having thought over the play I saw tonight, 
1 have decided that there was more to it than met my eye. But there 
are a variety of circumstances in which the perception and valuation 
are virtually indistinguishable. I have walked into a gallery of a 
museum and been immediately struck by one painting. Its beauty was 
immediately evident to me. Every other painting in the gallery I had 
to inspect and apply my critical faculties to appreciate. Yes, I 
could see the value in them, but I had to work to see it. The 
painting that struck me with its beauty constitues the combined
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perceiving-va li; ing act and the other paintings the perceived then 
valued act. But what virtually does not make sense is a valuation 
without a logically antecedent perception, however cotenporaneous the 
perception and the valuation may actually be.
If we disallow the possiblity of valuation without logically 
antecedent perception, then we have three p o s s i b l e  p r i m a r y  
combinations of perceiving and valuing. First, there are simple acts 
of perception without any valuation. (These are only of interest to 
us insofar as they lead to the second possiblity.) Second, there are 
acts of perception followed by temporally distinct acts of valuation. 
Third there are perceiving-valuing acts in which the perceiving and 
the valuing are logically but not temporally distinct. Secondary acts 
of valuing may follow or. the tail of either ttie perceiving then 
valuing acts or the perceiving-valuing acts. For instance, the 
paintings in the gallery which did not immediately strike with their 
beauty but which I subsequently came to appreciate can be the subject 
of further valuations such as an art appraiser's evaluation of their 
monetary worth. But the painting that did strike me with its beauty 
can be the object of further valuing as well. Having been struck with 
its beauty, I begin to formulate reasons why the features of the 
painting combined in such a way that I found it beautiful. In either 
case the secondary valuations are founded on more primary ones. 
Singer's appraisals and Scheler's value apprehensions are either of 
the primary perceiving then valuing acts type or of either of the 
secondary valuations type. Notice in the secondary valuations type it 
is possible to consider the value (of the object) rather than the
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object itself. But in the primary perceiving then valuing acts or the 
perceiving-valuing acts it is the object which is the object of 
consciousness after or during which value is conferred. But even in 
the perceiving then valuing acts reason can intervene in the schism 
between the act of perceiving and the act of valuing. Only the 
perceiving-valuing act leaves no room for reasoning. And it is this 
act that Singer attempts to capture (unfaithfully as it turns out) in 
his notion of bestowal. It is also this a-rational perceiving-valuing 
act that Scheler claims is love and tries valiantly to describe 
metaphorically.
Lest there be any doubt, I want to make it clear that I am not
talking metaphorically in speaking of the perceiving-valuing act. We 
do perceive without any particularly noticable valuing. A huge 
portion of philosophy deals with such perceptions. But we also have 
more complex acts of perception. The perceiving-valuing act is one 
class of them. The c o m p l e x  act of p e r c e p t i o n  t hat is 
perceiving-valuing is rarer than ordinary perceptions that are not 
value ladden, but even so most (all?) of us can claim to have had 
some. Being transfixed by a particularly awesome sunset is one 
example. Being struck by the power of a symphony is another. Perhaps 
you have overwhelmed at the sight of a particularly magnanimous act. 
Or at the truth that rings out in a play or a poem. There are even 
more mundane examples. In the first bite of a particularly good 
cantelopc I am delighted with its full flavored succulence. 
Percept ion-va lu at ions arc part of everyday life, if not part of its 
rout ine .
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In til e examples it is obvious that there is an enctional 
component. The delight or awe is surely an emotional reaction. But 
they are not reactions to the mere taste or sight of something. They 
arc reactions to the perceiving-valuing act. These acts may even form 
the even more complex perceiving-valuing-affecting act. But even if 
they do, the logical order is perception, valuation and then 
affection. This complex act reveals why Sclieler both asserted and 
denied that love was an emotion. Simple reflex emotions such as fear 
an anger are almost too simple to contain a valuativc element. They 
are more like psycho-pliysiological reactions than emotions. There is 
a chain r eac t ion--per c ep t ion then emotion. Cut while my awe at the 
sunset is a reaction to the sunset, it is not a knee-jerk reaction. 
There is a s p o n t a n e o u s  qu ali ty to pe rceiving-valuing-affectir.e acts. 
Put this is distinct from a physiological reflex. Simply put, simple 
emotions have no more than two logically distinct acts— perceiving and 
feeling. The complex act that love must be has the additional 
logically distinct act of valuing. Furthermore, the emotions attached 
to the perceiving-feeling act can range. This is particularly evident 
in love where the first blush may contain an extraordinarily positive, 
glowing feeling and a rejection may contain utter dejection and 
despair. And of course there are a multitude of other emotions that 
may be attached to th.e basic perceiving-valuing act depending on the 
circumstances. Hence, love has an emotional element, but it is not a 
single emotion. Much like an unstable molecule will tend to stabilize 
itself with an element or molecule of the proper valence, so too love 
tends to complete itself with an emotion that fits the circumstances.
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for example, joy at the acceptance of one's love by the beloved and 
despair at rejection. A calculus of love and emotions could be worked 
out, although I will not do that here. With the description I have 
just given Scheler's apparent contradiction can be resolved. Love is 
not an emotion insofar as the emotion is a simple one requiring only a 
perception and a reaction or is complex one with intervening rational 
judgements. (This second type of emotion has been rejected in a 
previous section and is even more clearly not love given the current 
discussion of the unitary perceiving-valuing acts.) But love is 
emotional: it takes various emotions depending on circumstances.
If we both go into the art gallery, you might be struck with the 
beauty of one painting and I another. The difference can bo accounted 
for in ternis of tastes that have be educated and cultivated over the 
years as well as by other variables, for instance, our differing 
constitutions. Tl.is is important; we are individuals with unique 
personalities that have developed through the course of our lives. 
Part of differences in selecting the love object can be accounted for 
just because our different personalities give us different views of 
the world. But more important at the moment is the possibility that a 
third person might enter the gallery and find the whole collection an 
abyssmal pile of garbage. I have a friend who has no use for 
impressionist paintings although many affect me profoundly. But T 
have some training in art and know some of the history that led to the 
transformation from realism to impressionism. Someone might object 
that my apparent perceiving-valuing acts at being confronted with one 
of Monet's wacerlily panels is really a perceiving then valuing act or
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even a secondary consideration of the value. There is no denying that 
I approach the paintings with a different, tutored point of view. But 
I would deny that in those special cases in which I am struck by a 
p a i n t i n g ' s  b e a u t y  I am " h a v i n g "  a n y t h i n g  other than a 
perceiving-valuing act. I may argue phenomeno1 egic a 11 y that my 
experience is of a perceiving-valuing act; I can distinguish this 
experience from those I have with paintings that do not forcefully 
strike me. The distinction needs to be drawn. My experiences are 
different, and hence the description of them also needs to be. But I 
can also point out to the objector that no person is an empty slate 
after the moment of birth and probably not since conception. Whether 
I explain it genetically or environmentally or both, I now have a 
personality, a foundation on which I expor icnce the things about me. 
To philosophize about some pristine creature without such a foundation 
is sheer folly when the matter at hand is a particularly human 
function. When I talk about the perceiving-valuing acts, I am talking 
about acts that people as they are perform. The psychologist may 
describe how people accrue value complexes that allow them to respond 
to certain stimuli and not others, but that is a matter for the social 
sciences. What the philosopher needs to know is that people are 
capable of such acts for at the moment they occur, they occur in a 
given, individual background. The perceiving-va luing acts can be 
examined and descibed whatever the gcneology of the ground on which 
they occur.
We are now in a position to give a definition or, perhaps more 
aptly, a description of the love act. Since we are concerned only
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v'itl: interpersonal love, the object of the love act will be designated 
Os "a person." This designation of the object is also provisional but 
will s u f f i c e  for the m o m e n t .  The love act i s a n act o f 
oerc e iving - va lu inn toward ^  person . Such acts take ^  wide range of 
possible at t endant emot ions depend ing on the c ircuns tanc e . The 
complex perceiving-valuing act is the only possibility here considered 
that plausibly fits the phenomena. The description logically orders 
the elements of the love act in a way that definitions of the love act 
as a desire, or emotion, or judgement cannot, because each of those 
kinds of definitions oversimplifies the phenomena.
But there is one serious omission in the definition. To get the 
description *.:e loft aside the issue of justification. As it stands,
the description still leaves open the possibility tb.at love is me rely
a matter of taste. You happen to be struck by the beauty of David's
paintings, I by those of Monet. Merely a natter of taste. You love
Sally, and I love Jane. Merely a natter of taste. But while we each 
can, depending on our artistic critical sophistication, defend our 
peference for David or Monet, we are speachless in any attempt we 
might make to defend our love. But the justification of my péchant 
for Monet comes, not from a description of my perceiving-va lu ing act 
toward his paintings, for presumably your taste for David is a 
structurally similar perc e iving-va lu ing act, but from the nature of 
the object of my perceiving-valuing act. Hence, to give a full 
description of the love act and to explore its justification, we will 
have to examine the objects of interpersonal love— persons.
CHAPTER III 
HHAT WE LOVE ABOUT WHO WE LOVE
4.1 Introduction
She [the beloved] is not static: she is fluid, changing, 
indefinable— a live. The lover is attending to a person.
And who can say what that is?^
The concept of a person gives Singer pause, as well it might. 
But although, his reluctance to explore what a person is is 
understandable, it is absolutely essential to an understanding of 
interpersonal love. After all, a person is the object of such loves. 
To say that, when we love another, we love a person is not merely 
redundant and uninformative, it leaves the nature of our love 
ambiguous. Without further comment, the perceiving-valuing act that 
is the love act could be directed at any object indifferently with 
comparable results and consequences. Yet we do not find people 
falling head over heels in love with rocks or trees. It is only when 
love is directed at persons that love exhibits itself most fully. But 
just when love exhibits itself most fully, we find its object most 
puzzling. What is it that constitutes the love of a person? How is 
this love unique? What is it (presumably there is something) about 
the person that is loved? An understanding of interpersonal love 
cannot be had without a clear view of what it is about a person that
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makes him lovable.
A n examination of the enduring emotions has shov.-n that love is 
unlike then, insofar as explicit reasons can be given for the emotions 
and cannot be given for love. What this amounts to is that no 
particular trait of the beloved can be given as the reason for love, 
and hence no particular trait is the reason for love. What happens to 
my love when you become arthritic if I love you for your mastery of 
the piano? Or when your body ages if I love you for your delicate 
skin and subtle curves? If I love you for your sharp wit does my love 
end when you are comatose, never to regain consciousness? Surely I 
may hold these and a myriad of other traits dear, but they are not the 
r e a s o n s  I love you. In part ve find these p h y s i c a l  and 
characterological traits a feeble foundation for love because they 
come and go while the person endures. But just as much they seem 
insufficient. While seeing, appreciating and enjoying the same group 
of traits in the beloved, the lover and non-lover do not have the same 
response to them. We might fault the non-lover for not appreciating 
them enough, but more likely we will see the lover as over-valuing the 
beloved's traits. The non-lover is not wanting; he is not somehow 
deficient, a particularly dull witted fellow without proper emotional 
responses. The non-lover may love someone else and find himself on 
the other end of the stick, demonstrating his capability to love but 
also finding himself responding "unreasonably" to another. Neither is 
the lover demented; while often in the beginnings of love the lover 
acts strange, not all lovers do and most in due course can both love 
and carry on perfectly ordinary life otherwise. No, uc do not love a
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person's traits .
We might say tha: what is loved is the goodness of the person. 
Surely the virtues of the man or woman deserve our love and justify 
it. Dut in truth goodness of a person is nothing more than another 
word for his lovableness. Both point to the positive qualities and 
traits of the person. And so the arguments that demonstrate that we 
do not love traits apply to the claim that we love the goodness of a 
person. In addition, as Scheler points out, loving a person for his 
goodness puts us in a peculiar moral position. If someone, after 
genuine and honest effort, fails to attain some virtue and if we love 
them only for their goodness, their failure to attain the virtue would 
prompt us to halt our love and shun them. Not only does halting our 
love at ti'.is point go against how we think the course o: love ought to 
run, it puts us in the position of not loving just when the person 
needs it the most and when (it would seem) it is most virtuous to 
love. In other words, part of our notion of love is that, if we love, 
we love whether the person deserves it or not. I am glad of her 
strengths and regret her weaknesses, but I love her all the same. 
Love is not a reward for being good boys and girls. But if I do not 
love you because you deserve it, because you are good, then all 
justification for my love seems to vanish.
We are left it seems in an impossible situation. If I love you 
for no reason at all, then my love is a ridiculous condescension 
having no more worth than a particular roll of the dice. But whatever 
reasons I might have are inadequate to justify my love, at least 
reasons of the ordinary sort— the kind we give for our other emotions
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and valuations. But perhaps this is just as well: we really don't 
want a reason of the sort that hinges on conraonly granted qualities of 
a thing. We want a reason better, more profound than "She's pretty" 
or "He's intelligent." He feel that our love is profound: shouldn't 
it have profound reasons? The only problem is coming up with those 
profound reasons.
Scheler advocates one possibility: we love a person for the 
unique person that he is. Since we are all unique individuals, loving 
a person in (for?) his uniqueness seems to explain why I love this 
person and notanother. But why this uniqueness rather than that? 
Singer puts the objection this way.
For what then does a man love a woman? For being the 
person she is, for being herself? Rut that is to say that 
he loves her for nothing at all. everyone is himself.
Having a beloved who is i-hat she is does not reveal the 
nature of love.-
V.’b.ile it is true that we love unique individuals, the uniqueness seems 
no reason or justification for loving. On the other hand, the 
justification for love, as I have suggested and to which we are 
virtually forced, is a justification of a peculiar sort. The sort of 
justification that would provide reason for anyone loving anyone else. 
For, after all, we have no reason to believe that a person couldn't 
love any other person. In fact, this is what Christianity enjoins us 
to do. With this need for an unusual justification in mind, 
uniqueness has some plausibility as a possible justification. 
Uniqueness is something everyone has, but no two people are unique in 
the same way, else they would not be unique. Before I descend into 
paradox and word play, I want to object that uniqueness simply does
151
not seer.’, profound enouph to be a justification. Put another v;ay, 
everything is unique. Persons surely are, but so are rocks and trees. 
Uniqueness doesn't give us reason for a purely human love, 
nonetheless it suggests the kind of reason we may be forced to if we 
are to justify love at all; a justification that can provide reason 
for loving any person, but specifically persons.
To find such a justification, though, requires an examination of 
persons. I will not investigate complete theories of persons nor will 
I provide one of my otm. Such a task is another project entirely. I 
will examine the part of Sartre's Seine and Nothingness that considers 
the initial, primary relationship between people. While he also gives 
a theory of love, I will not examine it in detail since it relies on 
assumptions I dispute, honothcltss, Sartre's exploration of Che Look 
and the Other t; i 11 provide direction in finding t e missing 
justification for love.
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4.2 Sartre's Look And The Awareness Of Others
To begin an examination of Bcinr and iiothinçness  ^with Sartre's 
exposition of the Look and the Other is to begin after his development 
of the for-itself, that is, consciousness. To understand the Look and 
the Other requires a rudimentary understanding of Sartre's conception 
of being-for-itse 1f and so a few prefatory comments are in order. 
Sartre develops his concept of consicousness from Hegel, Heidegger, 
and Husserl. It can be argued that his notion of consciousness mc: t 
closely resembles Husserl's, but whatever the genisis of his ideas, 
Sartre's understanding of consciousness diverges significantly from 
his predecesors. Sartre's consciousness is a nothingness which takes 
being as its object.
As curious as ic sounds to call consciousness a nothingness, 
Sartre has good reason for doing so. Sartre is well aware of the 
difficulties of any Cartesian type system which claims that there are 
two kinds of substance (two kinds of being), mind and matter; there 
always arises the apparently insoluble problem of how two radically 
different kinds of being can influence one another as mind and matter 
so obviously do. Sartre's solution to the Cartesian dilemma is to 
acknowledge that there are thoughts and matter but to claim, that only 
matter is. Matter or, in Sartre's terminalogy, Being just is and as 
suck is com.pletely identical with itself. As such, it cannot be 
related to itself and can make no reference to itself. It is massive, 
opaque and undifferentiated. Consciousness (which is our thoughts in 
the broadest possible sense of "thoughts") is what matter is not. 
Since matter is being, consciousness is non-being or nothing. Perhaps
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the best way to express plainly what Sartre is driving at is to say 
that consciousness is a nothing aware of being. Taking over from 
Husserl the notion that consciousness takes an object, Sartre points 
out that consciousness in taking an object is still not ever that 
object. I may think about you or perceive the tree, but my 
consciousness of you or of the tree is not you or the tree. In fact, 
consciousness can be viewed as negation. It not only is not its 
object (whatever that may happen to be at the moment), it also 
"haunts" being with negation. By isolating the tree from the ground, 
consciousness has actually distinguished the tree from what the tree 
is not (i.e., the remainder of being). Furthermore, if consciousness 
is not to collapse into being, it must retrieve itself in its 
awareness of being by being aware of its not being what it is aware 
of. Sartre defines consciousness as that which is what it is not and 
which is not what it is. This may sound paradoxical, but it is 
Sartre's attempt (an attempt which he makes at great length) to 
capture the nature of pro-reflective consciousness. Sartre imbues the 
pre-reflective consciousness with almost human characteristics. 
Presumably this is justifiable since it is human consciousness that 
Sartre is describing. In any case consciousness, even at the 
pre-reflective level, strives to be its own foundation. That is, 
consciousness attempts in its being consciousness of itself as not 
being itself as aware of being in-itself to be a being identical with 
itself and yet aware of itself. This is impossible since only being 
in-itself can be identical with itself and since this identity does 
not allow an awareness (which is not, cannot bo, the in-itself) of the
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being in-itself. In its striving to be a for-itself-in-itself (a 
being conscious of itself and yet identical with itself) the 
for-itself dooms itself to failure. All of the forgoing description 
of p r e r e f 1ectiVe consciousness, it should be noted, is not a 
relationship of knowing but of being. The prereflective consciousness 
does not know its object, rather it _i^  in relationsihp to its object. 
Even when consciousness reflects on itself the most primary 
relationship is one of being. The reflective consciousness is_ a mode, 
a modification of the prereflective consciousness. Reflective 
consciousness is, for Sartre, the sort of awareness one has when one 
is aware that one is typing or playing tennis or whatever. This sort 
of reflective consciousness is in the present; it is a consciousness 
of on-going consciousness. There is also reflective consciousness as 
knoweldgc that is of the past, as when I consider what I did 
yesterday. My past, of course, is no longer a consciousness and has 
become a being in-itself. My past Sartre calls a facticity which, 
along with my body as my other facticity, I must acknowledge as mine 
and yet I oust always go beyond or transcend these facts of my 
existence since I am a consciousness, a for-itself, and my body and 
past are being, in-themselves.
There are four aspects of prereflective consciousness that 
require closer
examination in view of this discussion of love: lack, value,
possiblity, and freedom. A being in-itself has to be, cannot be other 
than it is, and is law fully,causally determined. The for-itself, on 
the other hand, being what the in-itself is not, is not determined but
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free. Consciou!=ness is only bound by its dependence or. being 
in-itsclf as consciousness' object. The lack of freedom we ordinarily 
experience is based on this dependence. Our feeling that we are not 
free to argue with the boss or free to climb a mountain is based, not 
on consciousness' lack of freedom, but on the fact that consciousness 
is situational, that it is always in relationship to some in-itself or 
another. I am free to argue with the boss or climb a mountain to get 
to the valley on the other side. I just am not free to alter the fact 
that the boss will fire me if I argue with him or the fact that the 
mountain's height is such that I will freeze to death before I can 
reach the other side. The freedom of consciousness is probably the 
most criticized aspect of Sartre's philosophy; however, I will not 
take issue '..'ith Sartre's analysi.s since the analysis of t'ne object of 
love will not hinge on it.
The for-itself as nihilation determines itself as lack. Quite 
simply consciousness lacks being. A being, an in-itself, cannot lack 
anything. A broken chair may be said to lack an arm, but the broken 
chair itself lacks nothing. Only through consciousness can the chair 
be seen as lacking anything. Consciousness not only intends, but 
perceives the chair as it is in its fullness as being in-itself. It 
transcends the broken chair toward the complete chair and supplies the 
missing part. A lack, then has three parts: that which is lacking 
(e.g., the chair), that which is lacked (e.g., the missing arm), and 
the totality which would be were there not a lack (e.g., the 
"complete", whole chair). Any time we see something as missing or 
complete a whole of which only a part is given, we are manifesting
156
lack. Most often we tl.ink of lack as applied to some object, but 
Sartre claims that lack is the very "nature" of Consciousness. 
Consciousness, after all, strives for a whole which it is not. So the 
totality toward which consciousness strives as lack is identity with 
itself. That which is given is consciousness itself considered as 
awareness and what is lacked is the identity of the in-itself that 
consciousness is not. Thus, by its very nature consciousness is lack 
and perpetually so, constantly throwing out before itself the totality 
which it can never be. This totality (the for-itself-in-itself) is 
the self that consciousness attempts to be. It is also value. Value 
has the peculiar characteristic of both being and not being . It is 
not, since it is the unattainable attempt of consciousness. It is 
however for consciousness as that totality toward which consciousness 
aims. Here, as throughout his discussion of preref 1 ective 
consciousness, Sartre is not speaking of knowing and value is not held 
out to consciousness as an object and a specific goal. Rather value 
is contained within the act of consciousness as that which the act of 
consciousness transcends itself toward. Sartre is claiming in his 
discussion of lack and value that consciousness is lack and value and 
that lack and value are not merely modifications of consciousness 
which consciousness may or may not choose to take.
Sartre immediately follows his discussion of lack and value with 
a discussion of possibilities. I will not try to reproduce the course 
of the analysis of possiblity, but rather note its relationship to 
freedom, lack, and value. It should be clear that nothing can be free 
unless there are options (possibilities) open. This is generally
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accepted and uncontentious. Equally, insofar as there is lack there 
is possibility for in lack there is always the totality toward which 
lack aims as a possibility even if this possiblity is, in the end, 
impossible. Since value is the totality toward which lack aims, value
too is intimately related to possibility. And, of course, all these
relationships are ones of being, not knowing. A preref lective 
consciousness does not consider possibilities; it is its possibilities 
in the same sense that it is lack and it is the value toward which it 
strives .
A f t e r  he d e v e l o p s  these aspects of consciousness that 
consciousness is (freedom, lack, value, and possiblity), Sartre shows 
that consciousness in its very nature temporalizes and spatializes. 
Consciousness is not just in time and spnc-.-, in its being it makes 
time to be by tempora 1izing and makes space to be by spatializing. 
With the addition of space and time to the character— the being —  of 
consciousness we have a characterization of consciousness sufficient
for an examination of the Look and the Other.
The review of Sartre to this point is not comprehensive nor was 
it intended to be. For present purposes it is enough to get a general 
idea of Sartre's position. Consciousness is in constrast with Being 
as nothingness is in constrast to complete, opaque, self-identical 
being. But consciousness is not a simple awareness of being. It is 
an awareness of itself as being aware of being. In its both being 
aware of being and of itself, consciousness is also a freedom, a lack, 
value, and possiblity. From this core of attributes which it is, 
consciousness tempora1izes and spatializes. It is this extensively
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developed notion of consciousness that Sartre brings to his discussion 
of the Look and the Other.
S artre i n t r o d u c e s  the Look and the Other by way of the 
traditional problem of others variously stated as the questions "how 
do I know this other being is a person like myself?" or "How do I know 
this other being has a nind?" or, more appropriately for Sartre, "How 
do I know this other being has/is a consciousness?" Sartre, of 
course, rejects prior attempts to answer these questions and claims 
that the being of the Other (another conscious being) is given to me 
in a relationship of being. It is this relationship of being to the 
Other that Sartre describes in "The Look.”
Sartre first considers the Other-as-object and begins with this 
description .
This woman whom I see coming toward me, this man wiio
is passing by in the street, this beggar -.’hom I hear
calling before my window, all are for me ob iects— of that 
there is no doubt. Thus it is true that at least one of 
the m o d a l i t i e s  of the Other's presence to me is 
ob iect-ness
But a person is not like other objects in the world to which I might
attend. Sartre points out that if the man I view in the park were
only one object among many that "I could have him disappear without
the relations of the other objects around him being perceptibly
chang ed . " and "In short, no new relation would appear through him
between those things in my u n i v e r s e T h i s ,  of course, is not the
case; his being a man makes all the difference in the world.
Perceiving him as a man. on the other hand, is not to 
apprehend an additive relation between the chair and him; 
it is to register an organization without distance of the 
things in my universe around that privileged object. To
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be sure, the lawn remains two yards and twenty inches away 
iroir; hin, but it is also as a lawn bound to him in a 
relation wnich at once both transcends distance and 
contains it. Instead of the two terms of the distance 
bein;-;, indifferent, interchangeable, and in a reciprocal 
relation, the distance is unfolded starting from the 
nan.... Ue are dealing with a relation which is without 
part s . given at one stroke, inside of which there unfolds 
a spatiality which is not my, spatiality; for instead of a 
grouping toward me of the objects, there is now an 
orientation which flees from me
Yet the man is an object for me and he belongs to my distances. It is
just that because I perceive him as a nan
...the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its 
being and ... it is perpetually flowing off through this 
hole J
nonetheless,
The universe, the flow, and the drain hole are all once
again recovered, reapprc'nended , and fi::ed as an object.
All this is there for me as a partial structure of the 
world, even t houg h the total dis integration of the 
universe is involved
The d i s t in t egra t ion may bo contained as when tl.e man is absorbed in
the book he is reading. In such instances, ho is not perceiving all
that I an; perceiving but merely a small part. But even such contained
cases of the Other as object indicate a new aspect of a world that was
heretofor completely for me.
The quality "man-reading" as the relation of the man to 
the book is simply a little particular crack in my 
universe. At the heart of this solid, visible form he 
makes himself a particular emptying. The form is massive 
only in appearance ; its peculiar meaning to be--in the 
midst of my universe, at ten paces from me, at the heart 
of that massivity— a closely consolidated and localized 
flight .5
Even though this "drain hole", this "localized flight" in my world is 
the Other as object, it is not the original relation of the Other to
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ir.e . Sartre clair.s this is so because 1) such events in ray world 
concern only Che person (I view) and the things in the world, 2) the 
person is still only an object of knowledge (e.g., I can report, "The 
man is walking on the lawn.", and 3) that the man is purely probable
in two ways. First, it is only probable that he is a man an not a
cunningly contrived robot and, second, even if it is granted that he 
is a man, it is only probable that he is reading or looking— he may be 
daydreaming and only look as if he is reading. On these grounds 
Sartre says we can discount the Other as object as the origianl 
relation of the Other to me and hence we must look further for this 
original relation of the Other to ne. Sartre initially points to the 
permanent possibility that "...if the Other-as-object is defined in 
connect ion with tin? world as the object which, sees what I see, "1C then 
I cay be seen by the Other as subject.
While the possibility of seeing the other points to the 
possibility of being seen by him, the "being seen" cannot be derived 
from the "seeing." It is not as if "the Other's look after having 
wandered over the lavm and the surrounding objects cane follov.’ing a 
definite path to place itself on m e ,"  ^^  but rather a radical 
c o n v e r s i o n  of the O t h e r  is n e c e s s a r y  if he is to e scape 
objectification. For the Other to be a subject, I cannot objectify
him as just one more object in my world. Furthermore, if I am to be
an object to his subject then my objectivity cannot be derived for me 
from the (objective) world since I am the one by whom there is a 
world. Hence this possiblity of bcing-seen-by-anotlier cannot be 
derived from the Other-as-object (for here he must be a subject) nor
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can it be derived fron v.y b eing-as-sub j ec C (since I cannot be an 
object to nysclf, reflective consciousness not withstanding). The 
Other as object is, then, a reference to the Other as subject and, 
S a rtre c l a i m s ,  " b e i n g - s e e n - b y - t h e - O t h e r "  is the truth of 
"seeing-the-othular set of eyes, for I nay feel the look of another on 
me when I hear a rustle in the bushes as I attempt to sneak by enemy 
lines or when I hide myself from the house on the hill that might be 
enemy occupied. Even when I do encounter another's eyes, Sartre 
claims, I can either look at them or I can experience the look, but I 
can not do both. But whether the Other is actually present or not, 
whether I actually see his eyes or feel then boring through my back, 
the experience is of the look and the other as subject. In the 
experience of c!;c look I may feel shame as one of the primitive 
reactions to the Other as subject. It is this sham.e that Sartre uses 
to develop the details of my experience of the Ocher.
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or 
vice I have just glued my ear to the door and looked 
through a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of a 
non-thetic self-consciousness. This means first of all 
that there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing 
therefore to which I can refere my acts in order to 
q u a l i f y  them. They are in no way known ; I am mv 
acts. ...12
The scene behind die door is "to be seen" and the conversation going 
on "to be heard." "The door and keyhole are at once both instruments 
and obstacles . . ."13 This world before me is in relation to my free 
poss ib lit ies. I am my jealousy. My jealousy is the objective fact 
that there is something to be seen behind the door and is called 
situation. The situation reflects the facticity of the objective
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structure of the world surrounding me and my freedom, as well, since I
have tasks freely to be done. Yet, I cannot define myself as in a
situation since I an not a positional consciousness of myself.
There is nothing there but a pure nothingness encircling a 
certain objective ensemble and throwing it into relief 
outlined upon the world, but this ensemble is a real 
system, a dispositon of means in view of an end.  ^^
But just as I an so engaged, I hear footsteps in the hall. I have
been seen. I have been looked at. How I exist as mvse1f for my
pre-reflective consciousness. Before the entrance of the Other I
could only consider myself in a reflective mode of consciousness. But
now, Sartre says, the self comes to haunt the pre-reflective
consciousness. Since pre-reflective consciousness is consciousness of
t he world, its consciousness of the self exists on the level of things
in the world . This consciousness of fne self is not consciousness of
the self as an object, however, since only reflective consciousness
can take the self as a positional object. Rather, my self is present
to me only insofar as I am an object for the Other. I am conscious of
myself as escaping myself; I am conscious of myself as having a
foundation outside myself (in the Other). As such consciousness, I am
for myself only as a pure reference to the Other. Just as this self
is not the object of my consciousness neither is the Other. If he
were the object of my consciousness, he would be reduced to an object
and my self would vanish in my objectification. Neither do I emptily
intend this self as something to be filled in later. This self
entirely escapes me. I cannot know it since it does not exist for me;
it exists for the Other. Even so, I am a self which another knows.
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When I apprehended the Other as object in my world, I experienced him 
as a drain in the middle of it. Nonetheless, my world contained this 
draining out of it. With the look, the world flows cut of itself and 
1 flow outside of myself. In speaking of my flowing outside of myself 
Sartre is pointing to this self as something that I am and yet 
s o m e t h i n g  that I do not d irectly make to be. There is an 
indeterminacy and unpredictability to this self that stem not so much 
from my inability to know the Other as from his freedom, for this self 
reveals his freedom to me. The revelation of his freedom docs not 
come from an image he might produce of me but from a dimension of my 
being that is separated from me by nothingness —  his nothingness as 
freedom. I can never be for myself this being seated in a chair— my 
consciousness transcends ti'.is "being" as what I am n o t - - b u t  t 'n e Ctiier 
car. see me as seated on Che cimir just as iie can see Ci.e cane resting 
against the table. I recognize Che Cth.er's ability to make of me a 
thing and in this recognition, 1 have an outside and this outside is 
my nature.
To speak of my nature is to speak of my possibilities becoming 
probabilities. My free possibilities become before the Other's look 
possibilities in his world. He objectifies me and so may construe my 
actions as having patterns. These patterns are probabilities derived 
from my acting on my possibilities. My possibilities become 
probabilities when viewed by the Other and yet the possibilities 
remain such for me; 1 just experience tnem as probabilities for the 
Other. For instance, my possibility of hiding in a corner is cut 
short by the probability that the Other might find me there.
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Furtherr'.ore, as 1 an the Other s possibles so I am an instrumentality 
in his world.
Just as my nature can be charcterized as my possibilities 
becoming probabilities, it can also be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  as my 
spatializing becoming spa t iali zed and my tcmporalizing becoming 
temporalized. The world was for me as I spatialized it, but in the 
experience of the look I experience myself as being spatialized in the 
Other's world. In the same fashion m y  t e m p o r a l i z a t i o n  is 
temporalized. The Other tenporalizes himself and, as he views me, he 
temporal izes me. As a spatio-temporal object in the world, I offer 
myself to the Other's appraisal. In becoming an object before the 
Other, I subject myself to the appraisals and value judgements he 
night -ahe . I an th.ero for him to assess. And to the extent Ï am 
available to his appraisal, 1 can be considered a slave before hin. 1 
am a defenseless being before his freedom.
17 i t h his comments on the appraisal of the Other in the look, 
Sartre claims that he has finished his description of the look. He 
points out that his description has taken place on the level of 
pre-reflective consciousness and hence that his description of the 
look in no way involves knowing. The Other is particular, concrete 
condition of ray being-unrevealed, that is, of the self that I am but 
do not know. Since I am related to the Other in ray being, Sartre 
claims that his description has avoided sollipsism. His arguments 
have the following general forn. I do experience the look and the 
self that escapes me. I am a consciousness that (as has been shown 
previously) cannot make an object of itself. If I cannot make an
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object of myself and yet there is a self, then this self must be the 
product of some other, i.e., the O t h e r . A n y  attempt to make the 
Other merely a construction of ray consciousness is in error since it 
has failed to appreciate the relation of being between me and the 
Other. It is true that I can know the Other as object and that this 
knowledge of him is merely probable, but the Other as object is a 
degraded experience of the Other. The Other as subject as experienced 
in the look is a factual necessity of ray being. He is factual insofar 
as he is not derivable from me as consciousness, and he is necessary 
since I do experience the look.
Sartre considers the possible objection that I might experience 
the look and yet find that there was no one there to produce it . In 
light of this objection Sartre introduces the notions of presence and 
absence. Even if an Other was not there when I deduced from an 
experience of a look that he was, I demon s t rat c my capability for 
experiencing th.e Other through the look. In fact I may alter my 
behavior because I have experienced the look. After hearing the 
bushes rustle and thinking that it was someone, I may decide that my 
hiding place is not safe enough and go elsewhere. In such an event 
the absence of the Other indicates his presence to me. In fact it 
makes no sense to speak of absence at all except insofar as there is a 
presence. A halltree that never occupied a space in ray house is not 
absent. Only if it had been present at one time could in now be 
present. Similarly, my friend Paul is now absent because he has been 
present to me. Even now he is present to me in his absence when I 
think of going to see him or of a conversation we had. Hence even in
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Ciie experience of the absence of an Other, the look reveals to ir.e ray 
presence to the Other.
Sartre makes the point that the lock is prenunerica 1. That is, 
the experience of the look does not distinguish whether there is one 
or a thousand people looking at me. I am simply looked at. Only when 
I look do countable Others appear. But then, the look disappears, and 
I am left with the Other as object. By the time Sartre talks about 
the prcnumcrical look it is clear that the Other as subject cannot be 
considered any single ocher consciousness or group of consciousnesses. 
The look demonstrates that a) I ara capable of experiencing another 
consciousness and b) other consciousness exists since the look could 
only bo experienced in an Interact ion with a consciousness that is not 
lair. 0 .
That the look is prenuraerical raakes it evident that the Other as 
subject, as a consciousness, can only exist for me as a refused self. 
The Other cannot be discerned as this or that particular consciousness 
and hence cannot be specified as this or that other person. All that 
there is of him is this self that I am. But this self I refuse to be 
since as consciousness I transcend myself at every moment. But of 
course, in the same way that I refuse the Other, as another 
consciousness, he refuses me. This relationship to the Other in the 
refused self (and through the experience of the look) is a double 
negation. "Mot only do I make myself not-be this other being by 
denying that he is m e , I make myself not-be a being who is making 
himself not-be r.ie."^° But this double negation is in a sense 
self-destructive. If I make myself not-be this other being, then T
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loose ir.y objecthood in making an object of him. If he makes an object 
of me, the he looses his objectivity. Of these two states of the 
double negation the more fundamental ic that in which I am objectified 
inasmuch as in the other negation I deny his being. But since in the 
negation in which I am objectified I do not apprehend the Other 
directly, my experience of him is as my refused self. This refused 
self I transcend and so I alienate myself from the Other. At the same 
time this refused self is my bond to the Other. It is that which 
differentiates us; two consciousnesses can be distinguishably two only 
if they negate and objectify one another. It is this double negation 
that provides the basis for all ray relations with others. I am always 
either experiencing myself as an object for Che Other or transcending 
this ohiectification . The objectification leads to the transcendence , 
and tiie transcendence collapses oaci. into the objectification.
There are affective consequences of t'nis i n t e r p l a y  of 
consciousnesses. Emotions are generated out of the particular stages 
of my interaction with another. Sartre comments that I might remain 
fascinated with this Unrevealed, this Other, if I did not realize him 
specifically in fear, shame, and pride. It is interesting that Sartre 
mentions fascination first, but he makes nothing of the possibility of 
fascination. He is more concerned with some fundamental emotional 
reactions, not only fear, shame and pride, but arrogance and vanity as 
well. Each of these is developed from some particular moment in the 
experience of the Other. In fear, for instance, I appear to myself as 
t'hreatoned. It is not, of course, the for-itself that is threatened 
directly but the self. But then, I am this self and so the ruin of
the self ir.plies the ruin of the for-itself.
Fear is therefore the discovery of my bein^-as-object on 
the occasion of the appearance of another object in my 
perceptive field. It refers to the origin of all fear, 
which is the fearful discovery of my pure and simple 
object-state in so far as it is surpassed and transcended 
by possibles which are not my possibles.
I may escape my fear by thrusting myself toward my possibles thereby
transcending my object state and at the same tine objectifying the
Other such that his possibilities become dead possiblities .
Shane, too, hinges on the realization of ray object state. And
pure shame, Sartre says, "... is not a feeling of being this or that
guilty object but in general of being an_ object; that is, of
recognizing myself in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which
I am for the O t h e r . I n  shame I have "fallen" into the world and
realize that I need the mediation of the Other to be what I am. And
again, the way out of shame, the escape from it lies in objectifying
the Other. When 1 objectify the Other he has a subjectivity as a
hollow box has an inside, and since this subjectivity is there, at a
distance, contained, it looses its efficacy. Then his knowledge of me
appears as nothing more than an image he has of me and takes on the
character of "subjective" (in the sense of relative) knowledge. I am
in turn non-thematically aware of being capable of being an object for
the Other. It is this awareness that is imperfectly refered to in the
"I" of "I ara ashamed of myself before the Other."
In pride I am aware of my objectness before the Other but in
addition I ara aware that I am responsible for this objectness.
I emphasize my responsibility and I assume it. In one 
sense therefore pride is at first resignation; in order to
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be proud of being that. I nust of necessicy first resign 
r.ysclf to being only that.^ -
Pride is built on shame since it builds on ny original awareness of my
objectness before the Other that is shame. Sartre also comments that
pride is a reaction of flight and bad faith since "I try to apprehend
myself as affecting, the Other by my object s t a t e " ^ 0  at the same time I
hold the Other as a subject. Hence, Sartre claims, there are only two
authentic attitudes: sh.arae and arrogance— the shame of apprehending
Other as the subject through whom I get my objectness and the
arrogance of affirming my freedom as I confront the Other as object.
In vanity, as in pride, I accept my objectness before the Other. 
But whereas in pride I accept responsibility for that objectness, in 
vanity I attempt to use my objectness to manipulate the Other. I 
attempt to affect him passively with, admiration or love. He, as he 
objectifies me, confers qualities on me--beauty, intelligence, 
wit— and I in turn try to have him respond freely as a subject to
return these qualities to me so that I might know my self. But in
principle my self is unknowable to me and in the process of attempting 
to know it 1 objectify the Other as the object of this project. 1 
play a role for the Other, a self 1 would know, so that he will return 
it to n c . But in the process of playing this role, 1 look to the 
Other for this self and thereby turn him "into stone", into an object. 
At this point 1 have lost the self 1 would know in the depths of the
Other and 1 am faced with my own freedom objectifying the Other.
Sartre continues his discussion of the Other, and only when he is 
done, does he turn to the body. Even so, at the point at which he
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finishes discussing the basic affective reactions to the Other, he has 
provided enough of the essential relationship of self to tl-.e Other for 
a discussion of the Other as the beloved. The tools he provides for 
an exploration of the Other as the beloved do not seem promising. 
Given his description of the Other, it appears that there is no 
relationship that is not doomed to failure. I am either objectifying 
the Other or being objectified by him and no matter how elaborate my 
attempts at a union with the Other, ray attempts are always reduced to 
those two possibilities. If love is not a project doomed to failure 
and if all claims to love are not shams, then a réévaluation of 
Sartre's development of the Other is necessary. It is that project to 
which I turn next .
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4.3 Another Look At Objectification
V.'nac raakes Sartre's description of the for-itself's basic
relationship with others so dismal is that he claims that there are
only two— equally futile— possibilities. Shall I objectify you or
shall I feel objectified by you? Even the most complex relationships
are derived from these two possibilities. The more complex
relationships simply have layers of objectifying and objectification
intertwined with dissimulation. Dissimulation is necessary since the
only way to derive more complex emotions from the two basic attitudes
is through deceit. Sartre's analysis of love bears witness to what
happens when two attitudes are required to explain emotions and human
interactions with a significant emotional component. To love, Sartre
claim;, is t o want to be loved. In this love chat is a
wan L ing-to-b e-loved
. . . 1  w a n t  to a s s i m i l a t e  t h e  O t h e r  as the 
Other-looking-at-me, and this project of assimilation 
includes an augmented recognition of ray being-looked-at .
In short, in order to maintain before me the Other's 
freedom which is looking at me, I identify myself totally 
with my being-looked-at.-^
But to get the Ocher to love me requires more than having him. look at
me ; after all, he looks at me already, and at other things as well,
without loving me or them. For Che Other Co love me, he must treat rae
as the center of his world. I must be all that counts and that
through which all else is understood. I am an object for the Other,
but this very special central object.
In one sense if I am to be loved, I am the object through 
whose procuration the world will exist for the Other; in 
another sense I an the world. Instead of being a 
"this "detaching itself on the ground of the world, I am
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the 5 round-as-object on which the world detaches itself.^2 
And how do I convince the Other to give m e  this status? Through 
fascination. By being fascinating I attempt to seduce the Other into 
putting me in this privileged place in his world.
For the moment it is not important to understand why I , a s  a 
lover, have these goals or exactly how I pursue them; it is only 
important to see that I, as Sartre's lover, knowingly attempt to use 
the fact of my objectification (through the Other's look) to ensnare 
the Other as a free consciousness. Sartre claims that, at heart, the 
lover attempts to convince the Other through fascination to treat the 
lover as the ultimate object in the Other's universe in spite of the 
fact that the Other knows full well that the lover is not just an 
object. Love is consc iou snes s playing at being only object and 
deceiving the Other into believing that this ers tat a object is the 
only object worth looking at. Such a description of his love makes it 
clear that Sartre's account is relying both upon the two basic 
attitudes toward the other— objectifying and objectification— and upon 
decept ion.
Upon reading Sartre's account of relationships, probably all but 
the most misanthropic and depressed have wanted to deny his 
distinctions or at least claim that there was some third alternative 
to objectifying and objectification. A recent attempt at showing a 
third attitude has been made by Robert C. Good who claims that Sartre 
himself suggests such a third attitude toward others. Good points to 
Sartre's discussion in the section on bad faith of the possibilities 
open to the guilty homosexual. One possibility is for the homosexual
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to deny his "nature",deny the facticity thrust upon hir. by the Other
and thus be in bad faith by denying what is bin.
The homosexual acknowledges that he has engaged in acts of 
homosexuality in the past, but he refuses to agree that he 
is in any sense a homosexual. He insists that what 
defines him are his intentions and expectations for the 
fu t u r e ,  w h i c h  in c l u d e  not being a homo s exu a 1.23
This denial of one's past corresponds to refusing to acknowledge the
Other's objectification and asserting freedom as a consciousness. But
the Other's objectification has occurred, and the denial of it is in
bad faith. It would be bad faith as well for the homosexual to
completely identify with the objectification of the Other and confess
that he v; a s nothing more that a homosexual. He is still a
consciousness. Good suggests that an alternative to the homosexual's
complete identification with either his own objectifying glance or his
objectification by t h. e Utl,er is a c o m p r o m i s e  w h i c h  is an
acknowledgement of the circumstances.
He [the homosexual! could acknowledge that he is a 
homosexual, in so far as he has engaged in homosexual 
activities in the past, but also maintain that the 
existence of his future possibilities shows that he is not 
a homosexual by nature. Given that he could change and 
that his possibilities have to be taken into account in 
developing an adequate conception of what he is at the 
moment, his sexual preference cannot be said to be an 
inherent characteristic of his b e i n g . 24
Good then cites Sartre's description of the circumstance.
He would be right...if he declared to himself, 'To the 
extent that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct 
of a paederast and to tb.e extent that I have adopted this 
conduct, I am a paederast. But to the extent that human 
reality cannot be finally defined by patterns of conduct,
I am not o n e . 25
This example Good generalizes as the third attitude.
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In this third attitude, whenever one is objectified by 
another on the basis of certain behavior, one acknowledges 
that lie is the object the other person takes hin to be. 
That is, one agrees that he is the object he is thought to 
be, in so far as what one is is a l w a y s  p a r t i a l l y  
d e t e r IT. i n e d b y how one has behaved. However, one 
simultaneously insists that one is not completely defined 
by the object another takes him to be. One is always more 
than the object another has taken him to be on the basis 
of certain behavior. One's future possibilities have to 
be taken into account in any adequate account of what one
There is no doubt that this is a reasonable solution to the dilemma
that Sartre puts all of us in. It is all the more satisfying a
solution since Sartre himself recognizes it as a possible solution.
The solution seems to state the obvious: my past and body are things
that may properly be considered as such and my consciousness is not
such a thing and need not be bound by the properties of those th'.ngs
that are nine, i.e., n,y past and body. And yet this simple, obvious
solution that Sartre suggests early in Being and Mothingnes s he
ignores, when he later considers relations with others. A mere
oversight? I think not. Sartre has more in mind. He sees
consciousness' attempt to found itself as its fundamental project. I,
as a consciousness, try to create for myself the foundation of myself.
In this project I attempt to provide a being of which I ar: conscious
as my being. It is only by making this attempt at self-founding the
fundamental project of consciousness that Sartre can carry out his
project as he does. As Sartre himself might say, this theme infects
all of Being and Nothingness even his description of love.
...if the beloved can love us, he is wholly ready to be 
assimilated by our freedom.... Our objective essence 
implies the existence of the Other, and conversely it is 
the Other's freedom which founds our essence. If we could
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nar.age to intériorité the whole system, we should be our 
ovm foundation.
Such then is the real goal of the lover in so far as 
his love is an enterprise— , a project of himself.'^
This need to found oneself colors even the most basic relations to
others. When Sartre describes the other as object, he describes my
experience (as an objectifying consciousness) as a draining way. This
man I see in the park is an object and yet one which orients the world
away from me. The foundation of myself which 1 seek and which I
cannot have, even when aware of simple objects, is all the more in
jeopardy with the presence of this other that drains way the world,
takes way what meager pretense of foundation I have. And yet, as
Sartre points out, in such situations the Other is an object for me
and I may recover ny comrcsure in that realisation. I may arrogantly
rer.ind nysolf that the Other's bein; is the being I give him, and one
tr.at is forever beyond his grasp. The Other's objectification in my
eyes, his loss to me of any hope of his own foundation, is the source
of the authentic emotion of arrogance.
Sartre's discussion of the Look also reveals the turmoil of the 
soul in search of its own foundation. Nor;, in my search for a 
foundation, it is not the world that is taken from me (as is the case 
in my experience with the Other as object) but I myself. I find that 
the object Chat I want to be for myself so badly is an object that I 
cannot claim. Here is the promise of the for-itself-in-itself, the 
consciousness that founds itself, and that promise is cruelly wrenched 
from me just at the moment it comes into being. The for-itself that I 
am, finally gains the being that it wishes to be, but that being, that
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object: hood, only exists for another consciousness, not mine. And T am 
in shame-. I have been slapped in the face with the nissinr part of 
me. It is dangled in front of me, and like Tan tu lu s , I can never 
grasp it. My being is always beyond my reach in the consciousness of 
the Other. And so it must be that I am always in conflict with the 
Other for he has the key to what I most fervently and fundamentally 
want— to be a being conscious of itself.
Sartre claims shame is my authentic reaction to the Other's look.
Pure shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty 
object but in general of being an_ object; that is, 
o f rccognizing myself in this degraded, fixed, and 
dependent being which I am for the Other.-®
Clearly, it is in the face of the failure of my project to be my own
foundation that I am ashamed of the foundation the Other provides for
me but will not let me have. I have failed and the Other's every
glance demonstrates my failure. In a prideful response, I may attempt
to turn th.is failure to my advantage; I may react with pride to the
object the Other makes of me. I attempt to preempt the Other and
claim whatever he makes me to be as my own. But, as Sartre points
out, this attempt to found myself through the Other's objectification
of me, while an original reaction, is not an authentic one; pride is
founded on the shame I feel before the Other's g lance .{Footnote : Fear
is the other "original reaction" to the Other and will be discussed
later. For now it is enough to say that it based on the awareness
that through damaging or destroying my objectification (e .g .. my body)
the Other may effect, even destroy my consciousness. Perhaps this is
the ultimate slap in the face since I must be afraid of the very
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objectification I desire.} And so whether I respond to the Other with
arrogance, shaiae or pride, I am responding out of my desire to found
my self.
One might accuse Sartre of being an egomaniacal pessimist. He 
strives for complete dominion over himself and in his failure to 
achieve that goal rants about, among other things, the failure of all 
relationships. He does, after all, perpetually torment himself with 
an impossible project. How then can he possibly have a calm and 
cooperative relationship with Others? Perhaps he is an Icarus who
aspires to too much and falls but lives to tell us of the futility of
all striving. Tl.is might be the case, but first we must grant that to 
some degree Sartre was not so far off the mark. Psychological 
r c r. ê a r c h i: as s r. o n that there is some virtue to S a r t r e ' s  
interpretation of the look.
George Stack and Robert Plant have collected an impressive array 
of ejtperimental data that indicates the role being-looked-at plays not 
only in the lives of men but of animals as well. Tonic immobility 
"characterized by a waxy flexibility of the limbs, freezing in place 
and rapid eye fluttering"^^ is a defense technique used by small 
animals. Their lack of movement allows them to fade into the 
background while the predator is distracted with some movement 
elsewhere in the environment. Experimenters found that tonic 
immobility can be prolonged by eye contact with the animal, that even 
glass eyes suspended from dowels prolonged tonic immobility, and that 
larger pupils in the staring "eyes" also prolonged the immobility. 
But if a stare prompts some animals to defensive behavior, then what
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better defense than to stare back? This appears to be precisely the 
tactic of those insects, fish, birds, and snakes that have eye spot 
patterns. The eye spot pattern on a cobra is particularly evident 
when it is about to attack. Apparently the eye spot pattern protects 
it from attack from the rear. Yet while these defense tactics are 
provocative, experiments closer to home are desirable. For instance, 
"It has been found that gazing or staring is often a prelude to attack 
or a substitute for it in p r i m a t e s . "30 Humans, too, shot; a reaction 
to being stared at.
Experiments confirm that eye contact provokes 
emotional arousal as measured by Galvanic skin response
a c t i v i t y ........ What is to be noted ... is that eye
contact Per se was shown to have produced a nonspecific 
" e m o t i o n a l  a r o u s a l ” or e m o t i o n a l  r e s p o n s e  in the 
experimental subjects
In another experiment, "observers found that the motorists who were
stared at crossed the intersecticn at significantly faster rates than
did those who were not stared at ."32 Even before the motorists could
clear the intersection they exhibited gaze aversion behavior. Stack
and Plant conclude from such experiments that "Staring or gazing in
itself seems to be a salient stimulus that arouses tension, produces
emotional arousal, and induces avoidance r e s p o n s e s  ." 3 3
Stack and Plant claim that such experiments support Sartre's
description of the reaction to the look. It is clear, as they claim,
that pervasive reactions to the look among animals as well as man
makes it difficult to consider such reactions as nothing more than
pathological responses. Man and animal seem to have inborn reactions
to the look just as one would predict given Sartre's phenomenology.
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Hut Stack and Plant also point to a variety of circumstances in vhich
Sartre's description of the response to the look does not seem Co fit.
In situations in which an individual is offering a 
presentation, performing, giving a speech or lecturing it 
would be unusual for the object of visual attention to 
interpret staring as hostile, aggressive, or menacing.
There are also those situations in which one person is interested in
another and in such situations Stack, and Plant observe that the eye
contact involved nay simply indicate fascination or interest. Common
sense and personal experience tell us that in public speaking and
personal interest situations that the look does not convey a threat
but interest. Furthermore some experiments have discovered that
"pupil size is an indication of emotional arousal and attraction
The larger the pupil the greater the interest. These various
observations lead Stack and Plant to conclude that
Prolonged eye contact, intense staring and large pupil
size are, under certain conditions and in certain social
contexts, experienced as signs of attraction, interest, or 
desire. A conscientious phenomenology of "the look" must 
accommodate these polarities of response to being the 
object of the gaze of another.
Surely it is appropriate for Stack and Plant to call for a
phenomenology of the look that takes into account these more positive
responses as well as the negative ones. And just as surely Sartre's
account of the look is inadequate as it stands. There is even good
reason to believe that his account cannot be patched up to account for
the diversity of responses to the look. And even if it could be, it
probably shouldn't be, for while accurate in some respects, the
account seems too obsessive to be accurate. A closer look at fear,
shame and arousal will make this obvious.
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Sartre is correct to count fear among the authentic responses to 
the look. It is fear that is evidenced by the physiological arousal 
as measured by Galvanic skin response in the experiments. In the 
angry stare there is the threat of bodily damage, however removed that 
damage may be from probability by social custom. And even in Sartre's 
most favored instance— being caught in the act of eavesdropping--there 
is the fear of punishment. The fear produced by the angry look or by 
being caught in the act of eavesdropping is a rational fear. It is a 
fear stemming from an appropriate source. Whether I deserve the angry 
look or not, having received it I had best beware; someone intends me 
harm. Having been caught eavesdropping, I had better be careful; I 
could yet get the worst of it yet. The look in these situations 
produces fear because there is reason to b? afraid. Perhaps it not 
physical 'uar- tr.at I am afraid of in this instance, but a loss of 
social standing or of privilege. Even so, these too count as things 
about which I might reasonably be afraid. Not being afraid in such 
situations would be maladaptive. If I do not treat the look seriously 
in such situations, I may well loose anything from respect or 
privilege to life or limb. Fear is a very practical response to the 
look— when the look is threatening— and in so far as fear is an 
uncontrived and unpremeditated response to a look, it is also 
authentic.
Fear can be an authentic response, because there are hostile 
looks and deeds. But not all locks are hostile. What would be the 
authentic response for a puzzled look, a rapt attentive look, or a 
sexually desirous look? Surely fear is not the appropriate response.
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Is shar,e? Vihat possible connection can there be between a purzled 
look and shame? Sartre says I am in shame because I experience myself 
as an object. But why should I be ashamed of being an object? True, 
I do not have the freedom that I would have had had I not been seen. 
But my response to the curtailment of my freedom should either be fear 
that it be curtailed in a respect important to me or anger that 
someone should dare to curtail my freedom. Perhaps what Sartre does 
not spell out as clearly as he should is that I am ashamed in the face 
of the evaluat ive look. In the various looks Sartre thinks I have 
been evaluated and found wanting. And I am ashamed. Of course, in 
most people's lives even this is not enough to feel ashamed. There is 
the further condition that I feel the evaluator worthy of evaluating 
me. Someone might feel chat anyone is worthy to evaluate him or no 
one or only a specified few, but the shame can only cone when someone 
feels himself having been found wanting by those worthy of evaluating 
him. For Sartre, I am ashamed in the look because the Other finds me 
wanting: I have failed in my project to found myself. Any Other is 
worthy of finding me wanting in thisrespect since any Other has 
objectified me and thereby possesses the part of me I have striven 
for. The Other possesses the evidence of my failure.
Even if we grant to Sartre the claim that consciousness 
fundamental project is to found itself and that the look reveals in 
shame to consciousness the failure of its project, we are left with 
those other looks, tiot all looks arc specifically judgmental of my 
fundamental project. The look of hatred does not necessarily judge me 
a failure but an annoyance or obstacle to the Other's project. My
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response to Chat look had better be fear--that visceral response of 
arousal--not shar.e. If I am not aroused to ready myself to fight for 
::y projects or flee in the face of the Other's, then I will not last 
long . I will be crushed as just one more obstacle to be removed on 
the Other's way to his goals. If I respond with shame to the Other's 
attentive gaze, I will entirely miss the fact that he is not judging 
me as wanting but as (possibly) valuable. The sexually desirous gaze, 
too, will be lost on me if I react unswervingly with shame. Even the 
puzzled look will be beyond me if I insist on being ashamed instead of 
explaining myself.
The look is a call to arousal. Vîhat I should be aroused to must 
be determined by the situation. If I respond univocal ly to all types 
of looks, 1 an doomed for I shall falter and die in a world that calls 
for a variety of responses. But I do have this variety of response .
I am capable of discerning various kinds of looks. So it seems that
shame is equiprimordial with responses to other types of looks. 
Sartre might argue that that arousal experienced when looked at just 
is shame. I suppose that he could call it such, but first calling 
arousal shame would blur the distinction between arousal-shame and 
shame-interpreCed-being-found-want ing . Further, the claim that the 
response to being looked at is arousal conveys the important point 
tr.at the person has become ready to interpret his environment, namely, 
the source of the look. It is this readiness that is most fundamental 
for without it no interpretation of the look can be made ; first, I 
must be oriented to the look so that then I may react appropriately.
I t-.ave argued 1) that arousal, not shame, is the fundamental
183
response to the look, 2) that this must be so since the reaction of 
shame alone and even the reactions of shame and fear cannot give 
proper flexibility to respond to all circumstances that consciousness 
is called upon to respond to, and 3) that as a matter of fact shame is 
not the only response to the look. Conclusion 1 is unavoidable, for 
even Sartre allows chat we may respond to the look with either fear or 
shame. To be able to respond to the look with one or the other, to be 
able to c h o o s e  the most appropriate response requires that 
consciousness be aware of and directed toward that c h oice. 
Phys io lo;^  ical arousal performs just that task. To anthropomorphize, 
arousal tells us that we need to make a choice. More strictly, 
arousal is a focusing activity that eliminates to a large extent 
superfluous and redundant input. Assuming for the moment that there 
arc only two possible responses, fear and shame, arousal brings us Co 
the point of choosing the most appropriate one. Hence the arousal is 
prior to either the shame or the fear. This means that neither shame 
or fear is a simple, knee-jerk response. They are both responses 
which have required some, perhaps very limited and historically quite 
archaic, interpretation of the environment. Even if they were 
considered built-in responses, they would require association with 
selected, pertinent features of the environment. But however you 
interpret the nature of fear and shame, it is clear that not they but 
arousal is the primitive response to the look.
Since arousal is a necessary prerequisite to either fear or 
shame, it would be, among other things, uneconomical for all oth.c-r 
responses to be built upon just these two. For example, arousal is
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sufficient s tar t inn point for a sexual response to the look. And in 
this case at least it is clear that the look of sexual desire is 
incompatible with the look of negative judgment. To desire someone 
sexually, and hence when looking with sexual desire at someone, I have 
found them to have some positive attributes, if only the attribute of 
a b l e - t o - s a t i s f y - r a y - d e s i r e s  o r ,  p e r h a p s ,  
well-suited-to-satisfy-my-desires. And this positive judgment is 
incompatible with the negative been-found-wanting look-judgment that 
prompts shame. Arousal is a-judgnental and logically prior Co the 
judgments of "This is a look of hatred" or "This is a look of 
be ing-found-wan t ing" or "This is a look of desire." Arousal can 
orient me to the look of desire just as well as it can to the look of 
hatred or tr.e look of being-found-war. t ing . Hence, from the present 
choices, I must conclude- that tb.e reaction of shame cannot found the 
reaction of sexual arousal. Those two reactions depend on different 
types of judgment. Further, since arousal is essential to fear, 
sl.ame, and sexual arousal, arousal is the most fundamental response to 
the look. Only arousal is flexible (and non-judgmental) enough to be 
the ground for our responses to the look. Since we do have these as 
well as other (I have not mentioned anger which surely is as primitive 
a response to the Other and the look as any) basic responses to the 
look, shame cannot be the reaction to the look. It is only in the 
freedom of arousal that we can choose our response to the look.
Sartre plainly and repeatedly asserts freedom as a fundamental 
trait of consciousness, and yet he denies consciousness this very 
freedom by claiming that consciousness can only respond to the look
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with sbar’.e. Kc cannot have it both ways: either consciousness
responds to the look with shame and thereby is determined, or 
consciousness responds to the look with arousal, and is thereby 
f r e e . I  will assume that, Sartre being forced to the choice, would 
reaffirm his claim that consciousness is free and grudgingly reject 
the claim that shame is the response to the look. Freedom is a 
fundamental characteristic of consciousness without which Sartre's 
whole ontology would crumble. Shame as the response to the look, on 
the other hand, is not imperative. Sartre can maintain that the Other 
is made obvious to us by shame even though shame night not be the only 
way the Other is presented to us in the look. Sartre's most important 
use of shame is to demonstrate that we have an imnediate awareness of 
the Other in our response to the look . The experience of sh.ame is 
this demonstration, but the demonstration stands even if shame is not 
the only experience of the look. Even if shame is not the only 
experience that makes the Other immediately obvious to us, it is still 
one experience (among others) that makes the Other's quality as 
objectifying consciousness apparent to us. And that is Sartre's 
point, after all: we are not alone; we have immediate and unassailable 
experiences of a consciousness other than our own.
There is an interesting consequence to the claim that arousal, 
not shame, is the fundamental response to the look and this 
consequence might well make Sartre blanch. Shame as an interpreted 
response to the look requires an objectifying glance at the Other for 
that interpretation. Sartre's shame is an immediate and forced 
response to the look. But we have seen first, that arousal is a much
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more plausible candidate for this innediate and force response to the 
look and second, that Sartre cannot maintain his claim that 
consciousness is free if shame is a forced response. Arousal, on the 
other hand, is immediate and forced— just as much as what I see when I 
open my eyes in the morning. The arousal has the character of a 
giveness, and this giveness is just as much a giveness as the giveness 
of the objects before my eyes. This arousal is the presentation to me 
of a consciousness other than my own just as the objects arc presented 
to me as other-than-mc. And just as I freely choose my projects and 
reactions to the objects in the world so, too, do I choose ray reaction 
to the look. If my choice of reactions and projects to the Other are 
not to be a matter of pure whimsy and caprice, then I must discern 
whet h.ir.d of look, in wh.at manner the other, is being presented . 
Discernment requires looking at the other and hence any response to 
the look, other than the most basic ar o u s a l ,  r e q u i r e s  an 
objectification of the Other. Even shame, as imm.ediate an intimation 
of the Other (as objectifying glance) as it is, is also an 
objectification of the Other. Insofar as this fact is a reaffirmation 
of constant the play of objectifying and objectification that is 
consciousness' relation to the Other Sartre would agree, but insofar 
as shame, under the present description, cannot be considered a simple 
u nadulterated reaction to the look Sartre would oppose this 
re in terprêtation of shame.
l.’hile arousal may present us with the most intimate demonstration 
of the Other's existence, and while the evidence of the Other's 
existence that arousal may present us with is logically prior to the
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objectification of tl.o Other, any relationship to the Other core 
sophisticated than mere arousal requires both the experience of being 
objectified and the act of objectification. Looking and being looked 
at become so inextricable in any relationship that, while their 
interplay may be traced, it is perhaps better to consider them on par. 
Any undue emphasis on the look and my objectification under it would 
misrepresent the nature of the relationship. Sartre, of course, 
treats relationships as just such an interplay, yet he places the 
emphasis on consciousness' attempt to deal with its objectification in 
the look and treats consciousness' objectification of the Other most 
generally as a retaliatory strategy.
Sartre's em.ph.asis on consc iou sness ' objectification in the look 
is a direct consequence of his claim that consciousness ' fundamental 
project is to found itself. Consciousness' awarcness of its failure 
is most pronounced wlier. consciousness experiences the look and feels 
the shame of its objecthood being lost to the Other. Hence, Sartre 
sees consciousness as not only trying to found itself but as trying to 
avoid the shame which a direct and unabashed look produces. Yet, if 
sliamc is not a mindless reflex, it must be a responsible reaction to 
the look. As such, it contains the seed of an escape from the tyranny 
of the futile, self-founding project. Responding with shame to the 
look requires that first T objectify the Other and second that I 
determine from my objectification that his look is a look of judgment 
that finds me wanting. It is not, however, required that I realize 
these steps to my reaction of shame. If I do realize these 
intermediates between the arousal and the shame, then I have the key
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to abandoning ny futile project. If I realize that, even in shane, 
even in ny most poignant awareness of ny estranged objecthood, I have 
objectified the Other, then I realize that I have already done to hin 
what he has done to me. And I may realize that just as he looks at me 
as wanting so may I look at him; he is no better or worse judge than 
I. Each of us can demonstrate through the look that we are 
consciousnesses in search of a foundation. If the project is futile
for me, then it is futile for him; we are no different in this
respect. Whether in my shame I consider the Other as objectified by 
me or as the judge of me, I am forced to grant that the Other is no 
better off than I. If he objectifies me in the look, then to be 
ashamed before that look I must objectify him. I, as consciousness, 
have already escaped him and he has, just as surely, already escaped 
me. I: he judges me in his look, then to be ashamed before that look 
I must judge him. But I grant him the power to judge me and his power 
to inflict a judgment of shame is only so great as I allow it. It 
cones down to this: just at this point I need no longer be deluded 
that my project of self-founding through the Other is possible. I 
recognize that we are separate consciousnesses and cannot in principle 
be captured one by the other. And I realize that he presents no 
threat to or promise for a project of self-foundation. He can never 
directly steal away my consciousness by objectifying it; in my 
perpetual flight I am s a f e ^  And he cannot give back to me the 
object he has made of my flight; ray flight as consciousness prohibits 
me from beir.u that object. I nay only contemplate what he chooses to
give to me of the object he has made of me as I might contemplate a
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r c-.i ec.b cr anc e of t h i n p s past. T h e r e  is no a l t e r n a t i v e  to 
objectification and being objectified, but neither is there harm or 
pror.ise in these acts. They are laercly fact. In the realization that 
these attitudes are ny lot— and the Other's— I may accept my fate. If 
I take objectification and objectifying as primitives for me, then I 
need not confuse objectification with foundation. I will objectify as 
I must, but I need not seek pointlessly for a foundation I cannot 
have. Of course, I nay also, as Sartre suggests, pursue hopeless 
relationships in search of self-foundation, but I need not. In the 
realization of the elements of shame I have the choice of pursuing 
futilely or accepting with honor ny destiny.
kith these last conclusions we have what we need to determine who 
it is that is Icvcd . Sartre's Other still has its basic attributes. 
It is still anoti.er consciousness freely objectifying and capable of 
being objectified by an Other. But I have sb.own that relationships 
with the Other need not be doomed to failure. Sartre concludes 
relationships are doomed to failure because he conflates the project 
of seIf-foundat ion with objectification. Eut it has become quite 
clear that, while objectification and being objectified are 
i n e s c a p a b l e  a t t r i b u t e s  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  the p r o j e c t  of 
self-foundation can be a freely chosen goal and is distinct from the 
act of objectification. Sartre, of course, is right the attempt to 
find one's foundation in another is quite hopeless. But relationships 
with the Other need not be the attempt to find one's foundation, and 
hence there is the possibility that the relationship of love is not a 
doomed relations'nip. All that is needcdis that the love act, which is
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a valuing, havt its proper object, one that will not a priori door.i the 
love to failure. The rev.'orV.ed Other of Sartre has the proper 
attributes to be that object.
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3.4 The look of love
The object of love is the Other. This Other is an other 
consciousness that nay be characterized as a freedom and one of the 
sources of ny facticity. As we have seen, Sartre claims that my 
facticity is established by the Other and this fact forever troubles 
ny consciousness. I am never in posssession of myself. Ideally I 
would like myself to encompass the Other so that I could reclaim my 
facticity and found myself. But of course, this is impossible, and so 
Sartre claims that we try the next best thing— the seduction of the 
Other. In seduction I make ny self a fasc inat inat ing object so that 
the Other freely orients his world around this fascinating object that 
is - c . I then become the limits of his transcendence and the origin 
o; his world. In other words, I atLcmpL through fascination to get 
the Other to love . Sartre calls this project love. his 
explanation of why the lover makes being loved his project and his 
description of how the lover, by becoming a fascinating object, 
attempts to seduce the Other into loving is interesting, but his 
equation of love with wanting to be loved is deeply flawed. Equating 
loving with wanting to be loved means that the lover only loves if he 
has previously chosen the futile project of self-foundation. It is 
the ideal of being and in-itself-for-itself that prompts the lover to 
want to be loved and to be seductive in an attempt to capture the 
consciousness of the Other. Sartre's explanation of love works only 
if the lover has taken up the futile ideal as a necessary project. 
This futile ideal, I have argued, is not a necessary project for 
consciousness, only a possible one. Thus, while t’r.c futile project is
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not a necessary project for consciousness in general, it is necessary 
for Che lover if Sartre's account is true. Furthermore, the futile 
project of self-foundation must be assumed by the prospective lover 
tirior Co "Falling in love," since the prospective lover, to value the 
beloved for the beloved's ability to love the lover, must have 
previously determined to be engaged in the futile project. Only if 
the lover already has as his project the project of self-foundation, 
can he value the Other as an instrument in the attainment of that 
project.
Did I say instrument? Insofar as I conceive the beloved as a 
means to ny self-foundation and not as an end in himself, I view the 
beloved as a tool. But Sartre would 'nave it that love is wanting to 
be- loved, hanging to be loved is wanting to be an object before the 
Other's consciousness, a very special object it is true, but an object 
nonetheless. There seems to be a problem. Is love wanting to use the 
Other as a tool in the project of ray self-foundation? Or is love 
wanting to be a special object before the Other? Both: love is
wanting to use the Other's consciousness as a tool Co my project of 
self-foundation. The problem is that at one and the sane time I want 
to treat the Other as object (tool) and as subject. Dow I cant treat 
him as a tool, but he is not one. He is a consciousness. To treat 
him as a tool, then is to mistreat him. But I want to treat him as a 
subject only insofar as he can be a tool. In other words, to want to 
be loved by the Other I must objectify h ira first. Love as 
wanting-to-b0 - loved requires that I first appraise the Other as a 
satisfactory means to my goal of self-foundation. Rut this means that
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from the outset the description of love as wanting-to-be-1oved as 
means-to-self-foundat ion is based on a contradiction. As lover I must 
value the beloved as object and want him as subject.
S a r t r e  m i g h t  r e s p o n d  "Well, t h a t ' s  the way it goes. 
Relationships are rife with conflict." There is something perversely 
appealing about such a response. Nonetheless, if I value the Other as 
an object or tool to my ends, I have appraised her. If I have 
appraised her, I have not loved her in that capacity. Appraisal is a 
hind of valuation as is love, but it is a different kind. I am 
grateful for the money my wife has made to support us while I finish 
my schooling, but if all I value her for is her ability to earn a
living, I may throw her out when I am able to make my own or when she
wants to become a housewife and mother. She has, after all, served 
her usefulness. The reason I appraised her as valuabel is now gone. 
She has lost her utility as tool toward my goal of the good life as a 
dentist. But love does not have this judgemental quality, and we 
cannot give reasons of the sort we would for an appraisal. Love is 
not an appraisal and the beloved cannot be, as beloved, an object-tool 
toward my end of self-foundation. Even when I conceive of this tool, 
the beloved, as a consciousness to be used toward my end, I am yet 
appraising and not loving. Whatever love I may have for her is 
distinct from any appraisal I may have of her. It folows that, 
however much the lover values and hence wants the beloved as a means 
in the project of self-foundation, this valuation is an appraisal and 
is not love. Love is not wanting to be love .d LWanting to be loved
is a consequence of loving (as v;c shall see later), but cannot be
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cqücied v.-icl; love.
Even if Sartre is interpreted as clairainr, that the pro iect of 
love is to be loved, there are problems. First, this implies that 
love, at lest logically, precedes the project of love. Thus, love
must be defined or described apart from any description of the project
of love. Second, even if a_ project of love is to be loved, this is
not love's only project. V.'c need not hold that love is wholly
altruistic to point out that at least sometimes a lover acts without 
thought to return. In Sartre's case that translates: lovers sometimes 
act without thought of being loved in return. Such altruistic acts 
can be as simple- as those times we present a loved one with a trinket 
and say "I saw this and thought of you." The lover acted on impulse 
out of l o w  and without thought to being loved in return. "£ course, 
it is true that, if the trinket is contemptuously rejected, the Ivucr 
is hurt, and Sartre might say "You see the lover did exprect something 
in return after all." But this need not be the case; the loving act
need not have been a barter— "I'll give you this if you'll love me" or
even "I'll give you this in the hope that you will feel obligated to 
love mo." In fact the pain of rejet ion in such cases does not rest on 
the disappointment of failing to be Ivocd in return for goods 
proffered. The lover is hurth that his love has not been accepted. 
Acknowledgement is different from reciprocation. It! any instance in 
which I wish the beloved's welfare without regard for my own 
(including my being loved in return), I have a project borne of love
that is not a project of being loved.
On tliese various grounds we cn reject Sartre's claims about the
195
nature of love. Love is not wanting to be loved. Neither is w’anting 
to be loved love's sole project. Yet, this brief examinât ion of 
Sartre's concept of love highlights sonething troubling. Love is a 
p e r c e p t i o n ,  in S a r t r e ' s  terms, a look. As such, it is an 
objectification of the beloved. But this objectification cannot be 
the objectification of the Other when I dtermine the Other as a tool 
toward my projects. An objectification of the Other that determines 
the Other as a tool is an appraisal of the Other— just the sort of 
valuation that love cannot be. It would seen that if this sort of 
objectification is the only sort, then love is impossible. The kind 
of perception-valuation that I have described love as having to be is 
not the v a l u a t i o n  of appraisal (wl-.ich is to say not the kind of 
cbjectificatin of Che Other that Sartre routinely seems to mean).
Sartre's die hot ony of objectification and objectified, look and 
looked at, is too simple. Love is not an experience of being looked 
at; it is a perception after all, not a being-perceived. Neither is 
it an objectification or looking-at that appraises the Other's 
worthiness in th.e service of the lover's goals. Love has an 
altruistic element that Sartre does not allow in his distinction 
between for-myseIf/for-others, but he polarizes the distinction 
completely into the objectification for-mysclf and the objectified 
for- (or before) Others. This polarization is unacceptable partly 
because Sartre seems to be able to allow no other valuation between 
consciousnesses than appraisal. Sartre's mutually exclusive choices 
are either 1 use him or lie uses me. However above board this use and 
the accompanying appraisal is, it is still utilitarian. We have just
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seen how Sartre by trying to force some notion of ^Itruis!.: into his 
utilitarian sclienc- has described love in contradictory terir.s. The 
altruism of wanting to be loved, that is, wanting to have the Other's 
appraisals, not my own, determine the situation, can only be described 
in terms that finally reduce to my using the Other. Sartre's own 
description indicates as much, since it describes my desire to 
experience the Other's valuation in terms of my own project of 
self-foundation . The altruism that is an essential element (though 
not the whole of) love cannot be accounted for in terms of utilitarian 
evaluations on either the lover or the beloved's part. Altruism— the 
thought of another with no thought for on ese1f--cannot be accounted 
for in terms of self-serving appraisals. Any such account contains a 
manifest contradiction in terms.
If altruism is possible- and if love is not merely wishful 
thinking, then the objectifications of the Other that I r.ake cannot 
only be appraisals made in my own interest. The choices are not just 
either he appraises me or I appraise hir.ie, but either he appraises me 
or I appraise him or I love h i m . 39 phe loving of him is an 
objectification of him just as surely as my appraisal of hir.i; my love 
is my love for him, not his for me. But this objectification that is 
love is an objectification of the Other, not as a means, but as an 
end. he is, true enough, a possible threat to me. I may respond to 
him in fear that he may destroy me or sometliing dear to me. I may 
respond to him in shame Chat I am nothing more than an object of 
utility to him. I may grant these possibilities (or perhaps in naive 
loves, ignore or be ignorant of these threats), but I need not resond
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uitl: cslculzCed plans for the utilization of the Other before he 
utilizes ZIP. I tr.ay respond with the recognition of the Other's 
potential to destroy and humiliate. It is an aweful potentiality the 
Other has. And I have the potential to respond to this potential with 
at;e. This awe in the face of the Other's potential is love.
Awe is not fear or shame, althou^ht they are hidden in it. Awe 
is the recognition of the potential to inflict fear or shame. Fear 
and shame are reactioins to specific attempts to inflict destruction 
or utilization. As has been pointed out, to feel fear or shame the 
Other must be assessed (accurately or inaccurately) to have intentions 
to destroy me (or part of me or something of worth to me) or to z.ake 
me a tool for his utilization. These ar specific reactions to 
STCcific si times ions. Aw; precedes them as an appreciation of the 
t’ther's ability to inflict. Awe is, in part, an appreciation of tr.e 
Other's ability to disvalue me (in my destruction which I fear) or to 
appraise me (and thereby put me to shame as an object of utility for 
him). A.s an objectification of the Other, awe is the awareness of 
perception of the Other as a disvaluing bieng. More, it is a 
perception-valuation of this other disvaluing being. Here I am not 
objectifying the Other to utilize him as a tool to my ends. I am no 
more than recognizing and valuing him for what he is. It is as if I 
saw his pure potentiality. Never mind for the moment that that 
potentiality might, as actuality, turn to my disadvantage. Just now 
in awe I see and value the power of valuing that is the Other. And it 
is not just his ability to disvaue that places me in awe. his very 
ability t nisvalue indicates his ability to value. Disvaluing is a
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characcorizcciori or r.odi; of v a Ir. in;', . And so it is that this at.-c is 
not just a look that vai'ucs the Other's potential to destroy and 
utilize, to disvalue, but also a look that values the Other's 
p o t e n t i a l  to vlue, a v a l u i n g  that need carry no negative 
qualification. In love I need not be responding to the beloved's 
poi.'er to negatively value; it is the power to value itself that is 
important. The Other nay prize and even love for he is a being that 
values. He, just as I, is capable of awe. He is just as capable of 
positive valuations as negative since in his being he is valuation. 
My perception and valuation of the Other, which is my love for him, is 
ray awe of his potential as a valuing being. This is the who of love. 
This is ny beloved. A being capable of valuing unto love.
Love of tie; Other is value valuing value or nore properly val'uing 
being valuin^ valuin;; being. Th.is valuing is not a valuing for. It 
is not an appraisal. It is a sheer awe at the fact of the Other's 
valuing. As such it does nothing and is not directed toward sorae goal 
either mine or the beloved's. To have such a goal would be to place 
one or the other or the both of us as a tool appraised as useful. The 
valuation simply is. In the raids t of ray projects in which I, among 
other things, evaluate— appraise— and use Others I am struck by love. 
I find that amongst amongst these Others an Other that I see 
differently. Mo matter how highly I appraise thse Other's, they are 
always evaluated and objectified with regard to their usefulness to 
me. They may be tools or irapcdiments, but they are always seen in 
relation to ray projects. Tlie beloved shatters ray complacent appraisal 
and obiectification of the Other. Mow there is at least one Other who
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if- no I o’f. jcc t if ipc as tool and regarded witl. concern to his utility. 
Tor uhatcver reasons peculiar to tiy personality and situation, I have 
seen struck. And while it is true that I objectify the beloved, I do 
not objectify him in light of ny projects. Simply: here stands before 
me someone amazing. If I look at myself and then look at the beloved, 
I may note that he is just like me, an orientation point in the world. 
But in any case I sec that the world centers around him. It is 
evaluated purely from his perspective. That others are just like him 
does not matter; all I know is that this one is the center of the 
world from which, all valuations emanate. I "see" his valuing core, a 
core that is the axis of the universe. If I am not experienced and
have not loved before, I will forget myself. I will forget that I am
a center tc the world as much as he. In my awe, I will be dazzled and 
only see the universe revolving around him. I will be captivated. I 
will be in awe. I will love.
How we can see why Sender would speak of love in the following 
t erms.
For the primary orientation of love is towards values, and 
towards the objects discernible, through those values, as 
sustaining them
And again:
But the fact of the matter is that love relates, in the
first instance, to what has value, and to man only to the
extent that he is endowed with value and capable of
advancement in this respect
The Other certainly does "sustain" values, because he is a source of
them, and love does relate to what has value particularly when that
"what" is an Other who is a value conferring being. It is my
ir.pression ti-.at Ce:: a 1er's conr.i trr.cn t to an objectively existin': 
liierarchy of values prevented him from seeing the uniqueness of the 
love act directed toward the Other. The Other is not just a link in 
the great chain of values. He is a source of values, of valuing. 
Whether these values objectively exist is beside the point; it is not 
important that the Other confers values correctly or incorrectly or 
even, for that matter, whether there is even the question or 
possiblity of correctly or incorrectly conferred values. It is a fact 
that the Other values. There may be an objective value to the things 
he values, and then again there may not. Insofar as love is a valuing 
of the valuing itself, then there need be no guarantee that what is 
valued is indeed valuable. It would be entirely pointless for there 
to bo objective values " i n ” chines, if there were no being to 
recognize those values. We must be, therefore, at least capable of 
recognizing values for there to be love at all. If we could not at 
least perceive values, we would be with regard to values in the same 
position that we are with regard to ultra-high frequencies of sound. 
Until the adven of modern science, those sounds that a dog can hear 
but we cannot might as well have not existed. Ue were thoroughly 
unaware of them. And as unperceived, they could not effect our 
hearing. No symphonies were written with notes above the audible 
range for the simple reason that we could not hear those sounds and 
were unaware they existed. So, too, would values go unperccived, if 
we could not perceive them, or alternatively, create them. It is, 
then, a minimal criterion that man be able to perceive value to be 
able to love. It may be the case that man creates value instead of.
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or in addition Lo, percei''it's value. Wheter we perceive or create 
values need net be decided here. It is sufficient Chat nan be that 
through which value is realized (in th.e broad sense of realize). Love 
is a valuing perceiving act. And in as much as the object of 
interpersonal love is a valuing being itself there is no need for this 
being to be intrinsically valuable. Han's value comes from valuing 
whether that valuing being perceptive or creative or a combination of 
both. It is that value as a avluaing being Chat is the object of 
love.
I am not sure that there is any possible proof that what the 
lover loves is tiie valuational aspect of the beloved, but loving the 
valuing conferring center that is man makes more sense than any other 
explanation. In exam in in g Schelcr's view of love wo raw that love 
could not have an ordinary reason. My love for you could n ot be 
justified on the basis of your golden hair, your girlish laugh, or 
your brilliant insights. These were insufficient for a variety of 
reasons, but most important, such reasons did not seem to capture the 
who of love. You are not just your golden hair or girlish laugh or 
brilliant insights. You are more. Rut since none of what are 
ordinarily considered your attributes or any collection of them were 
sufficient to justify love, there seemed nothing on which to found my 
love of you. A.ll that was left was Singer's bestowal which claimed 
there was no reason for my love. Yet, love understood as pure 
gratuity made love unadulterated whimsy and therefore ridiculous. 
There needed to be some reason for love and yet not a reason of the 
ordinary sort. There needed to be a reason that would not dissolve
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with changes in circumstance.- or time. The reson for love needed to 
have- a persistency and universality. Since love itself is a 
perception-valuation, its reason must correspond to the nature of the 
act: when you sec, you see objects; when you hear, you hear sounds. 
Similarly when you perceive and value there surely must be a 
corresponding "object" to be perceived that is valuable. And what may 
be perceived that is valuable about the Other is his capacity to 
value. This valuation-potential that is the Other cannot be dismissed 
as just some other thing to be valued in my world and used according 
to its value to me. All else in the world passively awaits ny 
appraisal. The Other, though, steadfastly refuses to passively submit 
to my evaluations. Sartre's point, whicii holds in many if not most 
c irc-a-s t ar.c as , is the : 1 try to treat t h. o Other as a a object of 
appraisal and constantly fail to the extent that the Other is a 
consciousness that appraises me even as Î appraise him. Xo, wc dc not 
ordinarily treat the Other merely as an object, not just as another 
tree or chair. Wc do recognize that he is a force in our wo rid. But 
we treat the Other much like we would a small valcano or whirlwind. 
lA force to be reckoned with, and if possible, even used. The 
positive thinking literature counsels us to harness the abilities of 
those around us to succeed at our goals. Such works even acknowledge 
that you must work within the constraints of your "helpers" so that 
you do not cross their grain and lose their cooperation. But such 
advice is much like saying you must 1 earn the sea and the winds to 
sail; sheer force of will does not n;ako good sailing. Know the forces 
you v;isli to harness and use then; to your advantage or die. Such an
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attitude is er.tCTt.bed in every aspect of our lives. Wc arc told tnat 
you car. catch more flies with honey than vinegar. Wc are Caught to 
conform so that we may get what we want. Whether any such, attitude is 
praiseworthy or blameworthy is beside the point. What is clear is 
that in such attitudes the Other is treated as the object of appraisal 
and that in so treating the Other we underestimate him. But in love 
there is no such underestimation. The Other stands out as what he is. 
There across the room from mo is not a force to be reckoned with or 
used but valuation in process. In love I am aware of a source of
on-going valuations. In love I am most directly aware of the Other as
what he is. It isno wonder that in love we respond as we do. For in
love the ebb and flow of forces that ordinarily rule our lives is
patted, and Che beloved stands forth luminescent in his v al u e that is 
valuing. Here we have reason enough for love. I can think of no 
better.
What may sec odd about love is that it happens so rarely and is 
so particular. I love her but not you. I may never love you, but I 
can and do love. Yet, surely I ought to love you; you are just as 
much a valuing center as she is. Why love this person rather than 
that? The reason for love is a universal reason. It justifies loving 
anyone. Part of an answer to such an objection nay run something like 
this: the justification for love does justify loving anyone, but it 
does not demand loving everyone or even anyone. This is not a 
particularly satisfying response, but the reson I love this person and 
not that one is in large part the concern of psychology. The lover 
and the beloved are not disembodied consciousnesses. They arc persons
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with a history and in a situation. That history and situation are 
specifics tiiat a theory of what love is cannot address. In all 
likelihood the reason I only liave eyes for you is that you are very 
much like my mother, and I loved my mother, or you are very much 
unlike my mother and, and I hated her. It night be, then, that my 
preferences determine to whom I open myself to love. I am attracted 
to this woman because she reminds me of mother. This attraction can 
be translated as my preference for women of a certain sort. My tastes 
and preferences are appraisals that direct me to certain kinds of 
women. I have found (via ny mother) that women with a sense of humor 
are particularly pleasant to be around. Perhaps, when enough of these 
prefered traits occur in one person, I can no longer treat the person 
as a utility, e.g., someone vitii whom to have a good time. I then 
make something like a leap from an overwhelmingly positive appraisal 
to love. Her valuableness (to me) allows me to see her as valuing (as 
a center of valuing). (Wc will see in a moment how Plato reverses 
this shift. Instead of being led to see the valuing beings from 
valuableness, he claims that we move from the perception of valuing 
beings to ultimate valuableness, i.e., true b e a u t y . )  More 
sociological and less psychological forces may be at work. A 
generation who valued full figured girls may be succeeded by a 
generation who revolts and chooses lithesome wenches. But all such 
consdierations are a search for why you love this one special girl. I 
have offered an explanation of why you can and do love at all (this 
special girl included). Your neighborhood psychologist must provide 
an explanation of your specific case. In general all that needs to be
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Eaic is thst escli of us is an individual and will respond uniquely to 
people and c ircunstances . Our limitations as human beings will limit 
who we love and even our ability to love.
Just as important is that no theory of love that I am aware of 
takes into account the particularity of individual loves. Plato tells 
us that the lover sees the beauty of the beloved, but he does not tell 
us why this lover secs beauty in this beloved and not another. 
Schclcr claims that the lover sees the value of the beloved, but gives 
no indication of what this value might be in individual cases. So too 
Sartre gives a general account of the project of love, but does not 
tell us why someone might choose this project rather than another. 
Only Singer t a 11. s about the particularity of love. Yet even he says 
little more than chat when wc love wc love the particulars of the 
person. Then i.e admits that love is gratuitous and that any set of 
particulars that strikes our fancy t;ill do. \flien addressing the issue 
of why wc love one person rather than anoth.er, the best any theory of 
love can do, it seems, is describe the quality of being struck witli 
the beloved that so often accompanies the onset of love. It happens. 
We fall in love. With just this person.
Perhaps it is just as well that classic theories of love, and 
this one in particular, leave it to the psychologist to explain why 
you are th.e only girl in the world for me. At stake in these theories 
is the generality and universality of love. At first a theory that 
explains why 1 love you interms that could explain ny loving anyone 
w'nosoever seems to miss its mark. I want to h.now why I love you. To 
be told that I love you for reasons that would explain my love of
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anyone is d isappoin t in;: and unsatisfying. Yet if a theory of love 
loaves to science the job of explaining rcy specific reastion to you, 
it can, and nine does, explain phenomena traditionally associated with 
love. The very generality embodied in the theory explains such divers 
pheomcna as Diotina's ladder and Christian love.
In the S k: p o s i u m Plato, through the character of Diotima, 
describes the lover's ascent from the love of a single nan to all men 
and then on through progressively nore abstract entities until the 
lover loves beauty itself. Of course, Plato's cause is the advocacy 
of the philosophical life, but there is nore to the ladder of loves 
than Plato lets on. What could possibly justify or explain the 
development of a lover's love from one man to many? Plato says beauty 
itself. for w h. n c v  e r reaons (to be explained by the psychologist anu 
perhaps in Plato's case by tlio ao?tI.etic ian as well) the lover falls 
in love with the beauty of the beloved. This beauty is not particular 
to the beloved; it is Beauty as exemplified in the beloved. All that 
is required for the lover to love all men is for him lo see the Beauty 
exemplified in each. Since this cannot be a physical beauty— all men 
arenot equally physically beautiful— the beauty must be something that 
all men share equally. Presumably there is something that is 
objectively valuable that all men share in— beauty. Plato, by 
assuming what is valuable in the beloved is objectively real beauty, 
can then call upon his lover to love whatever exemplifies that beauty. 
Plato rests his explanation of love on what he sees as most 
valuable —  Beauty (as one aspect of true being). And of course, since 
he rests the- cxnlanation of what is valuable instead of the valuinc.
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he can i;avo his lover rise from the love of an individual to, in the 
end, love of beauty— v;hat is supremely valuable —  itself. In the 
Svmpo £ ium the lover loves what is valuable. But in the Phaedrus the 
lover loves and finds value in the beloved. This value, however, is 
not the absolute objective value of Beauty. It is the ability of the 
beloved to inquire and seek after knowledge. That is, the lover loves 
the beloved's ability to love. And this loving and seeking that is
love is a search after what is valuable. Between the two dialogues we
can see Plato attempting to describe love as a perception-valuation 
that is directed, first if not last, toward another center of
perception-valuation. All that is needed to get from loving a man or
men to loving btaut y itself is to substitute (presumably unwit tingly) 
love of ti;e valuing for love of t'lC valuable. Since, as Î i.avc 
argued, valuing is valuable, deriving Diotima's ladder requires 
notl.ing more than subsuming valuing (or valuing beings) under the 
category of valuable things. The arguable point in Plato's position, 
then, is whether there is an objective heirarchy of value in which man 
is only one tier or whether man is that through which any heirarchy of 
value comes into existence. In either case, Plato's love hinges on 
the lover's ability to respond to the beloved's ability to the 
b e l o v e d ' s  a b i l i t y  to l o v e .  If we e x p l a i n  love as a 
perception-valuation of the Other as avaluing center, then we have 
given the sort of reason for loving necessary to explain Plato's 
position. The reason for loving this one is reason for loving anyone. 
Universality is mistaken for objectivity, and the result is Diotima's 
laddcr .
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Ulien Plato s u g g e s t s  Chat v.'c can develop our love froir. 
encor.paesing one nan to nany, he indicates the universality of love's 
reason. In turn ethical systeras have taken up the universality as 
their thcne. The Christian tenant of "Love thy neighbor as thy self" 
can be taken as saying "Perceive and value valuing centers since, as 
valuing centers, others are as valuable as you— no nore, no less so." 
It is when we perceive others, not in the valuation of appraisal, but 
in the non-utilitarian valuation of love that they become our equals. 
It is in so far as we see others in their universality that we can 
love mankind. The particulars of this or that person are useful and 
can be the object of appraisal, but the universal quality of being a 
valuing being is useless and cannot be the object of appraisal. In 
the awe t'nat is th.e experience of love, others can be treated as ends 
and not merely as means. Kant's in s in ht s into Christian ethics can 
best be explained by the universality of the justification of love. 
It is not important here to examine Kant's ethics in detail. It is 
enough to see that the universality of the justification of love is 
the source of altruism and that the love percept ion-va lua t ion is that 
through which altruism can be realized.
But concern with the universal aspect of the justification of 
love can overshadow the psychological facts. It is individuals that 
love and for the most part it is individiuals that they love. The 
universal love of mankind is not the antithesis of individual love.s 
but its logical extension. Nonetheless individuals do not routinely 
logically extend their love. The utter awesomeness of just one love 
is sufficient to hold a person's attention. A person most often
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understands Ois love as a reaction to a specific person; he does not 
routinely draw an inference frori his love of an individual to tl;c 
v.'l'.olc of humanity. After all, that is what the (individuals's) love 
is: a reaction Co an individual. The reason a person loves does not 
seen important in the face of the experience and so the love remains a 
love of a person. Add to the basic experience of love the general 
circumstances of life and any inference from the particular to the 
general is improbable. We all nut appraise others (even the beloved), 
and they must inevitably become treated as utilities. There are 
groceries Co be bought, checks to be cashed, classes to be Caught. 
There will be, therefore, grocery clerks, bank tellers, and teachers, 
ko one is the worse for it, but each is utiliced. Insofar as others 
arc clerks and tellers and tc-ac'ncrs, they will be objects of my 
appraisal and not of my Ivoe. Furthermore, the simple fact is that 
many people are threats. Since they are, it is extraordinarily 
difficult to transcend our spontaneous defensive reactions toward a 
universal response of love. The limits of bieng human and the 
constrainsts of the world test even the saint's ability to love 
universa1ly.
By p l a c i n g  love in situation, the tension between its 
particularity and its universality can be explained. Any one person's 
love is, as a matter of fact, routinely directed toward a very limited 
number of people even though being a valuing being is a trait of all 
people. A person's love is justified by the universal trait of being 
a valuing being, and liencc all loves are justified and in principle 
one can justify loving any and everyone. Moneth.eless, wliile loving
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ev£-ryone can in principle be justified, that justification cannot be 
equated witVs causation. Circonstance and personality direct when I 
love. The particulars of ny situation cause ny love for this person 
rather than that. Rut the quality that justifies ny love is perfectly 
universal. With this said about what the love act is, who it is that 
is loved, and on what grounds he is loved, two closely related topics 
can be addressed.
211
4.5 Acts Of Love
Lovr is in itccli sterile and inpotent . The love act is nothin;;, 
more than a perception valuation of a valuing being. It does nothing. 
Yet, we are told that love makes the world go round, that it changes 
everything. Kc are regaled with countless tales of how love turns the 
misanthropic miser into a a kind and generous soul. If one were 
selling love, no doubt the marketing manager would remind you to 
emphasize to the prospective customer how much love can do for then. 
It's a great bargain: you have all these wonderful feelings and not 
only that but every day in every way you and whoever you love get 
better and better. Surely all these promises are not illusory. Love 
is promising. The great romantic tragedies are tragedies because the 
promise of a great iove has been snuffed out. The love was good, and 
it would have created good tlinrs if only....
It is not only popular misconception that supports the notion 
that love is effective. Plato describes how, in the course of love, 
not only the lover but the beloved is perfected. And Scheler is in 
agreement :
But love is a movement, passing from a lower value to a
higher one, in which the higher value of the object or
person suddenly flashes upon us ....^^
He claims even more explicitly that " l o ve... looks to the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of h i gher p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of value..., and Co the
maintenance of these, besides seeking to remove the possibility of
lower v a l u e . . . . S c h e l e r  also insists that this movement from lower
to higher value is not pcdaecjical but somehow just happens in t 'ue
course of love. But whether love is considered as pedagogical or as
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coi-roct ivc of the beloved it sono nore nysterious str.sc, it it clear 
tl'.at Scheler sees love as an act in v;hich there is a movement fror. 
louer to higher values. But tliis r.over.ent ic also a "sudden flashing 
upon," and so it seems that two kinds of metaphors have been confused: 
those of activity uith those of sight. In the process of confusing 
the metaphors an important distinction has been overlooked. Loving
someone and acting on tliat love are distinct kinds of acts. Even
though these two kinds of act nay occur simultaneously, they are not 
the same. By calling love both a movement and a flashing upon,
Scheler has conflated the love act with loving acts. Even though
Scheler can only be faulted for not seeing through the popular myth 
Ihat Lei Is us that love both strikes us v;ith blinding light and makes
are disc insu isl.a'n Is acts.
The love act is a perception valuation. There is nothing in 
perception or valuation in themselves that affects things beyond 
tl.emse Ives . V.'hen I see a tree, I do not alter it. And when I relish 
the brush strokes of the- Van Gogh, I do not change them. It is, of 
course, possible that I misperceive the tree, and if I mispcrceive, 
then my valuation may go astray. But if there is an object in the 
uorlu to perceive and value, then however accurate or inaccurate my 
perception, however appropriate or inappropriate my valuation, the 
tr.ing rersains unscathed. l.'ithout throwing into question a world 
external Lo and independent of me (which I do not wish to do here), we 
are forced to admit that love, since it is an act of perception 
valuation, cannot in itself char.g.e the beloved.
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T i ! c lovi. act coec not ciian:;f- the beloved, but I, whc-n I love, an 
not just a love act. l.'her. considering, r.ysêlf as a lover, the nost 
important oi t.: y other attributes is tiiat I an an av en t, uith desires, 
capable of effecting change. Since uhen I love I see the beloved as a 
valuing center, I nay desire for him instead of or in addition to 
myself. If the beloved is no longer just an object to be appraised 
and used but valuable because ho is valuing, then there is nothing 
preventing me from wanting for him just as I would for myself. The 
experience of wanting for the beloved, wantin.g the very best for th.e 
beloved is familiar to every lover, .^ nd while that wanting is not the
love act, it is an act th.at is directly dependent on the love act.
For only in so far as I see- tr.e Other just like r.c , can I desire for 
l.im just Co  T s;ould for myself. fine e I want for myself win. t T 
pleases r.'.e. wha t furti'ers my f.'oals, and t.’h.at enriches me, and since I 
see the Other as a valuing being just like me, I will have no trouble 
desiring for l;ir: these kinds of things. There is no denying that my 
desires for myself and my desires for him. may cone in conflict (let 
alone the possibility of his desires conflicting with ny various 
desires), but in principle I may desire for either one of us with 
equal fervor since we are indistinguishable and identical as valuing 
beings. The very nature of the love act as a perception valuation of 
a valuing center allows the lover to desire for the beloved as he 
might for himself.
This is not to say that the lover reasons analogically. lie does
not say to liimself "I value tliing.s and desire them because I value
ther.i. I perceive and value th.is other as a being just like me— .a
21 A
bcinr that va iu c s--and thus I uill desire for hit; as I desire for 
i.iyself." The lover loves. Tliat loving focuses his attention on the 
beloved. The force of the insight and valuation that is love may well 
distract the lover from his own desires, and he may, in his 
distraction, desire for the beloved. Certainly there is t he 
possibility that he can desire for himself and for the other, and he 
can have desires for both himself and the beloved just because they 
are indistinguishable as valuing beings. The awesomeness of love may 
drive the lover to the extreme of completely denying or forgetting his 
own desires for the sake of the desires of the beloved, l.'hat allows 
him. to substitute the beloved's desires for his ov;n is the beloved's 
c liar ac t c-r as va lu in^ u-sin,;. Past tr.e first rushes of love, lovers 
ordinarily have to come to some sort of ac co'.>i:;o d c t i o n amonv the 
various desires: his desires th.at have nothine to do with cue beloved, 
his desires to have the beloved, his desires for the beloved (for the 
beloved's pleasure and welfare) and the analogous desires on th.e part 
of the beloved. But what mah.es the accommodation necessary and what 
allows bis dedication to the beloved at love's first blush is th.e very 
essence of love as valuing being valuing valuing being. The love act 
by its very nature, then, allows for this plurality of desires. The 
most important of these for the moment is the altruistic desires for 
the beloved. These altruistic desires spring forth from love as much 
as any others, but unlike other desires, they are the source of loving 
acts .
Te sire com.es a step closer to altering its object chan t hi e 
pure on t ion valuation which is love. Desire holds out some ro.il toward
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•.■hich one may work. kow not only has sonothin;, or someone been 
valued, there is also a project for Chat sor.;ethin£ or someone. 
Whether I desire to enjoy or to have or to be, I have valued something 
and projected obtaining it. I value strawberry ice cream, and in the 
summer's heat I want to enjoy it. I value dependable transportation 
and so I want a new car. I value a good grasp of matters and so I 
desire knowledge. For me to desire something, I must have logically 
antecedently valued what I desire. And in so far as my desire is a 
desire and not merely wishful thinking I wi 11 liave some notion of now 
to obtain what I want. Failing that, I will be able to tell you why 
any project to obtain my desire is liable to fail. In desire, as 
opposed to wishfu 1 thinkiu_., there is at least an attempt at a plan of 
action to obtain the goal of the d.sire. A desire may bo impossiblc- 
to satisfy and it may be t hwar t eo , but th.e nature of desire is such 
th.at desire impels me to act in a manner that p r o m o t e s  its 
satisfaction. Simply put, I am an agent who can, and often does, act 
to satisfy his desires. I may reject my desires as immoral and refuse 
to carry out my plans to satisfy them. I may give up on a desire 
should I become convinced that I have no means to satisfy it. But my 
initial impulse is to act to satisfy my desires.
y hi en I act to satisfy an altruistic desire borne of love I have 
acted lovingly. The source of such an act is the love act which 
perceives and values the beloved. Having perceived and valued the 
beloved, I may and often do desire the welfare of the beloved. In so 
far as I have not considered m.y desires, such desires for the other's 
welfare art altruistic desires. When I act to fulfill these
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altruistic desires, I have acted out of ray love for the other. .-.ctin;, 
out of love for the other nay fairly be called acting lovir.gly or, 
alternately, loviny acts. The lovinu acts, however, are not the love 
act. Between them cones the internediary of altruistic desire. The 
sacrifices we hear of in the name of love presuraably are loving acts. 
Giving the only vacant seat on the lifeboat to your wife as the 
"Titanic" goes dovm is a loving act (presuning it wasn't done out of
pure sense of duty) . I loved ray wife before I gave her the scat and
the actual giving of the seat was an expression of that love. It was,
in fact, a loving act. It was not a love act.
In the course of a life and a love the distinction between the 
love act and loving acts rjay seen ncot. And in nany instances it is a
cor.,^.-; with w.e to a ne\; city so that I raay pursue ray career, wu say 
th.at she did it out of love (again, I assume she did not act out of a 
sense of duty). The distinction between the love act and acting 
lovingly is only obliquely referred to. Bvcn so, it seens enough was 
said. But the phrase is "she did it out of love" and it gives tiie 
impression that what -..'as done issued forth from love. It seems 
appropriate to substitute the "she acted lovingly” for "she did it out 
of love" since the loving act, as I have described it, does issue 
forth from the love act through altruistic desire. The distinction 
between the love act and loving acts may seem relatively unimportant, 
but to a degree they arc reflected in the way wc speak. Furthermore, 
the distinction does seem to apply to lovers and the way they act, 
whether th.eir descriptions of their love and loving acts reflect the
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d IE cinc t ion or not .
Perî’.aps tho reason love acts and lovinj, acts are confused is that 
the love act is, like any act c-f perception or valuation, invisible. 
We never see a person seeing; we only see how well he maneuvers in the 
vjorld. We see his acts. It may be that, when a person first views a 
painting that strikes liim, we can see his reaction: the gasp of 
appreciation, the rigid immobility. We may even in due course observe 
his buying or working to buy the painting. We can view his reactions 
and his actions, but we cannot view his valuing. So too, with love we 
can view the consequences of love, those loving acts, but we cannot 
view the love act itself. And just as we do not confuse t h. e 
perceiving or the valuing w i t h the way we ascertain th.at someone is 
perceiving or valuinc, so should we not confuse the love act w i t h 
lev in." acts.
The love act and loving acts are distinguishable but so are other 
acts associated with love. The lover's reactions in the first throes 
of love so accurately ch.ronicled by Plato in the Phaedrus are part of 
Che way wc- determine if a person is in love and an example of acts 
inextricably related to love. But more important than th.e reactions 
of the lover are his acts toward the beloved that are not loving acts. 
In the strict sense I have defined, loving acts must be supported by 
altruistic desires. It would be folly, however, to imply that all 
desires about the beloved are altruistic desires. Some are clearly 
sc 1 f-servin;; dcsire.s. Th.e desire to ba.sk in the beloved's presence as 
Plato describes il is surely self-serving. Tr.e lover wishes to enjoy 
the beauty of t n c beloved. Th.cre is no desire for the beloved's
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welfare. There is only a desire to enjoy. Under most circonstances 
scch a desire is harmless, and the beloved night find the excessive 
attention at nost annoying. More problenatic for everyone involved is 
the desire to be loved in return. In most, if not all, cases the 
lover not only wants to enjoy the beloved and wants to benefit the 
beloved but also wants to be loved by the beloved.
It is important to distinguish between wanting to be loved 
s imp I ic i ter and wanting to beloved while one is loving. The former is 
reducible to a self-serving desire. A person who just wants to be 
loved is not particularly concerned to love in return and if he does 
"love" in return it merely part of a barter: "If you'll love me. I'll 
love you." Such a wanting to be loved is merely wanting to have the 
benefits that accrue to a beloved. without love, a wanting to be­
loved is nothin g morr than a wanting to be idolized. Graces are then 
dispensed to the worshippers according to their dedication. But the 
lover wants to be loved as a consequence of his loving. For the lover 
the distinction between himself and the beloved as valuing centers is 
blurred. It is this blurring of the distinction between self and 
other that allows the lover to desire altruistically and to act 
lovingly. Only in so far as the lover sees no practical difference 
bett.'cen himself and the beloved, can he want for both of them 
indiscriminately. tie is of course correct if the only consideration 
is of the lover and beloved as valuing centers, but perceiving and 
valuing the other as just like me is not the same as being the other. 
There are practical limits to the "as if" quality of altruistic 
desire. At so:.:e point the lover becomes aware tl.at, while he and his
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beloved ore equals, they arc separate. Ir. the lover's awareness of 
separate and equal cones an awareness Ch.ot the beloved may love too. 
With, the awareness of the beloved's ability to love car. cone the 
desire to be loved by the beloved. As lover, I can be so enthralled 
with the beloved that I can forget nyself and become the obsessed 
aesthete wanting only revel in the beloved. I can be so taken with 
the beloved that I forget that I am the one that perceives the value 
of the beloved and instead only see the valuing center that is the 
beloved. But when I gain possession of my senses, when the world 
intrudes, I see myself and the beloved. I am not shaken in my 
awareness of the beloved as a valuing center, but I become aware that 
I, too, am one. And I want th.e beloved to see me for vliat I am as
much as I sec her for what she is.
lly wanting to be loved depends heavily on two factors. If the
beloved does love no and shows it, then either the want will not 
arise, or it will subside when she manifests her love. My wanting to 
be loved, then, is contingent on how much I am loved. It is also 
dependent on ny self-esteem. The less I think of myself, the less I 
think myself deserving of love, the less I will want to be loved and 
the more I will invest most of my wants in the other categories. With 
a low self-esteem, I will feel grateful when the beloved allows me to 
bask. in her presence, and I will desire altruistically and act 
lovingly, but I will barely hope that my love will be returned.
I have previously shown that Sartre's claim that the project of 
love is to be loved 1,y the beloved is flatted in two ways. First, 
Sartre does not account for the other possible projects the lover
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ni'.; ht hûvc with regard to tlio b e l o v e d .  Second, and no re­
fund anen t a 1 ly , love it distinct from any project love r;,ipht have. 
Only when I do love, can I then set at a project getting the beloved 
to love me. These two objections are problematic for Sartre's 
account, but that is not all. Sartre has not taken into account the 
fact that the desire to be loved is contingent on self-esteem. 
S a r t r e ' s  p a r a d i g m  of love is the i d e a l i z e d  love of two 
consciousnesses. Each has set before it Che doomed goal of becoming 
an in-i t se 1 f-for-it se If. And in love, each sets out to achieve this 
goal by seducing the beloved, hhiat is presupposed on such an account 
is that tlie lover has a clear notion of his worth; he must know that 
p. e is a consciousness equal to the consciousness i:-e is trying to 
seuuce. And, riven that in Sartre's account the beloved is utilized 
in the lover's project of self-foundation, the lover actually values 
i'.inseif more than the beloved. Cf course, this is possible, but it 
need not be. It is as foolish or wise for the lover to under-value 
himself as it is to overvalue himself. The fact is that the lover and 
beloved arc equal as consciousnesses, as valuing beings. I makes no 
more sense for me, as lover, to under-value nyself and not want to bo 
loved than it does to over-value nyself and only want to bo loved. 
That people do under- and over-value themselves is an undisputable 
facc, and hence it surely is the case that they do not routinely sec 
the parity between lover and beloved. Sartre's claim, that to love- is 
to want to be loved, then, must be qualified. Lovo a] lows the lover 
to want Co be loved. I'.ut love itself does not determine whether a 
lov-.r wants to be loved. The ozternal fact of whether the beloved
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c.ctiuilly shows her love is a partial determinant . Korr; importantly 
the uortii the lover places on hiiasclf nay determine whether and how 
much the lover wants to be loved. The lover in an act of sheer onoism. 
may say that his consc iousr.es s is the only one that r.atters and 
thereby want to be loved above all else. Such, a position is undercut 
by the fact that what he wants to love him must be something, of 
intrinsic worth— a valuing something just like him.s e 1 f--and thereby 
his equal. In conceit, he can willfully maintain his superiority over 
tl'.e other, but in fact the other is his equal. The lover in utter 
self-depreciation may go to the opposite extreme and deny his own 
worth and only exalt the worth of the beloved. Tut such a position is 
as untenable as tun otncr extreme tor two reasons. First, as a matter 
0 1 fact, the beloved is tise inver's eaua!--in so far as they are 
conscio'Ub, vaiuine be-ings. Second, the lover's valuation, his love, 
is worthless, if he is not worthwhile and his love is an empty, 
pat luetic gesture. Between the extremes is the possibility of striking 
a position closer to the truth. The lover can love the beloved 
unashamedly as his equal, and as th.e beloved's equal he can want the 
love the beloved has to give.
At this point we can say the following. Love is a perceiving 
valuing act that is in-itself inert. It is (here, by fiat) directed 
toward another person and is justified by the fact that the beloved is 
a valuing being just as the lover is. Furth.cr, the desires of love 
are a consequence of the love act. Those desires, in turn, are the 
source of the various activities surrounding love. .Among the most 
prominent of the desires associated with love is the desire to enjoy
tl',1' VmOcvcc's pret>c-r.cc, r. he (aiLrnistic) desire to pror.ot*' 1 1: e 
be-loved " L- u o 1 r a r e end the desire to be loved by the beloved. Laca of 
these hinds of desires nay have acts associated with the:... 'T'iiose 
acts, borne of altruistic desires, arc "loving acts", are most 
frequently associated with "pure" love and are the result of the 
lover^’s inability to discern any real difference between i:inself as a 
valuing beinu, and the beloved as a valuing being. The desire to be­
loved hinges on the loverself-esteem. An over- or under-valuation 
of hirrsclf in relation to the beloved as a valuing being will lead to 
an ext retie ly intense or an extremely United desire to be loved. The 
lover who values hinself as he values the beloved (since they are
as ;ic j ov c's . Final]}', w-. can conclude that the desire to be loved 
will result in acts ti;at could well u-c cailee Srductivo.
Such: a brief summary of love can h.ardly account for all the 
possibilities. Fon othe les s , the theory is sufficiently developed to 
be tested. The thi.-ory sliould be as coherent, and if possible, more 
coherent than competing theories and predict more often more correctly 
tlian competing theories. A test of the coherency and explanatory 
power of the proposed theory of love is the next task.
CHAPTER IV 
LOVE ON ANY ACCOUNT
5.1 Gabriel Taylor's Description Of Love
The foregoing account of love, while being a detailed examina t ion 
in some respects, is meant to be a schematic to get us around in the 
terrain where we find ourselves when in love. Gabriel Taylor in her 
article "Love" also makes an attempt to describe the terrain of love.
Sh e k e e p s  a s h a r p  e y e  fo r w h a t  wc o r d i n a r i l y  c o n s i d e r  to b e  t h e  f a c t s
analysis, she is concerned with the reasons and justifications of 
love. Her suppositions and tack, however, arc radically different. 
Since she agrees with my account, for the most part, on the factual 
description of love but explains the phenomena differently, her 
article provides an excellent opportunity to test the theories for 
internal consistency and explanatory power.
Taylor first considers emotions and distinguish.es bet’.reen those 
that are intentional and those that are not. Examples of the first 
sort are anger, fear, jealousy and envy. Examples of the second sort 
are "feeling, happy", "feeling depressed", and "experiencing nameless 
fears." Emotions of the first sort not only lake an object, but the 
person experiences them has certain beliefs about the object.
I f  x_ f e e l s  t h e  e m o t i o n ,  and if x  ts t h e  o b j e c t ,  tlicn 
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% vjill b.-lievc; ^  to have a specific property or set of 
properties. D ep end inp on which emotion iie fecit tie will 
believe, for example, chat y, is hanperous, that y_ has done 
hir. an injury or a good turn. Put itore formally, this 
requirement reads: for any member of this class of the
emotions there is a quality or set of qualities phi that 
for all X. and all y, if x_ feels the emotion towards y  then 
y  believes y to be uhi ....^
These qualities Taylor calls detcrminable qualities. Because these
determinable qualities are so general, they give us little information
about the emotion. It is unexceptional to say, for instance, that if
T feel fear I believe the object of that fear to be dangerous. We can
be more informative and specific.
X will t'uerefore also believe, and normally be able 
to articulate, that y  has certain determinate qualities 
P s i , and f u r t h e r  he i 11 believe tliat it has the 
determinable quality pi:i because it has the determinate 
quality a s i : the thing is dangerous , say, because it is
aggressive anu has si'arp claws, or again because it is 
malicious and powerful. do we have the further 
r e c u i r em on t , tiiat if y  feels the emotion in nuestion 
to'.tards soi:e object y  then y  believes y  to have some 
determinate quality, which normally but not necessarily he 
will be able to specify....-
Exactly what is found to be dangerous and why, can and will vary
widely from person to person, but there are limits placed on what X
can reasonably bo afraid of. If 1 fear x, then I must believe (even
if I cannot state) that the object of my fear has certain determinate
qualities. I can be afraid of x because it is powerful and malicious
but not because it is good and kind. Of course, while having certain
emotions entails believing certain things about the object of the
emotion, it need not be the case that, because an object has
particular determinate qualities, anyone should experience an emotion
toward it. You may be afraid of our boss because he is powerful and
sclicious, but, uven thoujh I grant he is, I ac not afraic, peri.ars 
because I have dealt v;ith his kind before. The relationship is not 
s yr.e t r ica 1 : if I have a certain emotion, Î must believe that the 
object of the emotion has determinate qualities and that, because it 
has those determinate qualities, I believe it has the appropriate 
determinable one(s), but if an object has certain determinate 
qualities, I may not believe it has some determinable ones and 
therefore do not experience a given emotion toward the object.
Taylor then claims that there are further conditions for feeling 
one of the emotions which takes an object. A person feeling such an 
emotion will, in addition, have certain wants and therefore tendencies 
to behave in certain ways toward the object of the emotion. Again, 
not all wants and tendencies to act are reasonable, given a certain 
enotion. There are som.e restrictions or. what I can want if I fear. I 
car. want to run away from the bear that I fear because it is dangerous 
(and I believe it is dangerous because I believe it is powerful and 
has long claws). But if I fear it, I cannot want give it a tender 
embrace.
But even if the beliefs about the determinate and determinable 
qualities are justified, is that sufficient to justify the emotion? 
If the beliefs aren't justified, then the emotion isn't. Of that much 
we can feel confident. But there are cases in which the beliefs are 
justified and the emotion isn't. "So for instance it could be argued 
that however rational the beliefs involved in a man's envy, jealousy 
or hatred, such emotions are highly undesirable, and if so it would be 
Odd to regard their occurrence as ever justified."-' Taylor points out
that what is bcinc overlooked ir. cuch cases is norms of various kinds
and previously formed moral views . We can clair, that one- is never
justified in feeling envy because envy is not morally justifiable.
Justifying my envy, then, would include not only justifying my beliefs
about the object of envy but also a defense of my beliefs about my own
role in life as opposed to that of my neighbor.
Fully justifying the feeling of this or other emotions on 
some occasion will therefore often be a difficult and 
troublesome undertaking as it is likely to include a 
defence of one's moral views.^
Further, whether a nan experiences a given emotion may well depend not
only on his beliefs about th.e object but his moral beliefs as well.
Obvious and extreme examples would be a man who does not
to r e a l i z e  chat they c.ay find them s o l v e s  in a p a i n f u l  
s i tu a ti o n,  or one w'no coes net feel r e m o r s e  because he 
c a n n o t  c o n c e i v e  of i;imself as e v e r  d o i n g  w r o n g . -
r.avin^ given this analysis of emotions chat take objects, Taylor
looks at love to see if it fits the characterization of such, emotions.
Love does satisfy the first condition; love takes an object. That
much is clear. 5ut when the object of love is another person are
there identifiable determinate and determ.inahle qualities of the
person? Taylor considers the posssiblity that being lovable is the
determinable quality. Who is considered lovable may vary from person
to person as what is considered dangerous nay vary. If being lovable
is taken as meaning someone who is "outgoing, friendly, and open to
affection,"^’ a lover night find the beloved lovable when no one else
would he willing to attribute that quality to th.c beloved.
Tut there is no reason to suppose th.at this must always be
the cast; Li'.ere seems to be no contradiction in saying
til at lovûti V. altl-.ouf;!'. he does not believe x  to be
lovable in t'ac- accepted sense, as there is a contradiction 
in say in; that x_ fears y, and yet does not believe y_ to be 
danyerous in some respect ?
Being lovable cannot be the determinable quality of love since, unlike
other emotions and the determinable qualities of them, the person may
love but not find the beloved lovable. There is tlie possibility that
there is some, yet undiscovered, determinable quality of t'nc- object of
love, but Taylor cannot find one that docs not fall heir to the same
difficulty and neither can I. This suggests that the most that can be
said is that x finds y lovable. But this reduces the issue to a
matter of taste and tells us nothing about the (determinate) qualities
of the beloved. There seems to be a striking dissii.ilarity botveen
Ti:at there docs net appear to be determinable qualities for love 
as there- are for emotions '.'hich take objects vould suggest that Taylor 
is barking up the wrong analogy. Certainly my examination of emotions 
and lovo led me to reject love as an emotion because love lacked 
important features that emotions had. But Taylor is concerned with 
the justification of love and does not forsake the possibility that 
love is an emotion. After all, both love and emotions may often have 
elaborate justifications. It is all well and good to say that "Love 
and emotions (often) have elaborate justifications; they're alike in 
this way" and quite another to base an account of love on such a 
flimsy basi s- - especia 1 ly when pertinent disanalogies are known, 
honctkclcss Taylor does. And since she cannot find the determinable 
let alone the determinant qualities of the object of love, siie uses
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üV.c- f.-.ct t'l.:.c emotions hevc attendant wants or desires as a foundation
lor assessing the justifiability of love. her tack now is to claim
that because the wants attending an emotion are justified only within
certain constraints and since love has attendant wan t s , love's
justifiability can be gleened from the justification of the wants
attendant to love.
If therefore we can find a set of wants which are 
typically involved in the case where x_ loves yg then this 
wi 11 put a constraint upon t'nc beliefs concerning 
particular qualities in virtue of which %_ can love x, and 
allow us to dismiss those which can in no way be seen as 
explanatory of the wants in question.^
In its most general formulation this ploy seems plausible. Look at
the wants attendant to love. Find the constraints on the wants and
th en apply t h e m  to th e o b j e c t  of  lo vo . In o t h e r  w o r d s ,  th e f r o n t  d o o r
IsT.-mto r h . u t  \;hen T a y l o r  a t t e m p t e d  to fi nd th e d e t e r m i n a t e  q u a l i t i e s
of the helovea so she then tries the back door. There is nothin.
wrong with a back door--if it's the right back door. Unfortunately,
wants art not necessarily the right bach, door to love or emotions.
It's true that wants or desires r.ay be the consequence of love or
emotions. I may want to benefit you because I love you and I may want
to injure you because you made me angry. But I may also want peace in
the world because of moral beliefs or general good will. liants need
not be the consequence of love or emotions. Since they need not be,
an analysis of the wants of love need not indicate any similarity
between love and emotions. Just because wants may have justifications
is no reason to assume th.at all such wants spring from a common hind
of source (here emotions). Yet Taylor assumes just this: that,
bccauio ■■■ar.LS r.cy havi; justifications and wants attend both emotions 
and iovc. iove is an emotion. Sucl; an assumption is unwarranted riven 
the rritaa facie evidence that love and emotions are not the sane kind 
of thing. The objects of emotions have determinant qualities and love 
docs not (apparently). Exhibiting the c o n s t r a i n t s  on the 
justification of wants whether they be the result of emotions, love, 
or some other thing is not sufficient to make up for the gaping 
difference in love and emotions.
Taylor is forced to the strategy of examining love through its
wants because the objects of love do not have the determinate
qualities that emotions do and because she rejects as possible
determinate qualities universal human traits.
...it seems true and even trivial titat very often at least 
if x_ loves y_ tiien he does so in virtue of certain 
déterminât o qualities which 'ne believes y_ to have, even 
though sucl: qualities may vary greatly for cifferent
persons, and even though, the lover nay find it difficult 
to be articulate about their,. But though choice and 
variety may be great, not just any description will do if 
X, is to love yg. Some constraints upon them can perhaps be 
derived from the original restriction, that the love in 
question he of a particular person; this allows us to rule 
out such features as are universally possessed by any 
normal person.-'
As Taylor sees the it, the question boils down to "Why do I love this 
person rather than that?" She takes it that the beloved has certain 
properties in virtue of which he is loved as just the person he is. 
But by making that assumption she misses the difference between asking 
"Why do I love (at all)?" and "Why do I love this person?" The 
difference is of the utmost importance. I have ar.swcred the first 
question by ciaining that I love because I perceive and value the
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beloved as a valuine beiu". I love ^  all because of a perfecciy 
general craii. "poscessecl by any normal person." And I have answered 
the second by saying that there are certain psychological and physical 
features of the person that I love to which I am responsive and which 
have allowed me to view and value the universal characteristic of the 
beloved. Taylor has conflated the two questions and is therefore 
prompted, first, to consider love an emotion and, second, when that 
approach fails, to consider the wants arising from love in a search 
for the qualities that justifies the beloved being loved. h'itli these 
criticisms in mind, we can examine how Taylor treats the justification 
of the wants concerned with love.
T a y l o r  f i r s t  g i v e s  a .general c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of the w a n t s  
associated with love.
'..'c view lev: as a give-and-tahn relationship, so the
essential t.-ants will have to reflect this feature. If x_ 
loves X  "C !:ave or. the one hand t g w a n t s  to benefit and 
cherish x> on the other his wants to be with x> to 
communicate with x> to have x  take an interest in liim, to 
be benefited and ciierish.ed by x- Such wants allow us to 
impose constraints on x's beliefs in that only those are 
now relevant v/nich can explain his wants. This, quite 
properly, leaves a wide choice of os i properties at x's 
disposal in virtue of which he may have these uantsT^^
The wants Taylor mentions sf-er. very much to be the wants associated
with love, but I wouId take exception on two points. First, she
claims these are essential. From her account so far there seems no
reason to call them essential. Observation will allow us to agree
t r. a t these v ants often accompany love, but sucli an inductive
generalization \;ill hardly do as justification for the clair, that they
are essential. Be.t even if we admit that they so often accompany love
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that we can consider them as essential there is still o n e  s m a l l  
difficulty. Taylor says the lover wants to cherish the beloved. This 
does not strike me as routinely true. What is routinely true is that 
the lover does cherish. It is because he cherishes that the lover 
wants to benefit the beloved. Even on Taylor's account (as we shall 
see) the lover values the beloved and wants because he values. Does 
it make any sense to say that the lover wants to value the beloved, 
for after all cherishing is a kind of valuing. Perhaps the lover 
wants to cherish the beloved more. This could be the case, but it is 
h a r d l y  e s s e n t i a l .  Descriptions of the first throes of love are 
replete with accounts of how much the lover does value— and presumably 
cherishes —  the beloved. Cherishing— or something like it— say be 
essential to love, but -7 an ting to cherish need not occur at all if tha 
lover cherishes enough in the first place.
Aside from these two relatively minor objections we can agree 
with Taylor's characterization of the wants of love. She claims, 
however, that this gives only a rough-and-ready description that is in 
need of qualifications and refinements. The refinement she suggests 
is the distinction between infatuation and love. She grants that an 
infatuated person and a person in love may want the same thing or 
person. Since infatuation and love cannot be distinguished by their 
object, she claims they are distinguishable by how reasonable the 
attendant wants are. She describes infatuation as ”a state which we do 
not even attempt to link with anything that is accessible to rational, 
or for that m a t t e r ,  moral evaluation")- and says that love "has 
traditionally been regarded as capable of being r a t i o n a l  and as
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admitting of degrees of moral e x c e l l e n c e ^  She then suggests that 
love and infatuation can be «0 characterized with the theoretical 
backing of the distinction between (at least) two very different kinds 
of want. "The crucial difference between these is that wants of one 
kind do and of the other do not involve some form of evaluation of 
what is wanted .13 Xn the case of wants that involve evaluation a man 
believes that what is wanted is worthwhile, although he need not 
believe it is the most worth while thing to want. He cannot, however, 
view what he wants as having no value whatsoever. In the case of the 
man who simply wants several situations are possible: "he may not 
evaluate ^  (the object desired] at all; or he may think that no value 
or 2V23 that a diavalue attaches to doing or having and finally he 
nay think it worth while to do or have but if so then nor. because ^  
as such is worth doing or having, but because he thinks it worth while 
to satisfy his desires, either on this occasion or as a g e n e r a l
policy."14
That love and infatuation are hard to distinguish in practice and 
that love may become infatuation and infatuation love, Taylor grants. 
Practical determinations aside, she suggests that love and infatuation 
can be distinguished on the basis of the kinds of wants associated 
with each.
If ^  loves X  then at least some of his wants will be based 
on the thought that it is worth while e.g., to be with and 
cherish while the wants of his infatuation have no such 
base .15
And again, the sane point.
...infatuation, being thought of as a blind passion, is 
very suitably linked with a type of desire which may lead
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a man to act against his better judgement, while the type 
of want ascribed to love accounts for the view that the 
lover tends to value what he loves. Such an assessment of 
the lover's part would hardly be possible if he did not 
believe that x  had certain characteristics in virtue of 
which it would be worth while to have his wants satisfied, 
indeed he will think this if what he values is being with 
X, cherishing x  etc., and not just the satisfaction of his 
desires
The association of blind desire with infatuation and reasoned wants 
with love again suggests that the lover believes the beloved to have 
certain properties and these properties provide the reasons for his 
wants. Further, the infatuated man will want someone as a means to 
the end of, say, the satisfaction of his desires, while the lover will 
want the beloved for herself and not just a means to some other end. 
The infatuated man may see someone merely as a means to slake his 
sesual appetite. The lover, on the other hand, could not see the 
beloved merely as a means to slake sexual appetites or gain social 
standing or obtain wealth.
Taylor summarizes her findings thus far in the following words.
...if X  loves X  then 3 wants to benefit and be with x  
etc., and he has these wants (or at least some of them) 
because he believes x  has some determinate characteristics 
PSi in virtue of which he thinks it worth while to benefit 
and be with x* He regards satisfaction of these wants as 
an end and not as a m e a n s  t o w a r d  some other end
At this juncture a few comments on Taylor's exposition are in 
order. She speaks of "simply desiring" and claims there are three 
possible characterizations of such desiring. A man who has such a 
d e s i r e  may not evaluate the object of desire at all. Or be may 
evaluate the object but judge it as having no value or negative value. 
Or he may see the object not as worth while in itself but merely
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valuable as a means to s a t i s f y  his d e s i r e s .  I take it by her 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of s i mple d e s i r e s  t h a t  Taylor is thinking of 
something like appetitive desires. Why do I want some of t h ose 
freshly baked cookies? Because the smell of them makes my mouth water 
and they're my favorite kind. Presumably in such cases I do not 
evaluate the worth-vhileness of the object, I simply want it. Yet in 
such simple cases do I have no beliefs that might or might not be 
justified? It could be claimed that, even in these minimal cases, the 
desirer may be said to believe that the object of desire tastes, 
smells, looks, or feels good and that he might justify his desire with 
the belief. In fact I do believe and justify in simple cases. I 
beliava the cookie tootes good or I uon't bite into it and I bite into 
it because I believe it tastes good. These are simple justifications 
and evaluations, but they are justifications and evaluations. Taylor 
has mischaracterized simple wants. But to allow Taylor to pursue her 
case, let us grant that when she says simple wants are without belief, 
justification, and evaluation she m e a n s  t h e r e  are few b e l i e f s ,  
justifications, and evaluations involved in simple wants. Given this, 
I take it that when Taylor claims that the objects of simple desires 
may be seen by the desirer as having no or negative value she is 
claiming that, after the desire emerges, a judgement is passed. Yes, 
I want the cookies, but I really shouldn't have them; I'm watching my 
figure, you know. The last possibility is that, when I find myself 
w a n t i n g  t h ose c o o k i e s ,  my only consideration is an appeal to a 
hedonistic principle. On principle I believe I ought to have anything 
that makea me feel good. I know these cookies taste good. Therefore
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1 should satisfy my desire if possible. It is important to note that 
these last two characterizations of a simple desire contain evaluation 
of the desire. The evaluation occurs as the result of the desire 
rather than the desire occurring because of an evaluation, nonetheless 
evaluation does occur. But Taylor claims that "The crucial difference 
between these [infatuation and love] is that wants of one kind do and 
of the other do not involve some form of e v a l u a t i o n ."18 clearly 
Taylor has contradicted herself; she has described simple desires as 
being associated with some form of evaluation and then claimed that 
they involve no evaluation.
The contradiction must be transparent even to Taylor and so it is 
safe to assume that she has something more in mind. She claims that
"If loves %  then at least sone or his wants will be based on tha
thought that it is worth while e.g., to be with and cherish while 
the wants of his infatuation have no such b a s e ."19 How it appears 
that the distinction between desires of infatuation and desires of 
love is between feeling and being good. I have a simple desire for 
the cookies because they taste (seem, feel) good. I may, subsequent 
to desiring, judge the good taste only an apparent good. The cookies 
may seem good, but they really aren't good for me. Or I may judge 
that any apparent good is_ good; if I enjoy the cookies then that's 
good enough reason for eating them. But when I love, I judge that the
beloved will provide a real (rather than apparent) good. Not only
does she seem good, she's good for me, too! So now the difference 
between desires of infatuation and love seems to be the difference 
b e t w e e n  u n e v a l u a t e d  or negatively evaluated apparent goods and
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evaluated real goods for me. But even this won't do. Taylor now adds 
the s t i p u l a t i o n  that the desires I have in love must be in part 
altruistic. I must treat the beloved as an end and not just a means. 
But how are the desires of love to be characterized? Are only those 
that the lover evaluates as being both in his and the beloved's best 
i n t e r e s t  d e s i r e s  of love? Are the lover's desires for himself, 
however rational, to be considered simple desires because the desires 
are for himself and treat the beloved as a means. And what about 
rational desires that the lover has for the beloved because the end is 
the beloved's good but (unfortunately) are not in the lover's best 
i n t e r e s t ?  It's not c lear ho w  T a y l o r  w o u l d  r e s p o n d  to t h e s e  
variations. 'Jhat is clear ia that she baa confused fjo continuuna 
that characterize desires. A deaire nay be more or leas rational. It 
may also be more or less altruistic. Being more rational does not 
g uarantee being more altruistic. And being more altruistic does not 
imply being more rational. I may without any particular thought (let 
alone justification) want something for myself. That ice cream cone 
you're e a ting sure does look good to me .  I m a y  also h ave v e r y  
rational self-serving desires. I want a word processor because it 
would eliminate my dependence on secretaries, it would facilitate 
corrections and editing and so forth. I may also rationally want for 
you. I want you to get the promotion because you worked for it, you 
deserve it, because you're the best man for the job. .ind I may want 
this whether or not your promotion effects me directly. And finally I 
m a y  w a n t  for you i m p u l s i v e l y .  That diamond dinner ring in the 
jeweler's window that X see as I pass by— Ï just know you'd love it
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and I wish I could get it for you, Taylor has sorely underestimated 
the complexity of desires and her account of love suffers for it. Her 
mischaracterization of desires makes some revision of her t h e o r y  
necessary to make it coherent.
Taylors definition (description? characterization?) of love
reads as follows:
...if loves i  then x. wants to benefit and be with x 
etc., and he has these wants (or at lest some of them) 
because he believes y  has some determinate characteristics 
PS i in virtue of which he thinks it worth while to benefit 
and be w i t h  x* He regards satisfaction of these wants as
an end and not as a m e a n s  t o w a r d  some other end
The definition does not distinguish between the lover's rational wants
for himself and for the beloved. Presumably the lover has both kinds 
of vants because he believes the beloved has certain characteristics. 
In addition he believes that these characteristics justify his desire 
for the beloved and his desire to be good to the beloved. Then Taylor 
claims that the lover regards the wants as ends in themselves. This 
is a curious turn of phrase since what is ordinarily thought of as an
end in itself in a love relationship is the beloved, not the desires
for the beloved. Shall we then say that the beloved is merely the 
means to the end of satisfying our altruistic desires? Do we have 
these altruistic desires and then find someone to love as a vehicle 
for the expression and satisfaction of these desires? I b e l i e v e  
T a y l o r ' s  i n t e n t  is that the beloved's welfare is the object of 
altruistic desires and we have such desires because we believe the 
b e l o v e d  worthy of such desires. On the other hand there are the 
lover's self-serving desires. T h e s e , too, are founded on a belief
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that the beloved is worthwhile. But here neither the beloved or the 
beloved's welfare is the object of desire. In ay self-serving desires 
as a lover to be with and enjoy the beloved I treat the beloved as a 
m e a n s  to my e n d s . Taylor tries to distinguish between using the 
beloved to o b t a i n  social st a t u s  and u s i n g  the b e l o v e d  for my 
enjoyment . But on her own terms the former should be love and the 
latter infatuation. After all love was characterized by rational, 
evaluative desires. How rational— even conniving— is wanting someone 
for the purpose of improving social standing or wealth. And just 
wanting someone for the pleasure she can give me seems very much like 
the s i m p l e  d e s i r e s  that T a y l o r  c l a i m s  are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
infatuation. What Taylor should say is that the lover both wants for 
hiasalf and for the balovad (and sonatinas a van for tha both of than
together) . That both these can be more or less rational is beside the
point. Therefore the lover wants, rationally or not, both for himself 
and the beloved because, in part, he believes the beloved to have 
certain characteristics that make her 1) worthy of wanting for and 2) 
being wanted. There seems to be no reason why the characteristics for 
one and t%fo need be the same although they probably often are. Taylor 
is firmly convinced that the lover believes that the beloved has
certain characteristics and that the lover justifies his love on the
basis of those characteristics. My revision of her definition seems 
to capture the essential aspects of her analysis.
Taylor claims, on the basis of her analysis of love in terms of 
wants and beliefs, that it is p o s s i b l e  to assess a m a n ' s  love 
f a v o r a b l y  or unfavorably. She cites three areas of evaluation.
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First, since the lover believes the beloved to have certain qualities, 
the lover's beliefs may be well- or ill-founded. Second, since the 
lover has wants and in so far as these can be distinguished from mere 
w i s h f u l  t h i n k i n g ,  be has some grounds for believing that he can 
satisfy these wants with the beloved and these grounds can be more or 
less good. Third, he may be mistaken in attaching the value he does 
to what he wants. In other words, the value he places on the beloved 
and what he wants as a result of placing value may contravene other 
values important to him. Taylor a d m i t s  t h e r e  is d i f f i c u l t y  in 
establishing a hierarchy of values such that we can say the lover has 
placed undue value on the beloved. She also claims that it is at 
least possible for the lover, if not the observer, to determine that 
something has gone -jrong -jith hio evaluations u’hen the values placed 
as a result of his love conflict with his other values.
All three of Taylor's areas of evaluation seem well taken. The 
lover has not become infallible by becoming a lover and so he may well 
have mistaken as well as accurate beliefs about the b e l o v e d . Just as 
sur e l y  he m a y  h a v e  i n a d e q u a t e l y  a p p r a i s e d  the possibility of 
satisfying the wants he has as a lover. He ma y  think that he can 
benefit the beloved— even have plans how to— and in reality be unable 
to. Just as likely he may have beliefs that the beloved can please 
him and want to be pleased when, in fact, the beloved is incapable of 
pleasing him. So the lover's beliefs that his wants can be satisfied 
by the beloved ma y  have good or poor grounds. Finally, it is clear 
that the value placed on the beloved may conflict with other values, 
though it may not be clear which values are more highly regarded.
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Taylor cites as an example Lord Sandal's telling his mother that he 
has just been with his true love and then promptly dying of the poison 
his true love administered to him. Presumably Lord Randal valued his 
life and his true love. The two values came into fatal conflict. 
Should I have had the chance 1 might have counseled Lord Randal that 
h i s  v a l u e s  w e r e  in conflict and asked him to assess if his life 
weren't more important than his love. Nonetheless, there are many  
c a s e s  in w h ich the conflict of values does not so obviously tilt 
against love. Given the chance, should I have advised Romeo or Juliet 
that the stability of family and state were more important than their 
love? Should I have warned them that choosing love would precipitate 
their death? In many cases, as Taylor admits, weighing the values is 
difficult. But her general claim seems true: the value the lover 
places on the satisfaction of his wants as a lover often conflict with 
the value of other wants.
To this point Taylor has stipulated the conditions for love and 
given three classes of beliefs associated with love. Beliefs falling 
into each of these classes may go awry. Presumably without any 
further amendation one could point out a lover's poorly g r o u n d e d  
belief (in any or all of the classes) and thereby claim that the love 
was unjustified. But Taylor is very much aware that we are unwilling 
to say that any love is unjustified. There seems to be something 
inherently virtuous about loving no matter how poorly founded the 
beliefs of that love are. To account for the fact that love may be 
defective but not unjustified Taylor introduces three more aspects to 
love.
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5.2 Complication» Set In
There are a variety of seemingly insurmountable difficulties in 
finding grounds for justifying love. Finding a determinable quality 
of the beloved is one Taylor wrestles with. N o w  she p o i n t s  out 
another that I (and Scheler before me) have already mentioned: unlike 
emotions, love is not occasional. We can speak of the occasion on 
which we were angry or afraid or grateful, but such talk of occasions 
doesn't seem to apply to love, Taylor suggests that "the beliefs and 
w a n t s  i n v o l v e d  a r e  too v a r i e d  to be ti e d  to one p a r t i c u l a r  
occasion."^^ She echoes Scheler when she says that love more than any 
other emotion "may be responsible for his [the lover] finding himself 
in almost any emotional state we can think of, covering the whole 
rangs from blisa to despair, or hope to jsalousy."^^ And shs 
concludes that "if there are no particular occasions for feeling love 
then of course we cannot ask whether a man is justified or not in 
feeling love on this or that occassion Scheler's conclusion on
the basis of the same observations was that love was not an emotion 
and I have argued that Scheler was right. Nonetheless I must grant 
that Taylor, whatever she claims love is, has correctly perceived that 
love endures and that questions about justification on a particular 
occasion are not applicable to love.
More interesting than her observations about loving not being 
occasional are Taylor's comments about the "nature of love". The 
nature of a man's love "consists of the form taken by the individual 
b e l i e f s  and v a r i o u s  wants, and their relation to each o t h e r ."24 
Taylor gives three parameters within which this nature varies.
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What 3ç sees as satisfying his want for company will of 
c o u r s e  v a r y  in d i f f e r e n t  c a s e s ,  as w i l l  what be 
understands by 'benefiting y ' , which may range from the 
simple and mundane to such a complex one as making x  sware 
of being valued as the person he is. Again, the wants in 
the two groups may vary very much in intensity, so x_'s 
wa n t  to h a v e  x  take an i n t e r e s t  in h i m  may be much 
s t r o n g e r  than his want to benefit x> or the other way 
about. He may also put a higher value on the satisfaction 
of one set of wants than on the other, irrespective of 
their intensity. The sorts of beliefs he holds here as 
well as the focus and intensity of his wants will indicate 
the ki n d  of love he feels, whether it is relatively 
disinterested or possessive, sentimental or p a s s i o n a t e . 25
Taylor is characterizing the lover's personality in terms of the focus
(altruistic or self-serving) of his wants, the relative intensity of
those wants, and the values be bolds independent of tbese w a n t s .
Clearly if tbe lover is a very selfisb person his focus will be on the
32lf-32rving -jants. Ho'javei he may find that in principle he values
benefiting others highly. This conflict in values and vants may be,
in turn, steeped with a ferocious passion or relative langor. Taylor
c l aims that if t h e s e  be l i e f s  concerning the nature of love are
irrational, then the lover's belief that the beloved has c e r t a i n
characteristics as well as his evaluation of these and his estimation
of his likelihood of satisfying his wants will likely be flawed.
T a y l o r ' s  c l a i m  h e r e  s e e m s  to a m o u n t  to t h e  c l a i m  t h a t
cbaracterological differences in lovers will produce differences in
their loves. Moreover, insofar as these characterological differences
can be evaluated as better or worse, the love will likely be more or
less reasonable.
Where z's view of what constitutes a benefit to x  so 
entirely coloured by considerations of his own interests, 
h i s  w a n t s  c o n c e r n i n g  x  w i l l  b e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  
'unbalanced'in that he is more concerned with taking than
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g i v i n g ,  and the demands he makes on x  vill tend to be
unreasonable .26
T a y l o r  later p o i n t s  out that the nature of a man's love is not 
necessarily related to his beliefs about the beloved. It is entirely 
possible that I have sorely mistaken beliefs about the beloved and yet 
have a generous attitude toward the beloved that results in benefiting 
the beloved. So, to the complexity of evaluating a love, we must add 
the dimension called the nature of love. This dimension often affects 
the lover's beliefs about the beloved, his evaluation of these and his 
projections of success at fulfilling the wants of love, but it need 
n o t . Taylor's claims seems to be that the lover's character colors 
his love and may make it defective but that this need not be so; a 
lover with characterological defects may surmount them and have a 
relatively unassailable love. I take it that Taylor -rould claim that, 
so long as there is a spark of altruism in a reaction to another and 
although self-serving interests far out-weigh the altruistic impulses, 
we may properly consider the reaction love. Taylor is of course right 
to point out that the character of the lover will effect the quality 
of the love. Love does not occur in a vacuum but is a very human 
activity. The qualities of the lover therefore will effect the love 
he bears. Furthermore, the qualities of the lover that, in general, 
give him insights and blind spots will carry over into his love and 
effect his beliefs about his love. To all of these claims we surely 
must assent, so long as we do not deify love but acknowledge it as a 
human activity.
But Taylor is not quite done characterizing love, the beliefs
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surrounding love, and the justifiability of those beliefs. To this
p o i n t  she has acknowledged that I, as lover, may have inaccurate
beliefs about the beloved and yet, because of the generous or noble
character of my love, my love may still be worthy of approbation. In
fact, loving and the ability to love seem commendable in themselves
regardless of the character of the lover or his love.
Love is thought of as somehow enriching to the lover as 
well as the person loved, and there seems something sad or 
ev e n  sinister about the man who never loves at a l l .2?
Taylor then describes five possible attitudes a man might possess that
m i g h t  d e t e r  h i m  from loving. And she claims that "Selfishness,
avarice, arrogance, sloth and cowardice are at any rate among the
major failings a man may possess if he lacks this or that belief or
want essential to the lover.”28 But having these failings does not
prevent a man from being a lover and neither does the lack of these
failings ensure that a man is a lover. There is nothing inconsistent
about a man being avaricious and loving. All that follows is that his
love may be defective because of his avarice. The same can be said of
any f a i l i n g ;  it does not prevent love, it may merely make love
defective. It is just as true that a man may be of good character and
yet not love. He may, like a Kantian man of duty, perform all manner
of good works and be judged commmendable without ever having loved.
Yet being of good character does seem to imply that a man would be a
"good" lover, one "whose beliefs are well-based and whose wants are
well-balanced."29
In light of these complexities Taylor comments on love and on
determinations of love as well-balanced, defective or unjustified.
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What we value about love is no doubt the s p o n t a n e o u s  
appreciation of another person, and maybe it can be said 
that even in its most defective form it involves a trust 
in another which is spontaneous in that it is not backed 
by any rights or conventions. From that point of view x's 
wants to be with %  etc., are as important as his wants to 
benefit etc. xi not because such wants indicate any kind 
of virtue in him, but because they express appreciation of 
the other person, for whatever r e a s o n . 3"
Given that love does contain an element of spontaneous appreciation of
another, we are unwilling to say that someone would have been better
off not loving at all. It is only in these last observations that
Taylor indicates what love is and why it might be valuable regardless
of other considerations. Having admitted that love is, at least in
part, a spontaneous appreciation of another, Taylor comments on her
initial project of comparing love to emotions and of finding grounds
for the justification of love.
...love is not so unlike paradigmatic emotions that the
question of justification does not arise: in the form of
q u e s t i o n s  of d e f i c i e n c y  and of propriety it does
In her concluding commments Taylor makes the claim, not that love can
be justified straightforwardly as can emotions, but that it can be
evaluated as deficient or not and as proper or not.
This seems a far cry from what I took to be her initial claim 
that love was very much like those emotions that took objects. In 
f a c t  T a y l o r ' s  a n a l y s i s  of love as an e m o t i o n  seems to h a v e 
disintegrated in the face of various observations she has made about 
love, observations that make love appear very different from emotions. 
First, Taylor points out that the relevant kind of emotions h a v e  
objects with both determinable and determinate qualities in light of 
which the emotion may be judged justified or not. Yet she cannot find
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any determinable quality for love. And since she cannot, she resorts 
to an a n a l y s i s  of wa n t s  in an a t t e m p t  to find the determinate 
qualities of the beloved. Her analysis of love in terms of wants is 
flawed because her analysis of wants is. But even if we grant her 
analysis of love in terms of wants and the beliefs concerning those 
wants, there is still her ad hoc qualification that the beloved must 
be treated as an end in himself. This altruistic stipulation is not 
developed from her analysis of emotions, wants, and beliefs but from 
observation about our general view that love contains an altruistic 
element. She describes love in terms of w a n t s  and the b e l i e f s  
concerning those wants and includes a stipulation about the beloved 
being treated as an end in herself. This description works to some 
extant, but it works because it is a restatement of our beliefs about 
love and not because of any virtues intrinsic to her theory of love.
In addition to admitting that love does not have an object with 
determinable qualities (as do emotions), she also observes that love, 
unlike emotions, is not occasional. Between these two observations 
Taylor should have concluded that love is a very uncharacteristic 
emotion, if it is an emotion at all. Further, to give an adequate 
account of love, she finds it necessary to speak about "the nature of 
love" and the character of the lover. These additional considerations 
of the character of the lover and his inclination toward a selfish or 
altruistic love or a moderation between these extremes, while giving 
some explanation of the lover's beliefs and expectations about love, 
f u r t h e r  b l u r  any r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  the love r ' s  b e l i e f s  and a 
justification of love. Finally, Taylor mentions that love may be
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laudable even when defective because it involves an appreciation of 
another person. In the end Taylor no longer talks about justifying 
love. She can only talk about the deficiencies and proprieties of a 
love and c l a i m  that these are related to the justifications of 
emotions.
It is interesting that Taylor is willing Co grant that virtually 
any love is "justified" in the sense that the lover, however corrupt 
and despicable, by loving has spontaneously appreciated the beloved. 
There is a clear implication that the particular qualities of the 
beloved are no longer at issue. Even if the beloved is a less than an 
admirable person, the love is worthwhile insofar as it spontaneously 
appreciates another person. Here is Taylor's limited distinction 
between the justification of love and the wisdom of a particular love. 
My analysis started with a search for a definition of love. Once that 
definition was in hand, 1 looked for the justification of love in the 
object of love. 1 assumed that particular loves might be doomed, 
defective, or tragic, but that any love had some intrinsic worth. It 
is that i n t r i n s i c  w o r t h i n e s s  of love that Taylor only belately 
a c k n o w l e d g e s  and w h i c h  forces her to r e j e c t  t a l k  a b o u t  the 
justification of love in the straightforward sense. Eer belated 
acknowledgement of the int r i n s i c  w o r t h i n e s s  of loving and her 
insistence on considering love an emotion when so much data tells 
against such an interpretation makes Taylor's analysis of love a very 
shaky one indeed.
However muc h  her analysis lacks cohesion, Taylor's account pays 
close attention to one aspect of love to which 1 have yet to give much
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consideration. She of course notes that a love is a love of a 
particular person. Because loves are of individuals, she concludes 
(wrongly, I would suggest) that the lover must p e r c e i v e  c e r t a i n  
qualities in the beloved that are the foundation of the lover's love. 
Backhandedly, and only at the end, Taylor seems to admit that love is 
justified because the lover spontaneously appreciates the beloved. 
But even in her admission she is concerned with the particulars of the 
lover and the beloved and how these particulars affect the quality of 
the love. In fact her paper would probably had been better titled 
"Beliefs, Wants, and Attitudes that Effect the Quality of Love." That 
loves c a n  be of b e t t e r  or w o r s e  q u a l i t y  is a fact too o f t e n  
overlooked. That loves can be defective, as Taylor puts it, bears on 
hov -je understand the love act in relation to loving acts.
Having been concerned among other things with the justification 
of any love, of love in general, I have, for the most part, ignored 
love as it occurs in particular instances. That has, perhaps, given 
an idealistic cast to my discussion that needs rectification. Clearly 
no love occurs in a vacuum. Humans are the lover and the beloved. 
However noble the insight of love, it is the insight of humans who 
o f t e n  do have grievous flaws. It is unreasonable to expect this 
perception valuation that is love (so inert as perceptions are) to 
r o u t i n e l y  and radically change the lover. In some circumstances 
surely love can be so striking, so forceful that the lover is all but 
compelled to change. More often the lover loves without stretching 
the confines of his character very much. The miser will still be a 
miser even though he loves. The jealous man will still be jealous.
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perhaps more so, when he loves. And so on. The miser might just give 
a little to the beloved on the side. He might deem the love worth a 
few pennies. But the jealous man will be, in all probability, more 
protective and will only grudgingly give up his jealousy, if at all, 
when he finds that holding the beloved too close makes her run away. 
The character of the lover does affect the quality of the love. His 
character affects his attitudes, beliefs, desires, and acts. And 
h o w e v e r  pure and pristine his love in itself, a man's love will 
evidence itself through the filter of his personality. He may believe 
in general that his wants should always be considered first and be 
satisfied when possible. As a consequence, when this man falls in 
love he vill tend to consider the beloved's wants as secondary to his 
own. And though he appreciates the beloved as being able to satisfy 
his wants, he will be unlikely to appreciate how important the 
beloved's wants are (at least to the beloved). It is likely that he 
will often assume that what he wants is what the beloved wants and, by 
so assuming, have some thoroughly mistaken beliefs about the beloved 
and the beloved's wants. Here we have the spontaneous appreciation of 
another, as Taylor calls the love act, and the consequent "loving" 
a c t s . The character of the lover may thoroughly color his love, so 
much so that we may judge it defective. But what is important to note 
is that the love act is not defective, only the acts that result from 
the love act— those acts that are, in part, determined by the belief 
system of the lover.
Taylor's ezamination does, then, point out the importance of the 
lover's character in determining the q u a l i t y  of his love. Her
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analysis fails, however, insofar as it draws on inadequate and often 
fa u l t y  theoretical underpinnings. Had she seen more clearly the 
distinction between the love act and the acts (logically) consequent 
on the love act, she c o u l d  have d i s t i n g u i s h e d  between what is 
justifiable in love and what makes it defective. The common belief is 
that loving is without qualification virtuous. This belief seems to 
point to the love act that perceives and values a n o t h e r  v a l u i n g  
center. Whatever else is the case, there seems to be no occasion 
under which this perceiving valuing is not justified. Hence the very 
love act is either self-justifying or in need of no justification. 
But the love act is not the acts consequent on love. These are very 
much dependent on the person vho loves and may involve faulty 
(unjustifiable) beliefs and uants. These faulty beliefs and uants may 
then give us good cause to judge a love defective. Since my theory is 
better able to make sense or the variables of love and do so without 
(I hope) serious conceptual misstep, since my theory can correct and 
clarify Taylor's, and even though her t h e o r y  m a k e s  some a s t u t e  
observations, I conclude that, on the whole, my theory is better able 
to provide a framework in which to talk about love.
What I have provided is a schematic of love. Every aspect of 
love has not been covered, only the most c e n t r a l  and i m p o r t a n t  
features. But with these features in hand, I can give a succinct and 
useful characterization of love. Love is a valuing perceiving act by 
a valuing center of a valuing center. This act of itself is inert. 
Only when the valuing center is considered as a complete person, who 
de s i r e s  and has the a b i l i t y  to act and change, can love alter
251
anything. The desires that occur as a result of the love act may be 
categorized into three types: 1) loving desires which are altruistic 
desires toward the beloved, 2) hedonistic desires which are a desire 
to enjoy the beloved, and 3) seductive desires which is the desire to 
be loved by the beloved. The mix of these desires and the acts that 
follow as a result of them are highly dependent on the character of 
the lover. The love act itself guarantees no balance between the 
various types; it is only the source of all t h r e e . Hence, on the 
whole, a good man will have a good love and a flawed man will have a 
defective love. Since the love act is justified whenever it occurs in 
response to a valuing center and since only persons (all of which are 
valuing canters) ars being considered as objects of love, love is 
aluays justified. This does not mean, however, that love is always 
perfect. Insofar as the lover's character is defective, then the love 
may be also. But however defective his acts consequent on his love, 
the lover's love is always justified. With this summary of love, I 
will let the reader take his leave and draw what morals he can.
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